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                                                   SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the nature of the problems that arise in the bid to identify and violently 
confront human-actors that are termed terrorist. Furthermore, the problems in question stem 
from the conception of terrorism solely as politically motivated violence. This precludes 
governmental actors of the state (internal and external) from supposed inimical actions that 
are termed terrorist. In other words, such conception denies the practice of state and state-
sponsored terrorism. The thesis then advocates for a re-conception of terrorism along two 
lines of terrorism against the state and that against humanity in order to help identify human-
actors that are liable to justifiable violent actions / reactions. 
 
The thesis comprises of six chapters and a short conclusion. Chapter 1 sets out the 
background of the study. It is concerned with the practical question of state-sponsored 
terrorism and the violent reactions of a group(s)—freedom fighters—based on perceived 
injustice. In particular, it explores the idea of the “War on Terror” which is designed by a 
government—the United States of America—to violently confront perceived terrorists vis-à-
vis the morality of political violence, namely the Just War Theory, and  the possible counter 
claims of a violent group(freedom fighters discourse). The major problem then becomes that 
of historical recrimination.  Chapter 2 follows on the heels of this background to ascertain if 
some of the existing conceptions of terrorism by political theorists can aid in the 
identification of terrorists’ vis-à-vis the freedom fighters. In other words, the chapter takes 
note of the often repeated aphorism “one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.” Two 
notable problems emerge, namely that of reductionism and alienation which hinders any valid 




imagination of the concept of terrorism—terrorism against the state and that against 
humanity. 
Chapter 3 is an attempt to clarify the ideas embodied in such re-imagination. It first of all 
attempts to identify and circumscribe the proper limits of politics and its corresponding act of 
governance. What this means is that terrorism against the state may be justified in order to 
realign the state’s power to the limits of politics. Chapter 4 takes up the idea of terrorism 
against the state in order to ascertain specific claims that may justify it. It also points out the 
danger of opportunism that comes about in an attempt at such justification. It concludes by 
pointing out condemnable violent actions that amount to terrorism against humanity, and here 
is located the idea of state and state-sponsored terrorism. A key element that emerges in this 
chapter is the idea of friendship (alliance) which can help forestall the descent of terrorism 
against the state into that against humanity. Chapter 5 takes up this key element to ascertain 
how it can play a role in the confrontation of terrorism against humanity in the face of a rule 
(states-sovereignty) that aims to overcome the fear of master-slave relationship in 
international affairs. The idea of human rights provides such justification. However, armed-
intervention in any form can provide an opportunity for the interplay of motives like the urge 
to dominate, exploit or destabilize nation-states. 
 
In anticipation to such interplay of motives, the United Nations, a body historically founded 
after the Second World War and on the basis of promoting international peace and stability 
has limited the issue of armed-intervention and its extent to the Security Council. This 
chapter, however, claims that the UN has failed to live up to expectations in this 
contemporary times especially pertaining to the conflicts that erupted in Afghanistan and Iraq 




Chapter 6 takes up another kind of violent action, namely torture to condemn its use or 
justification in any attempt to identify supposed terrorists or thwart supposed attacks that are 
deemed both imminent and of great magnitude. In particular, it argues against the views of 
Alan Dershowitz and Uwe Steinhoff who think that torture can be of political help in the fight 
against terrorism. Finally, the short conclusion, like a chilled bottle of water to an athlete, 








                                                      CHAPTER ONE 
 
                                                        INTRODUCTION 
 
                                           SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This introductory chapter articulates the theoretical background of the research. It 
points out the problem of historical recrimination implicit in the “War on Terror” 
declared by the erstwhile American President George W. Bush which has severe 
implications for the imputation of guilt and subsequent application of violence to a 
group of people. This stems from the international character of the declaration which 
sidetracks the government of a historically recognized nation-state or a particular 
geographical enclosure. The declaration, however, exhumes the unique problem 
facing any government with regard to the defence of his or her state in a post 
Westphalia conception of Just War Theory. In other words, the chapter identifies the 
problem in the attempt towards the moral evaluation of the violent act of a group or 
government in a post Westphalia conception of Just War Theory, especially with 
regard to the principle of just cause and legitimate authority. 
 
1.0 THE “WAR ON TERROR” AND THE QUESTION OF STATE-SPONSORED 
TERRORISM 
  
When the erstwhile president of the United States George W Bush declared a “War 
on Terror,” he generated a difficulty in the application of principles enunciated by 
Just War Theory and the contemporary international law that emerged from it.  
Under the banner of the “War on Terror” Afghanistan was invaded and the partial 
reason for the invasion of Iraq owes its justification to the “War on Terror” too. 
Apart from Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has carried out armed attacks in 
other states. For instance, in November 2002, the United States used a missile-laden 
2 
 
flying drone to kill six terrorist suspects in Yemen.
1
 The present President of the 
United States, Barack H. Obama, continued the same act of full or partial invasion of 
nation-states by justifying the drone attacks on Pakistan. What this means is that the 
“War on Terror” as conceived by these Presidents is not a metaphoric reference to 
war such as “war on poverty” or “war on illiteracy,” rather it has a military 
undertone, which also includes preemptive and preventative actions.
2
 In other words, 
the “War on Terror” has to be waged in violation of immunity requirement of 
international law for nation-states. As David Luban rightly puts it, “the enemy, the 
                                               
1 See: David Johnston and David E. Sanger, “Fatal strikes in Yemen was based on rules set out by 
Bush,” New York Times, Nov. 6, 2002, p.A16. 
 
2 In an address to the graduating class of West Point Military Academy in June 2002, President Bush 
said “if we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long…Deterence—the 
promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks 
with no nation or citizen to defend…we must be ready for a preemptive action when necessary to 
defend our liberty and to defend our lives.” He also said “we must take the battle to the enemy, 
disrupt his plans, and confront threats before they emerge.”  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.  A month, later, in a speech at 
fort Drum, New York, he reaffirmed this position saying, “America must act against these terrible 
threats before they’re fully formed.”  See: Remarks by President George W. Bush to Troops and 
Families of the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York (July 19, 2002), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020719.html. In the same vein President 
Barrack Obama in his electioneering campaign argued that he will order attacks on Pakistani territory 
if terrorists are hiding there. Following this statement, on January 23 2009, he ordered drone attacks 
inside Pakistan. See “President Obama ‘orders Pakistan drone attacks’” Timesonline January 23, 
2009. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5575883.ece. Since 




terror, is not a territorial-state or nation or government, but an amorphous group with 
the power to traumatize its victims.”3   
 
Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits “the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,” with only two 
exceptions.  The first is that the Security Council can authorize the use of force, and 
the second is that each state has a right of self-defense, as set out in Article 52: 
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. 
Traditionally—following the treaty of Westphalia—the right of self-defense has not 
been understood to mean the use of force against non-state actors within the territory 
of another state,
4
 and as Michael Byers pointed out, since 1945, most governments 
have worked hard not to invoke preemptive self-defense—even when the factual 
circumstances would support such a claim. For example, in 1967 Israel justified the 
strikes that initiated the Six-Day War on the basis that Egypt’s blocking of the Straits 
of Tiran was a prior act of aggression. The United States justified its 1962 blockade 
of Cuba as regional peacekeeping, on the basis of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, 
                                               
3 David Luban, “The War on Terrorism and the End of Human Rights,” Philosophy and Public Policy 
Quarterly, Vol.22, No.3 (Summer 2002,), p.13. 
 










Self-defense, on the other hand, precludes any war to inflict punishment. This means 
that the idea of the “War on Terror” in boundary crossing cannot be to punish a state 
for harbouring  a certain group of people. Punishment inflicted on a state by another 
is seen as a breach of the equality among states; while punishment inflicted on 
groups in a state by an external state can only be seen as a usurpation of duty. 
Writing in “The Doctrine of Right,” Immanuel Kant holds that “no war of 
independent states against each other can be a punitive war (bellum punitivum). For 
punishment occurs only in relation of a superior (imperantis) to those subject to him 
(subditum), and states do not stand in that relation to each other.”6 Here, Kant 
continued to toe the path of equality of nations which Emmer de Vattel espoused 
earlier when he said that “a dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small republic is 
no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom.”7  
 
From the foregoing, it can be deduced that any attempt to justify border crossing in 
the “War on Terror” will not proceed on the basis of “might is right,” for then it will 
be a straight-forward and barefaced contravention of international legal norms and 
laid down rules.  Rather, any justification of such border crossing must be based on 
the idea that there is a “wrong” received. This idea of “wrong” may not be farfetched 
                                               
5 Michael Byers, “Preemptive Self-defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal Change,” 
The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol.11, no. 2 (2003), p.180. 
 
6 Immanuel Kant,   The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
p.153. 
 
7  Emer de Vattel, Le droit des gens, trans. Charles Fenwick (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 




given what happened on September 11, 2001 in the United States and similar or 
likely happenings in other nation-states like the UK and Russia. And following the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been considerable concern about terrorism 
worldwide and how best to combat it. 
 
However, it must be noted that any purported justification for crossing state borders 
and territories in a violent way will also apply to non-state actors. This ought to be so 
since in crossing such borders, the international rule of state immunity is suspended 
and fairness will have to demand that such suspension be equalized irrespective of 
size or number of the group involved. In the words of John Rawls, justice as fairness 
“denies that the loss of freedom of some is made right by a greater good shared by 
others. It does not allow that sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the 
larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many.”8 
 
In effect, the “War on Terror” generates a paradox, which means that the so-called 
terrorists can justify their acts based on the same principles or arguments that are put 
up by states. This is so since “[states] use moral language just as they do. [Their] 
moral judgments are fallible just as theirs are. And [states] have a moral 
responsibility, just as they do, to take great care to ensure that the important 
decisions [they] make are not merely ones that [they] however sincerely, believe to 
be morally justifiable, but also ones that [they] can actually justify.”9 
 
                                               
8 See: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.3-4. 
 
9 Thomas Pogge, “Making War on Terrorists—Reflections on Harming the Innocent,” The Journal of 




Indeed, the legal requirement of state sovereignty and immunity is not absolute and 
therefore can be overridden. Some political philosophers, jurists and even members 
of the United Nations at one time or the other made it clear that territorial integrity is 
not sacrosanct. Michael Walzer, writing in Just and Unjust Wars, states that: 
 
…the ban on boundary crossing is not absolute—in part because of 
the arbitrary and accidental character of state boundaries, in part 
because of the ambiguous relation of the political community or 
communities within those boundaries to the government that 
defends them.
10
   
 
 The eminent jurist Lord Millet, during the House of Lords debate about the 
extradition of the former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet, stated that the doctrine of 
state immunity is the product of a classical theory, but in the modern times it no 
longer exists in its pure form and the way in which a state treats its own citizens 
within its own borders has now become a legitimate concern to the international 
community.
11
  Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the United Nations in a 
specific reference to Kosovo said: 
 
The (UN) charter protects the sovereignty of peoples. It was never 
meant as a license for governments to trample on human rights and 
human dignity. The fact that a conflict is internal does not give parties 
any right to disregard the most basic rules of human conduct…All our 
                                               
10 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Book, 1977), p.89. 
 




professions of regret, all our expressions of determination never again 
to permit another Bosnia or another Rwanda, all our claims to have 
learnt something from the recent past will be cruelly mocked if we 




 However, the above statements were made with specific reference to what is 
generally regarded as “humanitarian intervention.” But whatever the acronym 
intends to convey, one thing is certain, that moral arguments abound through which 
armed interference in the affairs of nation-states can be carried out. Humanitarian 
arguments for intervention may not have considered the very fact of cross-border 
terrorism but it is certainly not oblivious of the fact that cases where intervention 
ought to take place may be cases of terrorism either by the government on its 
citizens, or by one group on another. In effect, whether arguments for intervention 
have taken cognizance or foreseen the contemporary cross-border terrorism or not, 
one can say that the aim of such armed interference in nation-states can either be to 
stop or forestall certain human acts that may be deemed unjust or to engender certain 
desirable states of affairs.  
 
Michael Walzer, referring specifically to the American invasion of Afghanistan, 
says, “assuming that we correctly identified the terrorist network responsible for the 
September 11 attacks and that the Taliban government was in fact its patron and 
protector, the war in Afghanistan is certainly a just one.”13 However, he quickly adds 
                                               
12 See: Beach Hugh, “Secession, Intervention and Just War Theory: the Case of Kosovo,” Pugwash 
http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/beach.htm03/02/2000. 
 




that such a war must not be retributive but rather preventative in nature, that is, “to 
destroy the network and stop the preparation of future attacks.”14 
 
But what does Walzer mean by “patron and protector”?  One thing is certain; they do 
not mean aggression. If he actually means that the Taliban is the aggressor, then why 
can’t the war be retributive, that is aiming not just to destroy the terrorist networks 
but to bring the perpetrators to justice in international courts, as happened in the case 
of the Nazis. However, I think that by using the words “patron and protector” Walzer 
was hinting at something else, namely that of state-sponsored terrorism. In this case 
the Taliban government may be a sponsor of terrorists. Another issue that emanates 
from Walzer’s affirmation is that the wrong which a nation-state may receive and 
which in turn can provoke a violent reaction may not necessarily emanate from the 
political machinery of a recognized nation-state. The violent response from such a 
state or group of people ought to be evaluated through the lens of Just War Theory if 
such response ought to be justified morally.  
 
Therefore, I wish to locate the theoretical background of this work in what is 
generally referred to as Just War Theory; on the choices, intentions and 
commitments it guides and shapes, and on the dignity of a people who can respond 
either integrally and reasonably or deviantly and arbitrarily to its requirements, while 
at the same time bearing in mind the freedom fighter’s discourse, i.e. the claims of a 
group or groups who violently agitate for the full benefits and burdens of citizenship. 
I think that Just War Theory—given other available theories for this task (of the use 
of violence)—is a good practical theory.  





Just War Theory is an attempt to think morally about war. Paul Ramsey rightly states 
that the theory of justum bellum should perhaps be translated as “justified war” 
rather than the “just war.”15  It has to be noted then, that despite being a theory about 
war, it has a strong presumption against the use of force and war generally.
16
 This is 
to say that a world free of wars or use of force is the ideal.  On the other hand, being 
an exercise in practical reasoning, that is to say moving from reasons for action to 
choices (and actions)  guided by those reasons amidst other reasons and alternative 
choices, it  acknowledges that there may be situations that call for the use of force 
and violence in order to achieve justice and peace. As Walzer observes, the “just” in 
Just War Theory is a term of art, that is to say “it means justifiable, defensible, even 
morally necessary (given the alternatives).”17 
 
                                               
15 See: Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 
1961), p.15. 
 
16 See: National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace:God’s Promise and Our 
Response (Washington, D.C: United States Catholic Conference, 1983). Also, The Harvest of Justice 
Is Sown in Peace (Washington, D.C: United States Catholic Conference, 1993).  
 
It is pertinent here to point out what seems to be an error in the recent thinking of James Turner 
Johnson. He thinks that saying that just war idea begins with a presumption against war or the use of 
force makes it over into something very different from what it properly is. He says “in the 
presumption against war model, force itself is the moral problem, and peace is defined as the absence 
of the use of such force.” Cf., The War to Oust Saddam Hussein:Just War and the New Face of 
Conflict (Oxford:Rowman&Littlefield,2005), p.35-36. Turner Johnson’s error, on the one hand, lies in 
his thinking that force is the problem. The problem however is the imposition of the will that comes 
with the use of such force which is first of all a physical act. Following Clausewitz who after defining 
war as a duel on a large scale, says that “physical force is the means; to impose our will on the enemy 
is the object” cf., War, Politics and Power (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962), p.63. One can 
then say that the idea of just war is to justify such imposition that will alter or destabilize the peace of 
a prior political order. On the other hand, peace as defined by Augustine in De Civ. Dei xix,13 is 
nothing but a well ordered concord(tranquilitas ordinis) and Aquinas following him in Summa Q.29 
added nothing more than saying that peace is more than concord since concord can be established 
among men by fear of an impending evil. Peace for him then is concord and “the appetitive 
movements in one man being set at rest together.” 
 




 In all, the Just War Theory is primarily concerned with the why and how of wars (jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello). To this effect, it sets out principles that ought to guide 
decisions and actions—either going to war or not, and conduct in actual warfare. 
“Terrorism” and the resultant “war on terror” are generally not conceived as war in 
the traditional or conventional sense of the term. However since “terrorism” and 
“war on terror” make use of force and violence akin to that obtainable in war, it is 
not out of place to evaluate the morality of those acts in terms of principles set out by 
the Just War Theory. I will not be making reference to all just war principles since I 
have extensively dwelt on them in the past,
18
 rather, I will make reference to those 
principles which I think are more pertinent in any evaluation of “terrorism” or the 
resultant “war on terror.” I think that three principles are more germane, namely 
Legitimate Authority, Just Cause and Non-combatant Immunity. 
 
1.1 THE FREEDOM FIGHTER AND JUS AD BELLUM PRINCIPLES  
There is an often repeated assertion that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter.” Many people often dismiss this assertion as mere rhetoric. For 
instance, Walzer says, “I don’t accept the notion…”19 This assertion does not of 
necessity entail ethical relativism in matters of violence as many writers would 
have us believe.
20
 But as S.N Balagangadhara and Jakob De Roover, pointed out: 
                                               
18 See: Wilson Anosike, Just War Theory, MA Thesis (Singapore: National University of 
Singapore,2006). 
 
19 Walzer. Arguing About War, p.131. 
 
20 Walter Laqueur writing in  The Age of Terrorism  (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1987), p.7 
makes a distinction between the claim of the moralists  and the argument of the relativists with regard 
to terrorism.  He asks “but if the moralists are wrong, does it not follow that, as the relativists argue, 
‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’?”  This kind of rhetorical question goes a long 




If the terrorist was not a member of the ethical domain we all share, 
there would be no terrorism to speak of. The very possibility of 
terrorism depends upon the fact that the terrorists too make 
distinctions between good, bad, right, wrong, criminal, legal and so 
on in exactly the same way we do. That is to say much like most of 
us in the world, he too would find some actions (like murder, theft, 
rape, arson, looting, etc) immoral and criminal the way we do…he 
is and has to be similar to us. If he was not, terrorism would not be 
able to find recruits at all. If there is one thing we have learnt, it is 
this: the recruiting ground for terrorism is fertile, continually 
expanding and consists of ordinary people much like us….21 
 
   Rather than expressing an ethical relativist’s view point, the saying “one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” goes a long way to encapsulate the spirit 
of Article 1 (2) of the United Nations Charter which talks of the development of 
“friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace.”  On the other hand, as Nathanson points out, it can be a 
device for warding off moral criticism. One man’s terrorist is another’s freedom 
fighter, he says, “…assumes that people who are freedom fighters have such a 
valuable goal that they are justified in whatever violence they use to achieve it.”22 
 
                                               
21 S.N Balagangadhara and Jakob De Roover, “The Saint, the Criminal and the Terrorist: Towards a 
Hypothesis on Terrorism,” in The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol.18, No.1, 2010, p.6. 
 





From Nathason’s assertion, what follows is to check whether the principles of jus ad 
bellum can justify the use of violence by freedom fighters. In this regard, two 
principles of jus ad bellum stand out, namely that of legitimate authority and just 
cause. 
 
1.1.1 LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 
   Just War Theory holds that a legitimate authority ought to shoulder the declaration 
of war. It is right, as C.A.J Coady pointed out, that this requirement has to be 
understood in the light of a principle, ‘primarily aimed at ruling out what the 
medievals called “private war of which feuding and brigandage are good 
examples….’”23 However, the further question will be why is private war excluded? 
The plausible answer will be that Just War Theory, being a theory of practical 
reasoning and hence of morality, understands that morality can only be sought in a 
community.  Morality is always about the good of the community. Hence where a 
community or society and its good are in question, there arises the problem of how 
best to deal with decision-making. Unanimity should be the ideal situation, but there 
are all kinds of problems with unanimity, hence the need for authority. Social or 
political authority in this sense, as Finnis writes, “is a technique for doing without 
unanimity in making social choices—where unanimity would almost always be 
unattainable or temporary—in order to secure practical unanimity about how to 
coordinate our actions with each other, which, given authority, we do simply by 
conforming to the patterns authoritatively chosen.”24   
                                               
23 C.A.J Coady, Morality and Political Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
p.172. 
 
24 John Finnis, “Natural Law and Legal Reasoning,” Cleveland. State. Law. Review,38 (1990), p.6. 
See also: “The Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary Social Theory,”Notre Dame  




The decisions of any legitimate authority must then bear in mind the good of its 
people. Decisions cannot be taken contrary to the good of the community in 
question. Therefore the intrinsic part of legitimacy itself is the idea that the authority 
in question wields its power for the good of the people involved. Its decision would 
then be seen as just. The decision to take up arms should not be a trivial decision 
since it significantly affects the community in question. Put in the words of Levinas, 
“in war reality rends the words and images that dissimulate it, to obtrude in its nudity 
and in its harshness,”25 or best expressed in Weil’s Illiad, “war is that which turns 
anybody who is subjected to it into a thing. Exercised to the limit, it turns man into a 
thing in the most literal sense, it makes a corpse out of his body. Somebody was 
here, and the next minute there is nobody here at all.”26  
 
 Augustine, who is seen as the precursor of Just War Theory in the medieval times, 
says that, “the natural order conducive for peace among mortals demands that the 
power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the 
supreme authority.”27 Authority in Augustine, as in other medieval writers, is seen as 
the extension of God’s government of the world, such that the deputies of God ought 
to be concerned with the good of the people under them. This idea of the sovereign 
                                                                                                                                     
 
25 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (Boston:Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 1979),p.21. 
 
26 Simeone Weil, “The Iliad or the Poem of Force,” in Peter Mayer(ed.) The Pacifist 
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as the messenger and deputy of God, as James T. Johnson points out, is 
axiomatically expressed by an often-quoted biblical passage, Romans 13:3-4: 
 
 For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Would you 
have no fear of him who is in authority? Then do what is good, and 
you will receive his approval, for he is God’s servant for your good. 
But if you do wrong, be afraid for he does not bear the sword in 





A crucial reason for the legitimate authority requirement is the attempt to remove 
punishment from the hands of private individuals. Indeed there is a similarity 
between war and punishment. Both involve coercion that is unilaterally imposed, 
that is to say, those that are in the receiving end of the coercive acts do not will such 
acts. If punishment is left in the hands of private individuals, vengeance and 
vindictiveness will quickly take over such society and it will degenerate into the 
Hobbesian state of nature where there is an all out war of all against all and the result 
will be life being “nasty, brutish and short.”  Therefore to consolidate authority and 
always give justice a communal foundation, war and punishment must always be put 
away from the hands of private individuals. Thus Aquinas writes: 
 
…it is not the business of the private individual to declare war, 
because he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his 
superior. Moreover, it is not the business of a private individual to 
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summon together the people, something which has to be done in 
wars. But since the care of the common weal is committed to those 
who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common 
weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it 
is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that 
common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-
doers, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom.xiii.4): He 
beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God’s minister, an avenger 
to execute wrath upon him that doth; so too, it is their business to 
have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal 
against external enemies.
29
   
 
In all, war waged without public authority is not permissible. The legitimate 
authority criterion in effect makes a distinction between the rights of the individual 
as a member of a polity and the rights of the individual subsumed under the 
sovereign, who is also a citizen(s).  This is to say that the individual as a member of 
a polity has some duties or decisions which he or she cannot make alone. Rather, he 
has to make them in consonance with other citizens, and the sovereign is seen as the 
custodian of such decision-making power. 
 
 Ramsey points out that apart from the issue of impartial judgment by a prince, like a 
judge on a bench, a likely reason why Augustine required the declaration of war to 
be done by the highest official authority was because the existing political authority 
has the responsibility, “for that combination of wills or agreement as to goods 
                                               




necessary to the earthly life of a multitude.” Therefore, “the king, more than any 
individual or party, could be expected to be the voice of this alignment of wills, and 
he is therefore charged with the responsibility of preserving it.”30 
 
 The hypothetical social contract theory of modern philosophy aptly captures this 
distinction. The sovereign—the custodian of the general will—is seen as the 
protector of the rights of those who entered into the social contract, namely the 
citizens. However, it is worthy to note, as Joseph Boyle also observes, that there is 
presumably nothing in this analysis that requires the sovereign to be a single 
individual and not a constitutionally empowered group operating according to some 
fixed decision-procedure, as can be seen in a parliament or congress. And there is 





  If the legitimate authority requirement is understood in this way, then a large group 
of individuals or sub-state entities who use violence for a cause will be able to claim 
legitimate authority in the sense that they are not using violence as an expression of 
private irredentism. This move can be made in two ways, (a) by commanding a large 
followership whose well-being is in question, and (b) by discrediting the existing 
authority that is supposed to bear on the well-being of such groups. This means that 
this requirement immediately rules out lone actors whatever their cause may be since 
he or she can always resort to the law to settle any grievances or wrong he or she is 
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However, owing to the development of international law dating from the Westphalia 
treaty, the requirement of legitimate authority became a formalistic requirement 
where the ruler of a particular territory is now regarded as the sovereign authority of 
the people inhabiting such territory, and the onus of the legitimate authority 
requirement is passed over to him. This contributed to the laconic treatment given to 
the requirement in the writings of contemporary just war theorists, while much 
concentration is accorded the just cause requirement, which is not the same in the 
writings of medieval (Christian) philosophers. 
 
1.1.2 JUST CAUSE 
As I mentioned earlier, the primary purpose of authority is to bring an end to the 
potential disputes of the ways in which an action—presumably a good action—is to 
be carried out. This technical or procedural function does not settle the substantial 
function of the goodness of the action. This means that a good theory of practical 
reasoning must understand that an authority, while ideally having the good of the 
people at heart, may not always decide what is good for them. Viewing this in the 
light of the social contract theory, the issue is the fallibility or infallibility of the 
General Will. Rousseau, writing in The Social Contract, says that, “the general will 
is always right and tends to the public advantage; but it does not follow that the 
deliberations of the people are always equally correct. Our will is always for our own 
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good, but we do not always see what that is; the people is never corrupted, but it is 
often deceived, and on such occasions only does it seem to will what is bad.”33 
 
To forestall this fallibility of the sovereign in questions relating to wars, the medieval 
and the enlightenment era writers on Just War Theory raised the issue of just cause. 
Augustine and his contemporaries knew that certain selfish desires of the sovereign 
as a person or group, which may or may not promote the good of the people in 
question, can always be used as a pretext for wars. Thus Augustine asks the question, 
what is evil in war? And in answering it, he says that “it is not the deaths of some 
who will soon die anyway. The desire for harming, the cruelty of avenging, an 
unruly and implacable animosity, the rage for rebellion, the lust for domination and 
the like—these are the things to be blamed in war.”34 And many years after 
Augustine, Hugo Grotius affirmed his observation that throughout the Christian 
world, there was a rush to arms in trivial matters, as he puts it, “for slight causes or 
no cause at all…”35  
 
For the medievals then, there was a need to set the conditions that will clearly 
portray the fact that the authority in question will not be waging a war for selfish 
reasons. Augustine clearly states that “a just war is wont to be described as one that 
avenges wrongs, when a nation or a state has to be punished, for refusing to make 
amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized 
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unjustly.”36 Thomas Aquinas reiterated Augustine’s position in his own writings, 
while Francisco De Vitoria can be seen as summarizing the idea of a just cause in 
what he termed “a wrong received.”37 However, during the development of 
international law, following the Westphalia system as I pointed out earlier, the 
punitive idea that is contained in the just cause criterion has been deemphasized 
since states are seen as been equal. No state is allowed to punish another.  The idea 
of a just cause is now seen from the legalist point of view of “aggression.” It then 
follows that “nothing but aggression can justify war.”38  Aggression, which is seen as 
a criminal act, constitutes “any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state 
against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another...”39 Aggression 
ought to be resisted, since the state in question need to defend itself and the rights of 
its citizens from the aggressor which will in turn deter future aggressions from such a 
state and others.  
 
In the legalist paradigm, just war is seen as a defensive act on the part of the state 
which is the recipient of aggression. Religious scholars—especially in the Catholic 
circles—have moved quickly in the direction of international law by seeing war from 
the defensive perspective. The decisive document marking this shift is the Second 
Vatican Council’s (1962-65) Constitution on the Church and the Modern World 
(Gaudium et Spes) in which the bishops called for “an evaluation of war with a 
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totally new attitude,” and part of that new attitude involves the limitation of the just 
cause criterion: 
 
As long as the danger of war remains and there is no competent and 
sufficiently powerful authority at the international level, 
governments cannot be denied the right to legitimate defense once 
every means of peaceful settlement has been exhausted. Therefore, 
government authorities and others who share public responsibility 
have the duty to protect the welfare of people entrusted to their care 
and to conduct such matters soberly. 
But it is one thing to undertake military action for the just defense 
of the people, and something else again to seek the subjugation of 
other nations (paragraph 79).  
 
The defensive idea of a just war does not mean that states who are defending their 
territory against aggression cannot engage in offensive actions. Defensive here is not 
opposed to offensive since the defensive war will necessarily involve offensive 
actions. It only means that any state whose war is just must have received a wrong or 
have been a victim of aggression.  
 
However, it is worthy to add that within this parameter of defense, nothing in the 
idea of a just cause bars the defensive state from engaging in preemptive and 
preventative actions. Here preemption will not refer to a war waged in response to a 
perceived imminent attack (first strike) in order not to be the losing side when the 
war eventually happens. Rather, it refers to actions that will forestall future 
aggression.  Preemption in this sense is strategic in character. Preventative action on 
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its own will be the attempt to “defang” the aggressive state of the capacity to carry 
out future aggression. As Vitoria puts it, “were no vengeance taken on enemies who 
have done or tried to do a wrong, they would be emboldened to make a second 
attack.”40 However, the extent of such deterring act will determine if the action has 
the intention of subjugation or merely deterring future aggressive acts. In this sense 
then and also given the background of September 11, the idea of preemptive and 
preventative actions do not correspond to its usage by Walzer when he talks of 
preemption as that of perceiving an “imminent attack” or preventative war as one 
“designed to respond to a more distant threat” which has the background of historical 





Theoretically speaking, it must be noted that, the idea of pre-emptive war and 
preventative war are both strategic with reference to the contest of arms, especially 
with the stealth nature of modern weaponry. The future balance of power which 
Walzer’s preventative war refers to has no theoretical difference with the idea of 
imminence which pre-emption refers to. The future is always imminent. The future 
can be tomorrow, next week or four hundred years ahead. We cannot theoretically 
predict when the future with its balance of power will arise. The only proof that there 
is a shift in the balance of power is in the real contest. In reality, there may be a 
complete shift of power without the actual perception of it. Historically, the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbour and Hitler’s war rant was premised on the supposed 
incapacitation of America’s military might when compared to theirs’. 
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In theory then, it becomes mere anachronism to insist on a strict dichotomy between 
the ideas of preventative war and pre-emptive wars which is just a return to the era of 
Homer or Hesiod and the implicit manipulations through the desert storm on the one 
hand, or that of Spartacus and Greek mythologies, on another, when wars were 
fought on horse backs. 
 
From the foregoing, and given the fact that morality does not rule out boundary 
crossing, it can be said that nothing in the just cause criterion bars states or non-state 
actors from engaging in preemptive attacks if they are likely to be recipients of 
recurring aggression. The idea of preemptive or preventative strikes that are part of 
the “War on Terror” cannot then be condemned solely on the basis that the 
immediate aggression has been repelled. The argument for their justice or injustice 
will stand or fall with the argument of the said aggression. In other words, freedom 
fighters can have valid claim to a just cause for their violent reaction. 
 
1.2 THE ROMANCE OF THE NATION STATE AND HISTORICAL-
RECRIMINATION 
 History attests to the fact that many of the actors who were initially branded terrorist 
went on to become celebrated national heroes and even heads of states. In 1987, for 
instance, the then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said of the African 
National Congress (ANC), whose leader, Nelson Mandela, was in jail, “Anyone who 
thinks it is going to run the government of South Africa is living in Cloud Cuckoo 
land,” and in 1988 a Pentagon report called the African National Congress one of the 
“more notorious terrorist groups,” and not until 2009 did the United States of 
America delisted Nelson Mandela in its list of terrorists who are to be watched.  But 
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ten years after Thatcher’s remark, Queen Elizabeth II greeted President Nelson 




This contingent fact about terrorism and groups that are called terrorists, if accepted 
as the only way in which terrorism can be discussed, will leave the determination of 
a terrorist to history. History will then decide who is a terrorist and who is not. This 
kind of argument I believe is what Yasser Arafat was making when he said: 
 
I, as chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, hereby 
once more declare that I condemn terrorism in all its forms, and at 
the same time salute those before me in this hall who, in the days 
when they fought to free their countries from the yoke of 
colonialism, were accused of terrorism by their oppressors, and 
who today are the faithful leaders of their people, stalwarts 




It can be said to be unfortunate for Arafat since history has not vindicated him and he 
is not alive to witness whether  or when he will receive such vindication or not. 
However, I think that this is not the only way to talk about terrorism since history is 
often times written by the powerful. The truth in the historical argument, as I see it, 
is that in many cases, external powers either collude with internal forces or 
unilaterally hold a people under chains or ensure their complete subjugation, and 
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attempts to pry such powers away cannot be said to be wrong.  Indeed around the 
second half of the 18
th
 century there were about 35 empires, kingdoms, countries and 
states in the world. The figure roughly doubled to 70 by the 1930s, and almost 
doubled again to 130 by the 1960s, and today over 193 entities are generally 
recognized as sovereign states, and the one time Secretary General of the United 
Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali, once predicted that by this century the number 




It is of course not new to say that the multiplication of the states mostly came 
through the instrumentality of organized violence. Monarchies and feudal lords used 
to rule over Europe. Their dethronements, even those claiming divine rights, were 
wrought by violence which led to the expansion of liberties for the people. For us in 
the African continent, decolonization and sovereignty were not given on platters of 
gold. The Europeans, especially the British and French who once bestride Africa, left 
after a brutal armed struggle against them.  The struggle for freedom generated a 
wave of nationalism which mostly became an ideology—both from theorists and 
citizens—where the nation or nation-state is seen as a fetish and thus an object of 
romance. This romance is not bereft of wrong doings. 
 
Complaining about the romance of the nation state to the detriment of the people 
whose human rights are violated, David Luban writes that “nationalism may have 
originated as an ideology of liberation and tolerance; in our century it is drenched in 
blood. What Mazzini began, II Duce ended…”45 In a specific reference to Michael 
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Walzer’s argument in “The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics,”46 
Luban says that the picture most theorists of nationalism paint about the nation-state 
is a myth. The picture he says “glosses over intramural class conflict, turmoil, 
violence, and repression; these it represents as the reflection of inscrutable processes 
akin to national destiny.”47  
 
I think that Luban is right that nationalism often masks a lot of wrongs. However, if 
we should not gloss over these wrongs, we should also not gloss over the fact that 
the laying of the foundation of some of the wrongs or the actual execution of them 
were done by powers external to the said nation-states. In Africa for example, and 
especially during the cold war era, outside powers aided the most repressive regimes 
with arms and aids for no other reason  than their rival super-power was supporting 
another faction. The Americans supported Savimbi in Angola, Mobutu in Zaire and 
Doe in Liberia. The Soviet Union supported Neto in Angola and Mengitsu in 
Ethiopia. It is an obvious fact that the regime of these dictators saw the most brutal 
killings in Africa. We also know the role which Belgium and France played in the 
events leading to the Rwandan massacres. Beyond Africa, the same scenario played 
itself out.  In Cuba, for instance, the United States of America backed the Batista-led 
government, while on the other side of the Atlantic the Soviet Union was notoriously 
interfering in the countries of Eastern Europe, prominent among them being 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. 
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Given the brutalities of some these governments I have mentioned, one really 
understands why Luban is piqued by Walzer’s controversial thesis which holds that 
states which oppress their people, may nevertheless, be considered legitimate in 
international society, as long as they do not fall under what he calls the “rules of 
disregard,” that is, they do not expel, massacre or enslave a large numbers of people. 
Apart from such states of affairs, he says that we are obliged to act as if states are 
legitimate. This is what he calls, “the politics of as if.”48  The very question that 
emerges from Walzer’s thesis is, who are the “we”? External members may or may 
not subscribe to Walzer’s position, but in my opinion, it is hideous to ask the citizens 
of such states to acquiesce to Walzer politics-of-as-if, which in another sense means 
to engage in an act of self-mutilation.  Given the fact that most citizens are bound to 
see such governments as illegitimate, it is doubtful that they would accept Joseph 
Boyle’s view that “…that the proper authority of the sovereign in undertaking war, 
which Aquinas took to be a necessary condition for a permissible war now belongs 
to the leaders of a polity, not to leaders of transnational organizations.”49 
 
In essence, if the freedom fighter’s discourse is to be seen as possessing any meaning 
beyond historical-recrimination, then such discourse must possess moral cause(s) 
that transcend specific historical spaces. In this view then, two moral causes insert 
themselves into the freedom fighter’s discourse. (1) The right that a nation must not 
be hindered in her attempt to make an input in matters concerning her wellbeing.  
This right can be generally referred as that of self-determination. It then means that a 
nation must be able to play a part in forming its government and to determine how 
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such a government will relate to other nations or governments. (2) The right that a 
people should equally benefit from their government irrespective of race, colour, 
gender, language, religion and other beliefs.  
 
Thus the discourse of the freedom fighter is not far from the expression of Article 21 
of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights which says: 
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly 
or through freely chosen representatives. 
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government; 
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be 
by universal suffrage and shall be held by secret or by equivalent free voting 
procedures.  
 
1.2.1 DEMOCRACY AS THE NEW FETISH 
 Following the era of decolonization and liberation, the advent of the 20 and 21
st
 
centuries saw the idea of democracy being embraced by most nations and the once 
authoritarian and feudal societies thrown open by the power of periodic elections and 
people-empowered representatives. However, this good manifestation of equality in 
different societies has given rise to what I see as the fetishism of democracy. Many 
theories and heads of states, while mouthing sanctimonious platitudes that 
“democracy is the government of the people by the people and for the people,” have 
failed to understand the morality behind such platitudes. Virginia Held captures the 
misconstruing of such morality when she writes that “while it is true that George W. 
Bush’s crusade to impose democracy on Iraq through invasion and occupation has 
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been a disaster, it has followed from a misuse of morality even minimally understood 
and does not constitute evidence that morality in international affairs is out of 
place.”50  
 
It is not only heads of states like George W. Bush who are susceptible to the 
subversion of democracy by the zeal of seeing it being instituted in many states. 
While writing on the need for other states to invest in the reconstruction of Iraq after 
its invasion by the US, Michael Walzer said “whatever the prehistory of its 
achievement, a stable and democratic Iraq, even a relatively stable and more or less 
democratic Iraq, would be a good thing for the Middle East generally, for Europe 
and Japan, and (if it was involved in the achievement) for the United Nations.”51  
This statement raises a very crucial question in nation-building or stabilization of 
states. The very question is, “for whom does the nation-state exist?” Any answer to 
this question that overlooks the citizens of the state in question will be morally 
unjustified.  
 
The existence of any nation-state, though, cannot overlook the good interests of 
others, interests like good neighbourliness, hospitality and mutual co-existence, but 
the primary concern of such a state will have to be the interests of its own members. 
In the case of Iraq and Walzer’s expression, I can only say that the stable and 
democratic Iraq may or may not promote the interests of those states he mentioned. 
The future, as we know, remains a constant on the minds of all but limited minds. 
However, the future depends on the viability of the present and that present has to do 
with the rights of the living Iraqi people. 
                                               
50 Virginia Held, How Terrorism is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence, p.30. 
 




The goodness of democracy lies in the promotion of freedom and equality which are 
preconditions for different and varying activities and it is always a good thing, as 
Humboldt notes, “to see a people breaking their fetters, in the full consciousness of 
their rights as men and citizens.” It is equally more fine and uplifting “to see a prince 
himself loosing the bonds and granting freedom to his people—not as an act of 
grace, but as the fulfillment of his first and most indispensable duty…”52 However, I 
will quickly add that this duty should also bear in mind that the understanding and 
consent of the people for whom the freedom is meant is crucial. 
 
 Kant observes that “even if the sovereign decided to transform itself into a 
democracy, it could still do the people a wrong, since the people could abhor such a 
constitution and find one of the other forms [of government] more to its 
advantage.”53  Kant’s observation is not farfetched in our contemporary era. In 2002, 
the long-serving monarch of the Himalayan nation of Bhutan decided to unilaterally 
transform itself into a democracy. However, the majority of the people were not 





Nations or states are nothing but a group of people and such people are not devoid of 
history. Any attempt to democratize nations must be done in a way that the people 
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themselves become the champions of such act. If that is not the case, as in Iraq, the 
people may come to loathe the whole process and can violently resist it. In other 
words, democracy cannot be turned into a fetish that should be imposed by external 
agents. Rather than imposition, external agents can engage in insinuation and 
enlightenment. There cannot be an enforcement of democracy since it will be a 
contradiction in terms.  
 
History is filled with cases where specious reasons are used to justify the use of force 
on a people, and such specious reasons are easily conjured up: that it is to the 
world’s advantage, partly because such crude peoples will become civilized,55 and 
partly because such a people’s country will be rid of corrupt leaders, and they and 
their descendants will be better off in the near future. But all these putative good 
intentions cannot erase the stain of injustice—here and now—and the means used for 
it. The absurdity of such alibis and self-righteousness of power only provide external 
governments with rationalizations that lend a veneer of sympathy to acts of injustice 
against other nations.  
 
From the foregoing then, the freedom fighters’ discourse can be summed up by 
saying that when a people has been denied and continued to be denied every 
opportunity for self-determination and/or when the benefits that is supposed to flow 
from the government unequally to its citizens are skewed for a long period of time to 
favour a certain group of people, it becomes an injustice; such injustice becomes 
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obscene when power is placed in its service against any reaction or contrary demand 
for the status quo.  The defiance of power implies that a language must be called into 
being which does its best to appropriate its obscenity and fling its excesses back in 
its face. Violence will always present itself as a ready and veritable language; of 
course such language may become psychedelic. But in the final analysis what 
matters is not the exhilaration but the conscious confrontation of agents of 
repression. As Finnis notes: 
…the pursuit of understood good need not be either in competition 
with or in isolation from feelings and experiences. Typically, 
success in the attainment of any goal is itself an experience, indeed 
an experience which is pleasurable and satisfying. What matters to 
us in the last analysis, is not the emotional experience of getting 
knowledge, but coming to know; not the emotions of friendship, 
but being a friend; not the exhilaration of freedom, activity, self-
direction, authenticity etc., but consciously being free….56 
 
Perhaps, this may be the reason why, in his condemnation of the actions of the 
Algerian militia as terrorist, Walzer misconstrues the catharsis, exhilaration or an 
out-pouring of emotions implicit in Sartre’s argument favouring liberation 
movements in the preface of Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth.57 However, 
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criticism of such language is simply squeamish or pietistic; perhaps that of   
Christianity which expects people to turn their other cheeks, and not stick out their 
tongues; offer handshakes of reconciliation, and not stick up their fingers in an 
obscene defiant gesture.  
 
Such criticism, for it to be relevant, must begin by assailing the seething  compost of 
injustice from which such language took its being, then its conclusions may be 
worthy of notice. This is so since it is only injustice that links force to the moral 
order. Failure to do so, it will only succeed, yet again, in collaborating  with power—
                                                                                                                                     
else beside the man-who-kills can be liberated, perhaps through a vicarious experience which sounds 
absurd. 
 
The second question has to do with the term “European” In this regard Walzer asks “Will any 
European do?” And he concludes that unless Sartre thinks that all Europeans, including children are 
oppressors, he cannot believe that.  The fact to be noted here is that Walzer lends credence to his false 
and constructed questions by severing the head and tail of Sartre’s argument from its body. Though 
attesting to the fact of Sartre’s Hegelian style by saying “in his usual fashion, with a certain zest for 
Hegelian melodrama…,” he yanks off a huge and informative part of the quotation—both the 
preceding statements and the ending of the quotation—that generated his questions. In fact the 
preceding sentences of the quotation Walzer was referring says “When the peasant takes a gun in his 
hands, the old myths grow dim and the prohibitions are one by one forgotten. The rebel’s weapon is 
the proof of his humanity. For in the first days of the revolt, you must kill:…” then the completion of 
the statement in question reads “…; the survivor, for the first time, feels a national soil under his 
foot.” No sincere reader will by any stretch of the imagination indulge in the sheer literal mutilation 
Walzer did to Sartre’s statement while still paying lip-service to the hyperbolic style of the dramatist. 
 
Sartre was of course addressing his European counterparts on the evil deeds of colonialism and their 
acts of hypocrisy regarding it.  The beginning words of the preface clearly say “not very long ago, the 
earth numbered two thousand million inhabitants: five hundred million men, and one thousand five 
hundred million natives. The former had the word; the others had the use of it…..In the colonies the 
truth stood naked, but the citizens of the mother-country preferred it with clothes on…”  He knew 
quite well that not all Europeans were settlers or oppressing the natives not to imply that the killing of 
any European including himself will suffice for the liberation of Algerians. In fact, six pages after the 
quotation above (p.13 of The Wretched of the Earth) he states “our soldiers overseas, rejecting the 
universalism of the mother country, apply the {numerous clauses} to the human race: since none may 
enslave, rob or kill his fellow-man without committing a crime, they lay down the principle that the 
native is not one of our fellow-men. Our striking-power has been given the mission of changing this 
abstract certainty into reality: the order is given to reduce the inhabitants of the annexed country to the 
level of superior monkeys in order to justify the settler’s treatment to them as beasts of burden.” And 
just a page before the above statements he clearly says “But, you will say, we live in the mother 
country, and we disapprove of her excesses. It is true, you are not settlers, but you are no better….”  
From the above excerpts, it becomes clear that Sartre was no where making allusion to either 
mathematical ratios or to an ideological use of the term European, which will inevitably make him 





that is, taking power and its excesses as the natural condition, in relation to which 
even violence must be accountable. Of course, such language of violence may or 
may not succeed in dismantling the structure of power and ought not to pretend to 
doing so. It does, however, contribute to the psychological reconstitution of public 
attitudes to forms of oppression and above that serves as a strategy of reduction to 
the status and stature of the power-besotted class or individuals in public 
consciousness, exposing and de-mystifying their machinery of oppression. What this 
means is that mental liberation must precede any act of physical liberation by the 
dethronement of the authority to which power serves; thereby unmasking the 
superstition of power which enervates the peoples’ will, obscures their self-
apprehension and authenticity and facilitates their surrender to any system of 
oppression ranged against them. 
 
1.3CONCLUSION 
This introductory chapter exhumes the problem of historical recrimination that often 
underlies any attempt to impute guilt on a group of people or the government of any 
nation-state. This problem is often couched in the aphorism one man’s terrorist is 
another’s freedom fighter. However, the aphorism, on the one hand, points to the 
direction of state and state-sponsored terrorism and, on the other, may serve as a 
vehicle for the descent into political and moral relativism in matters of group-
violence.  
  
Given this background of state and state-sponsored terrorism, on the one hand, and 
the freedom fighters discourse, on the other, there appears the palpable problem of 
the identification of the terrorist. This then compounds the problem of any definition 
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of terrorism. The problem is not that a definition cannot be proposed, rather that of 
creating a logical class without members. I think that this is the problem with most 
definitions of terrorism, i.e, their inability to serve the functions of a definition, 
namely the identification of the elements or characteristics of the objects being 
























2.0 TERRORISM: REDUCTIONISM AND ALIENATION 
                               SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This chapter engages some definitions of terrorism by political theorists in order to 
ascertain if there are elements or characteristics which they possess that can help in 
the identification of human actors called terrorists. In the review, two major 
problems are encountered. The first is the reduction of acts deemed terrorist to 
political acts, i.e. rational acts of common good backed by force. This hinders the 
identification of government actors as terrorists and above all any attempt to portray 
terrorist acts as irrational. The second is the reference to a class of people called 
“innocents” or “non-combatants” which is a carryover of the concept of jus in bello 
found in Just War Theory that can only be historically determined due to the 
adverbial nature of the concept. 
 
2.1 DEFINITION: BETWEEN THE TERRORIST AND THE FREEDOM 
FIGHTER 
  Many theorists have tried to define terrorism.  I start with Walzer, who sees it as 
“the deliberate killing of innocent people, at random in order to spread fear through a 
whole population and force the hand of its political leaders.”58 Walter Laqueur, 
writing in The Age of Terrorism, says that it is “the use of covert violence by a group 
for political ends, is usually directed against a government, but it is also used against 
other ethnic groups, classes or parties.”59 However, it is pertinent to note that 
Laqueur insists that any definition of political terrorism which ventures beyond 
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noting the systematic use of murder, injury and destruction, or the threat of such acts 
aimed at achieving political ends is bound to lead to endless controversies. 
 
 C.A J Coady, putting forward what he sees as a tactical definition, says that a 
terrorist act is “a political act, ordinarily committed by an organized group, which 
involves the intentional killing or other severe harming of non-combatants or the 
threat of the same or intentional severe damage to the property of non-combatants or 
the threat of the same.”60  It is germane to emphasize the insertion of the term “non-
combatants” by Coady in his definition since the term concerns us here. The term 
was inserted as a way of distinguishing the concept of war with that of terrorism. 
Earlier, in response to Brian Jenkins, who defines Terrorism as “the use or 
threatened use of force designed to bring about political change,” C.A.J Coady says 
“we might note that Jenkins’ definition has the consequence that all forms of war are 
terrorist. Whatever verdict we give on war, it is surely just confusing to equate all 
forms of it...with terrorism.”  61   
 
From the above definitions, the conception of terrorism seems to have been reduced 
to that of the political, i.e. a deliberate and rational use of violence and force for the 
good of a polity. Terrorism becomes a purposeful act, it becomes logical and 
rational. The image of the terrorist as that of the amoral, the fanatic or the 
psychopath who destroys and murders people at random recedes or disappears 
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altogether.  The political space now accounts for all acts that are termed terrorist. 
What this means then is that all  group-violence that are justified based on religion, 
culture etc  are discounted as terrorist or reduced to that of politics. All non-political 
spaces have now been alienated from any responsibility pertaining to violence.  In 
practice then, what we now have is the totalitarianism of the political, other human-
spaces are, of course irrelevant. Terrorism becomes an ideal act—however warped 
those ideals are. 
 
As Robert L.Phillips rightly points out, “the order of politics is not the order of 
Being.”62 Politics emerges as the rational attempt to regulate or order freedom, which 
is a fundamental characteristic of human beings, for the general good or harmony of 
a people in a specified geographical space, which can conveniently be referred to as 
the state.  This harmony can be achieved either through a habitual acceptance of 
some norms by individuals, by common consent or even out of mere prudence. What 
this means is that the dynamism of politics is always towards the better. It therefore 
follows that any political act at its barest minimum has to be a good act. As a 
political act then, the use of force can only be justified by the common good of a 
people of a particular geography.   
 
This inherent good of political acts contrast the political sphere from the sphere of 
slavery or better put, the colony of slaves. In the sphere of slavery or colony of 
slaves, there is the actual use of force but above that is the  continuous possibility of 
its use in the expression of the demands of authority, whether actual or presumed 
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(perhaps just an expression of a whim) and also for the good of the masters which 
generates a constant state of trepidation. 
 
What logically follows from this reduction of terrorism to the sphere of politics is 
that the concept of the “War on Terror” becomes superfluous. This is so given the 
fact that there is always a preference for the use of dialogue or diplomacy than 
recourse to violence in the resolution of political conflicts. But as David Luban 
points out, “here the chief problem is that the War on Terrorism is not a territorial 
state or nation or government. There is no opposite number to negotiate with. There 
is no one on the other side to call a truce or declare a cease fire, no one among the 
enemy authorized to surrender.”63 One may argue that the superfluity of the concept 
doesn’t stem from the fact that there are no opposite governments to negotiate with, 
but rather from the fact that it breaches the immunity of states and hence sidelines 
the government of such states. However, as I pointed out earlier, giving the 
background of Just War Theory, the UN and statements of eminent jurists, the 
immunity of states is not absolute. It can be breached given certain conditions. 
 
The issue here is that the definitions of terrorism by the theorists I mentioned achieve 
plausibility by setting up a contrivance for the motive of violence, i.e. limiting it to 
political motivations. Their fundamental error is evident. They forgot that violence—
what terrorism is all about—is the product of human freedom and that freedom is not 
always rational and hence not always at the service of politics. This entails that 
terrorism is not always rational. Therefore, any definition of terrorism, on the one 
hand, for it to be practically relevant must not suck out or neglect the idea of the 
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terrorist as a psychopath, a lunatic, a fanatic or an amoral person. As Walter Laqueur 
actually points out, “most contemporary terrorists are fanatics.”64   On the other 
hand, politics and by extension the state, cannot be seen as the natural condition or 
the mother to whom all other spheres of human expression—religion, arts, 
economics, etc—will be ingratiating themselves to. Rather, the state and political 
actors should value and respect the people since they are logically and 
chronologically prior to the state. Hence the relationship of the state to the people 
ought to be that of one whole to the other and not that of a whole to its part.  
 
 History points to the fact where trivialities or non-political spheres of human 
existence led to group-violence. It may be hard to recall that an actual war was 
fought because of football; the countries involved being Honduras and El Salvador. 
In 2006, group-violence was triggered by a comic from a Danish cartoonist after the 
Danish government insisted that such act is not political in nature and cannot be 
officially apologized for. These examples supply us with the quintessence of 
trivialities or non-political spheres of human expression as the quintessential begetter 
of group and organized violence, unless we will have to reduce or submerge such 
recreational spheres and their consequent activities such as football and cartoons into 
that of the political. If such becomes the case, all spheres of human expression are 
left at the mercy of politics and where there is a depredation of insane power, the 
actors and such spheres run the risk of death and mummification, i.e., paralysis of 
action before possibilities or possibilities unrelated, or not directly morally related, to 
what we can, may and must do as long as human history endures.  
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Given the practical problem of fanaticism, amorality or the psychopath, the 
definitions I stated earlier reveals another problem, namely that of imputation, since 
any attempt towards moralization must be able to identify defaulters whom guilt 
ought to be imputed. No group will accept the intentional targeting of non-
combatants or innocent people, even the notorious Al Qaeda. In an interview with 
Fred Pleitgen,  a CNN   journalist, a captured commander of Al-Qaeda,  Munaf Al-
Rawi, denied that they intentionally set out to harm innocent people or force any 
person to become a suicide bomber. He says that the death of innocent people is 
“unfortunate” and that suicide bombers volunteer on their own for such missions. 





Without any reference to material conditions, or without any group accepting the fact 
that it targets innocent people, the above definitions run the risk of being mere 
rhetoric; that is to say they will only serve as formulas for iteration without any 
practical relevance. However, I think that those who offered such definitions have no 
intention of setting them as nursery rhymes that are only good for rote and iterations 
but definitions that may be of use to policy makers or freedom fighters. 
 
By using what I call value-laden words—illegitimate, innocents, etc—these theorists 
or any reasonable individual will be committed to say that terrorism is anywhere and 
everywhere wrong, as can be seen in Coady’s affirmation that given his tactical 
definition and the just war requirement of non-combatant immunity, the answer to 
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the question whether terrorism is wrong is clearly “yes.”66 A major implication of the 
inbuilt conclusion of these definitions is the necessity of allegiance. When a 
government or a group of people appropriates such definitions, we are forced to 
make a choice and the phrase will always be “either you are with us or the terrorists” 
and, surely in matters of violence, a time comes when the inevitability of choice 
presents itself, since we are often reminded that silence is no insulation from attack; 
the boundaries of the geography of victims eventually extends to embrace those who 
think that they are innured by silence. 
 
Many other theorists reject these kinds of definitions, especially when they are 
appropriated by governments. The contention here is that governments will see 
terrorism as something only their opponents can commit, as something only those 
who seek to change policies, or to attack a given political system or status quo can 
engage in.
67
 In such case then the idea of state-terrorism disappears from the whole 
discourse of terrorism and “war on terror.” Another difficulty that stems from 
weaving in the idea of innocent people or non-combatants is that it is not clear—
given the tendency of groups to denial—who the innocent or non-combatants are as 
distinct from legitimate targets.  
 
Terrorism is not something that is only engaged in wartime when the attack on non-
combatants—which are normally seen as non-military persons—will be illegitimate, 
and outside wartime, it will be sheer humbug to identify combatants with the 
military. Like the idea of combatants, innocence is also a fleeting term during war. 
While a teenage soldier, in the strict sense of the word, is likely to be morally 
                                               
66C.A.J Coady, “Terrorism and Innocence,” p.58. 
 
67 See: Virginia Held, “Terrorism and War,” The Journal of Ethics, Vol 8, no.1, p.62.  
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innocent, he or she is a legitimate target because of his or her active defense—with  a 
weapon—of the status quo in contention, while  adults  who are not armed are not. 
The solution may lie in our prodding deeper into the meaning of the concept of non-
combatants, combatants or innocents if we are not to run the risk of descending into 
historical recrimination where a group of people will be pointing to the government 
as the real terrorist or the government in turn unjustly accusing a people or the 
citizens of the states of engaging in terrorist acts. 
 
2.1.1 COMBATANTS AND INNOCENTS: PROBING DEEPER 
2.1.1.1 NON-COMBATANT IMMUNITY 
Non-combatant immunity is the foundation of what is generally regarded as jus in 
bello, that is justice in the actual battle field. This principle arises from the need to 
avoid wars lapsing into wars of ideologies—that is all or nothing. In other words, the 
moral basis for the distinction is to avoid the imputation of guilt and consequent 
attack on those who did not will the status quo or acts that are seen as a “wrong” nor 
those that are not defending it through the use of arms. This is to say wars that 
conscript or see all citizens of the aggressive state as legitimate targets.  A good 
theory of practical reasoning must bear in mind that the government of a country is 
not the same as the community.  Therefore the aggression of the government does 
not mean that all the citizens or members of such state committed the act. Any armed 
attack in defense of such aggressive acts must then be discriminatory in character. It 
must distinguish those who are the actual aggressors and the agents who are carrying 
out the aggressive acts on the one hand, from those who are mere victims of 
circumstance—ordinary citizens—on the other hand. The aggressors and their agents 




This is the theoretical origin of the non-combatant immunity in war. The question 
will then be, how do we identify the combatants and the non-combatants? While 
Daniel Zupan holds that a combatant is one who has adopted a maxim that aims at 
harming us,
68
  Thomas Nagel sees him or her as one who poses an immediate threat 
or one whose capability to harm is immediate.
69
 In Nagel’s sense then, children are 
not combatants in the sense that they will grow up to join the military, nor are 
women who give comfort to the soldiers.  In international law, the solution to this 
problem seems to be fairly easy. Combatants normally refer to the military; and 
members of the military can be identified by their insignia or uniform. However, 
some writers also claim that such straight-forward identification of combatants with 
members of the military narrows the scope of those who should be legitimate 
targets.
70
    
 
The distinction of combatants and non-combatants made in just war theory is not just 
a distinction made in order to justify attacking the aggressor, but also a distinction 
that aims to accommodate certain features of our world. The distinction between 
what is chosen as end or means, i.e. intended, and what is foreseen and accepted as a 
side-effect, i.e. an unintended effect, is a feature of the human condition which is 
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more or less spontaneously and more or less clearly understood in unreflective 
practical reasoning, but which must be brought to full clarity in a reflective ethical 
and political theory. The reflective attempt by just war theorists to bring this feature 
of our world to clarity is in the doctrine of double effect (DDE). 
 
Double effect then is a way of reconciling the absolute prohibition, i.e., not to be 
intended, of attacking non-combatants with the legitimate defense of the state from 
aggression, i.e., military activity. The doctrine of double effect developed by early 
medieval philosophers like Aquinas states that it is permitted to perform an act likely 
to have an evil consequence (the death of non-combatants) provided the following 
conditions are met: 
(1) The act is good in itself or at least morally indifferent, in this sense it is a 
legitimate act of war; 
(2) The direct effect is morally acceptable-the destruction of military 
capabilities; 
(3) The intention of the actor is good, i.e, not aiming at evil effects; 
 
(4) The good effect is sufficient to compensate for the evil consequences.71 
 
Another feature of the human condition captured by this distinction is the near total 
revulsion of the human being with regard to harming his or her fellow human being. 
This natural instinct of compassion is captured by Rousseau when he writes that, 
“equally confined by instinct and reason to the sole care of guarding himself against 
the mischiefs which threaten him, he is restrained by natural compassion from doing 
                                               




any injury to others, and is not led to do such a thing even in return for injuries 
received.”72 The revulsion to kill another person can be so intense that it often stalls 
military engagements. It is said that in the Second World War, only 15-20 percent of 
soldiers were shooting to kill, most were either deliberately missing or not shooting 
at all. Military historians, as Helen Benedict points out, concluded that this was 
because no amount of conventional drill could overcome a human being’s revulsion 





To overcome this revulsion the military of many states incorporate different kinds of 
training that would condition soldiers to kill reflexively and dispassionately. 
Benedict, in reference to the “Boot Camp” which is a part of the basic training of 
military recruits, says that “however much the military portrays it as being about 
building discipline and esprit de corps, the bottom line is that boot camp is about 





In effect, the distinction of combatant and non-combatants helps to single out a small 
group of people—since combatants are normally smaller than the general 
population—whom guilt or immediacy of harm can be imputed and thereby reducing 
the revulsion of soldiers to fight. On the contrary, imputing guilt or harm on a whole 
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nation or state will heighten revulsion and make way for pacifism with its inherent 
consequences. 
 
The non-combatant immunity principle is seen as being crucial to any evaluation of 
acts that are termed terrorist. In fact, many theorists readily point to the number of 
deaths of non-combatants in attributing the term “terrorism” or “terrorist” to an act 
or a group. However, it may be good to point out that in so far as the deaths of 
civilians or non-combatants plays a part in the evaluation of terrorism; the principle 
of non-combatant immunity is not consequentialist in character. This is to say that 
the validity of the principle doesn’t depend on body count, i.e, the death of non-
combatants. If it had been so, the attribution of the term “terrorist” to an individual 
or a group of people vis-à-vis another individual or group will be to balance the 
number of deaths causally brought about by an individual or a group against that of 
the other with the fixed death-number of non-combatants as the balancing or 
determining figure.  
 
In this case, the question raised by Latheef Farook will be apt  “who is a terrorist?” Is 
it Osama who was accused of killing around 2,800 people in New York and 
Washington on September 11 2001? Or Bush and Blair, who jointly killed an 
estimated 50, 000 people in Afghanistan and more than 130,000 people in Iraq, and 
virtually ruined these two countries…”76 The problem is that Farook does not fix a 
benchmark for determination. 
 
                                               





However, the question raised by Farook points to something else, namely the 
relationship between justice and prudence. Any argument for justice must bear in 
mind prudential requirements. This means that justice and prudence ought not to be 
in conflict with each other. Rather, they ought to unite; the thought of contrariety is 
absurd. In other words, the practice of prudence presupposes a theory of justice. 
 
 Therefore, the saying “let justice be done even if the heavens should fall” should not 
be understood to mean that those in power or those in the position to effect justice 
should do so with utter disregard for the rights of the parties for whom the said 
justice is in question but must also make room or consider their other larger aims, 
aspirations and commitments in life. It should, rather, be understood as the 
obligation of those in charge of justice not to extend or limit people’s right through 
sympathy or dislike. In short, it is a maxim against favouritism or vendetta.   In the 
words of Michael Walzer, then, “to set prudence and justice so radically at odds, 
however, is to misconstrue the argument for justice.”77  In effect, the circumstance in 
which putative actors of justice carry or continue to carry out their actions has a lot 
to say about their intentions. 
 
In Just War Theory, the principle of proportionality in Jus in Bello is an attempt to 
unify the justice of war and the prudential requirement of not intentionally targeting 
non-combatants through the use of disproportionate weapons. What this means is 
that some weapons by their nature have the capacity to destroy things or human 
beings that are not considered as legitimate targets. The issue of nuclear weapons 
readily comes to mind. Nuclear weapons by their inherent capacity can be so 
                                               




destructive beyond legitimate targets. The nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki bears witness to this.  
 
This is why there is an attempt to limit the acquisition of such weapons by states. It 
then means that the right to wage a war does not guarantee the right to use any kind 
of weapon whose character is indiscriminate. Thus dating back to the Geneva 
Convention of 1949, the St Petersburg declaration of 1868 and the Hague declaration 
of 1907, certain weapons have been banned specifically because of their 
indiscriminate character. Therefore, any just war whose aim is to secure the just 
cause ought to do so with weapons that are proportionate to its cause. This particular 




  As I noted earlier, while Daniel Zupan sees a combatant as one who has adopted a 
maxim of harming us, Nagel sees him or her as one who has the capacity for 
immediate harm. Now the question will be what is a maxim? Kant,  in the Critique of 
Practical Reason, says that maxims are propositions that contain the general 
determination of the will of the individual. This means that “the condition is 
regarded by the subject as holding only for his will….”79  Here, the individual is not 
seen as one making a decision for another, rather for himself. He accepts the pledge 
of harming the other person or the enemy. It is on this idea of subjective 
determination of the will that Aquinas distinguished between “innocent” and “guilty” 
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persons and insisted that it is never lawful intentionally to kill innocent persons.
80
 As 
Hartigan points out: 
For Thomas, as for his predecessors, however, the term “innocent” 
must be understood to refer to a general moral condition: an 
individual is innocent or just, if his will is in conformity with God’s 
will. When the enemy is described by Thomas as “guilty,” this 
means that the enemy is unjust or sinful, because his subjective 
intent has been to violate God’s law. The criterion of guilt is 
therefore not so much an overt act of injustice in the objective 
order, or what in modern terminology might be called an aggressive 
or an illegal act. This manifestation may be a subsidiary aspect of 
the enemy’s guilt, a concrete manifestation of his internal injustice, 
but it need not be. The final determination of an enemy’s guilt is his 




The practical implication of the above insistence that guilt be determined by 
subjective intent is that we run into the epistemological problem of “the other mind.”  
This is to say that there is a near impossibility of breaking into the minds of other 
people to determine their intention. And with such impossibility, we are left with no 
way of holding people responsible, not to talk of punishing them.  Coady was not 
unaware of this problem, for he writes: 
Terrorists must intend to harm noncombatants, but of course some 
terrorists do not believe that their targets are genuinely 
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noncombatants or innocents. Does this belief matter for the 
characterization of their acts as terrorist? In philosophical jargon, 
this is the question whether in such sentences as “the IRA intended 
to kill this innocent people” the context governed by the verb 
“intended” is to be read as opaque or transparent. More 
colloquially, does terrorist status turn on the objective facts about 
the nature of the target or on the attacker’s subjective belief?...In 
short, I would hold that if the mistake is factual then the attack is 
not terrorism, but if it is conceptual, then the attack is.
82
   
 
From Coady’s assertion and the reduction of terrorism to the political, the question 
will be, “are we not back to the same issue of recrimination and denial?” Who among 
the recipients of violence can be truly said to be combatants and who are not? How 
do we ascertain and impute responsibility on the so called terrorist?   The practical 
task that emanates from Coady’s assertion is that of post facto analysis. But post 
facto analysis cannot solve the problem of reductionism and alienation created by the 
definitions examined earlier. In fact, I assert that as it is with the gravitation towards 
the absurd reduction of terrorism to the political, so it is with the opposite motion 
towards tragic elevation to the fanatical or farcical, i.e., accounting or seeing 
terrorism solely as acts of fanatics or zealots. Neither obeys any mono-chromatic or 
uni-perspective law of post-facto analysis.   
 
As I noted earlier, the solution to this problem of combatants and legitimate targets is 
easily resolved in international wars by attaching the label of combatants to members 
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of the military, soldiers fighting in battlefields and the heads of governments. This is 
so given the fact, as I mentioned earlier, that war is seen in international law as a 
defence against aggression. The military as an institution is the machinery of defence 
for the state and consequently the government. This function of defence is carried out 
with the aid of tools, such as, knives, guns, detonators, tanks, fighter-jets etc. These 
tools are often referred to as arms or ammunition.  Given the character of these tools 
when used by individuals to defend the status quo which resulted in war, there was a 
shift in emphasis.  The moral intent of the enemy was no longer emphasized as the 
criterion for guilt or innocence; rather, the fact of bearing arms or not bearing arms, 
of aiding an unjust cause or abstaining from such aid, becomes the basis for 
exempting classes of the enemy from attack.
83
 The question then becomes “who is 
defending the unjust status quo?,” and not “who is to blame for the status quo?”  This 
is the basis for the Geneva conventions on the protection of prisoners of war. In order 
words, prisoners of war are defenceless. 
 
However, by shifting emphasis from moral guilt or subjective adoption of a maxim 
for harm to bearing arms, we run into another problem, namely that of the conscript 
soldier.  As I wrote, combatants are constrained by forces and circumstances that 
determine what they must do. They tend to be young and with little opportunity to 
develop an educated opinion, hence so suggestible in adopting maxims.
84
 Coady did 
not overlook the problem of the conscript soldier. Though not discounting conscripts 
as combatants, he blames those who coerced such individuals to fight. He states: 
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when we classify people as non-combatants or innocents we do not 
mean that they have no evil in their hearts, nor do we mean that 
combatants are necessarily full of evil thoughts. The classification 
is concerned with the role the individual plays in the chain of 
agency, not mere cause… The combatant may be coerced to fight, 
but is still prosecuting the war, even if the greater blame lies with 
those who coerce.
85
     
 
We now arrive at a discovery, namely that being a combatant is a role that is assigned 
by history and oftentimes such history has to do with violence and hostilities. This 
role cannot be performed without instruments of action. The liability for attack then 
also depends on one using the tools for the act. This is akin to what Patrick Devlin 
calls the “Quasi-Criminal Law.” As he puts it: 
 
 The first distinguishing mark of the quasi-criminal law then, is that 
a breach of it does not mean that the offender has done anything 
morally wrong. The second distinguishing mark is that the law 
frequently does not care whether it catches the actual offender or 
not. Owners of goods are frequently made absolutely liable for 
what happens to the goods while they are under their control even if 
they are in no way responsible for the interference; an example is 
when food is contaminated or adulterated.
86
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In other words, Devlin sums up the fiduciary underlining of role-playing or agency 
coupled with a discretion or confidence or where personal skills and ability is a 
relevant factor. This is usually expressed in the maxim “delegatus non potest 
delegare,” whose theoretical consequence is that an agent or a role-player is under a 
moral and legal duty not to delegate those duties to someone else. In its practical 
application, the maxim encompasses the principle that “a person to whom an 
authority has been delegated cannot, as a general rule, sub-delegate that authority to 
another person so as to release himself of its performance or from liability from its 
exercise or non-exercise, unless the authority to delegate has been expressly or by 
necessary implication conferred upon him.
87
 Consequently, where the agent is 
threatened due to his principal, he or she has the right to set off the capital 
requirements of such threat which may amount to losses or liabilities, unless the 
capital due to the principal is held on trust. In a nutshell, the agent is said to be in a 
vicarious state. However, in order to protect his or her personal/private rights, the 
agent or role-player is entitled to a lien over property belonging to the principal that 
is in his possession. 
 
A misunderstanding of this fiduciary role of defence by individuals—be they military 
or not—might lead writers to think that there are two concepts of innocents in war. 
Stephen Nathanson erroneously makes a distinction between what he calls the moral 
innocence and status innocence.
88
 Here status innocence normally refers to civilians 
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while being guilty by status that of soldiers. This erroneous belief stems from 
Walzer’s assertion that soldiers, simply by fighting, whatever their private hopes and 
intentions are, lose their title to life and liberty even though they have committed no 
crime.
89
 This misconception I think arises due to the erroneous belief that the military 
is an institution for killing.   
 
Walzer’s argument here seems to say that being a soldier is fundamentally different 
from belonging to other institutions of the state or being a human being. In other 
words, if the right to life is a human right or a right conferred by the state, no soldier 
loses it just by engaging in a political—good—act for the state. The first problem 
with Walzer here is that he does not specify how this loss comes about. However, he 
cannot do that if he does not first of all argue on how the right to life is acquired. If 
such right is actually conferred by the state and a soldier loses it by defending the 
state, then soldiering will only amount to conscription or slavery. In such case, the 
idea of jus in bello will be lost since the conscript or slave is required to act with 
some restraint while at the same time having no right and fundamentally the right to 
life(if it is a human right). The question will then be, for whose benefit will the act of 
self-immolation or restraint in battle be. 
 
The military is primarily an institution for the defense of the state and this function 
may not only come by killing. The threats to the state that may demand defense may 
even come from natural disasters.   The truth of the matter is that, those defending the 
status quo that is in contention are legitimate targets insofar as they are in possession 
of weapons. Their being guilty is vicarious on the moral guilt of heads of states or 
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commanders who engendered the bellicose condition. Therefore there is nothing like 
status innocence, rather, one’s role in a history of hostilities can make him or her a 
legitimate target.  
 
 On the other hand, being a non-combatant is not a role. Rather, it is an appellation of 
distinction. It distinguishes those individuals who have been assigned the defensive 
role of the status quo or the object whose determination is in question. This is the 
case because, as I stated earlier, Just War Theory is biased towards or has a 
presumption of peace. Only combatants deviate from such presumption. Therefore, 
any definition that touts or uses the idea of non-combatant immunity must be aware 
of its adjunct—history. History on its own evokes the idea of time and place; this 
means that any idea of combatants or non-combatants must have a time reference and 
a given place. It also follows that weapons or arms will also be historically 
conditioned with regard to the danger facing the state. This follows from the fact that 
such tools that are frequently referred as arms can be used to perform other functions 
apart from harming. The knife as a combat tool is both an instrument for harms—a 
blood-letter and a creative instrument.  The farmer uses knife, so does the cook and 
the sculptor or carver. When these tools are used outside the history of hostilities, 
their users cannot be said to be combatants. 
 
In fact, a closer look at a variety of combat tools reveals the duality or multiplicity of 
their uses. Those working in the mines and quarries make use of detonators; fighter-
jets have been used to convey relief goods in times of natural disasters and are also 
used for air shows in celebrations. What this means is that what is a weapon or not 
also depends on the object of determination. We can now say that a weapon is that 
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which is used to defend the historical status-quo that is in contention or whose object, 
be it material or formal like land or culture, is in contention.  
 
 By posing the usage of arms in making the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants, we run into an obstacle, namely the natural status of children (including 
babies).  Ignoring for the sake of convenience the idea of the child-soldier, we can 
say that children do not have the natural capacity to bear arms. This natural capacity 
then seems to vitiate any argument that non-combatants should be historically 
located. However, as I noted earlier, being a combatant is a role that is assigned by 
history. The pertinent question will then be could children be assigned any defensive 
role with regard to any status-quo that is in contention? It is here that we arrive at the 
concept generally referred to as “innocent threat or shield.”90 
 
Innocent threat simply refers to one who is not actively harming or seeking to harm 
others but is forced to be in a position that prevents an attack on the source of harm. 
What this means is that children can be combatants or legitimate targets in a given 
history where they are being used as innocent shields or threat. For instance, when a 
child is vested with explosives to target the enemy he or she becomes a combatant 
and when used as a shield he or she becomes a weapon of defence and thus a 
legitimate target. 
 
However, this natural incapacity of children to disrupt the tranquility or the coming 
to being of any political order, i.e. the order of distribution of burdens and benefits, 
brings to light the problem of reductionism that I have been hinting. What this means 
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is that any intentional attack on children (who are not playing the role of innocent 
threats) by freedom fighters cannot be qualified as a political act. As Ramsey puts it, 
“no ethics—least of all Christian ethics gives [one] leave, either in his private or 
public capacity, to kill another man’s children directly as a means of weakening that 
man’s murderous intent or act. Preparation to do so,—if that is the true and the only 
object of our weapons—is also intrinsically a grave moral evil and politically 
wrong.”91 Perhaps this is the place to denounce what has now been popularly referred 
to as the Beslan school massacre of September 2004 where a group of armed Ingush 
and Chechen rebels took school children as hostages. 
 
2.2 CIRCUMVENTING THE PROBLEM: TERRORISM AS GUERILLA 
WARFARE 
To overcome these difficulties of imputation and alienation, many theorists, instead 
of viewing terrorism as an indiscriminate use of violence, see it as a form of guerrilla 
warfare. Robert Taber views it as a more humane way to wage war. He says that 
“terrorism, conventionally viewed with pious horror as political murder (but how 
more murderous than blockbusting a city or napalming a village?) is far more 
humane, being more selective, than most other types of warfare.”92  In line with 
Taber, Richard Clutterbuck uses the term “urban guerilla warfare” interchangeably 
with “urban terrorism” and likewise “rural guerilla warfare and “rural terrorism.”93 
This view of identifying terrorism with guerilla warfare has to do with the freedom 
fighter’s discourse mentioned earlier. Most groups usually identified as terrorist are 
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equally seen as freedom fighters. These include the IRA in Nothern Ireland, the 
LTTE in Srilanka, Eoka in Cyprus, the FLQ in Quebec, Hamas and PLO in the 
Middle East. 
 
 The method of guerilla warfare was mostly used by natives against colonialist 
troops in their quest for freedom. And generally, the natives see the method as more 
effective and cost-saving when compared to open battle, given the fire power and 
might of their rivals. The cost of such tactics to the  colonial troops, some argue, led 
to the  1874 international conference in Brussels where it was decided that in order 
to be recognized as lawful belligerents, guerillas must among other things, “answer 
to a specific commander, wear a distinctive badge, carry arms openly and conform in 
operations to the laws and customs of war.”94 Of course, the laws and customs being 
referred were European laws and customs. This colonial experience some say was 
replicated in America, where the northern states, advocating the European approach 
to war, had emerged victorious against the numerically inferior southern 
Confederacy.
95
  In essence then, it is argued that the result of the frustrations of 
European colonial armies, combined with the experience of the Union forces fighting 
Confederate irregulars, led to guerilla warfare being politicized and defamed in the 
nineteenth century. And this trend, set in motion, would ultimately in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries see the advent of terrorism as a derogatory label. 
 
Seeing terrorism as guerilla warfare has the advantages of justification and 
imputation. A group of people can easily be identified as the ones using violence to 
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bring about a certain state of affairs, and such violence cannot be condemned apriori 
but may be justified as a clamour for political freedom.  Terrorism cannot be seen as 
always and everywhere wrong. However, identifying terrorism with guerilla warfare 
does not escape the trappings of reductionism. All organized or group-violence that 
threatens or murders people are then seen as guerilla warfare which is not the case. 
In fact, the hankering to reduce all forms of terrorism to the political sphere may 
have gained impetus by the factual relation between guerilla warfare and what is 
today termed terrorism. Another difficulty of identifying terrorism with guerilla 
warfare is that it sidetracks the identification of any government with terrorism. In 
other words, state-terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism logically disappears in any 
discourse on terrorism. This is so since a government cannot fight a war of liberation 
against itself. 
 
From the two opposing camps on the definition of terrorism, one can actually 
perceive the tension going on between the absolute prohibition of intentional killing 
of human beings, and the value placed on freedom in matters, especially of a 
political nature, that concerns a group of people and their well being. The two 
perspectives then have something to offer in the understanding of “terrorism” and 
“terrorists groups”. However, for a better understanding, I suggest that in the light of 
the principles discussed earlier, we make a distinction between what I term terrorism 
against the state and terrorism against humanity. Terrorism against the state aims to 
capture the idea of the freedom of individuals or groups of people with regard to 
political issues. Terrorism against humanity aims to capture those violent acts—
excluding political ones—that undermine the absolute prohibition of the intentional 
killing of human beings. Therefore political authorities should recognize the prior 
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existence of the people as homo economicus, homo religiousus, etc. before being 
homo politicus. 
 
What this means then is that, any attempt to condemn or exhort any act of terrorism 
against a state will have to understand the limits of politics (the state) and the 
historical or factual conditions of any particular state or states in which such 
organized violence is targeting. Such armed struggle in itself will have to respect the 
just war principles which, as I pointed out, are principles of practical reasoning and 
not just the laws and customs of a particular people. In this respect then, non-
intended deaths would also have to be tolerated as part of the human condition and in 
the light of the doctrine of double effect.  This will mean that not all terrorism will be 
wrong given the limits of the state and the historical condition of a struggle.  
 
However, the attempt to justify terrorism against the state will not render us into 
naive-humanists—people who see themselves as living in a reasonable world in 
which everything is up for negotiation. In other words, we must recognize that there 
are no regulative mechanisms for the fanatic mind. The fanatic use of violence to 
achieve ideological aims must be forcefully confronted, politically. The “War on 
Terror” then, seen as a mechanism for containing the psychopath and the fanatic 
mind cannot be faulted. We therefore escape being likened to Camus’s naive 
humanists.  In the novel The Plague, one of Albert Camus protagonists comments 
acerbically on the naive reaction of those he calls “humanists.”  
 
These people he says, walking down the streets of Oran (the city in which the novel 
is set), may smash underfoot a rat carrying the plague bacillus but claim that “there 
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are no rats in Oran.” Why? Because there cannot be. What I am referring to, then, is 
that there are pathologies of humanity which have gradually morphed into ideologies 
and are manifested in the organized murder of human beings. These ideologies and 
groups that profess them cannot be exhorted or rationalized away. Any attempt to do 
that will be pernicious. In other words, terrorism against humanity cannot be 
politically justified in the sense that any justification will have to go beyond the 
ontology of the state and also involve the negation of humanity itself. Rather it has to 
be violently confronted.  
 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
What has emerged so far from this chapter is that the definition of terrorism by many 
theorists does not aid us in the imputation of guilt in cases of violent reactions by 
putative freedom fighters or depredation of insane power on the part of the 
government. In other words, the definitions do not assist us in the logical 
identification of state or state-sponsored terrorism. This problem is due to: 
 
(i) the reduction of all terrorist acts into political acts thereby transforming all acts 
deemed terrorist into rational and good acts and hence implicitly excluding state and 
state-sponsored terrorism. 
(ii) the use of value laden words like innocents and non-combatants whose material 
reference can only be historically determined. 
 
Given this difficulty, I propose that to be able, on the one hand, to impute guilt on 
the government or freedom fighters, we need to view the concept of terrorism from a 
bifocal lens (a) terrorism against the state and (b) terrorism against humanity. 
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Terrorism against the state will be a violent reaction against a state whereby the state 
is deemed unjust. This idea purports to show that the political sphere does not absorb 
all aspects of human expression and hence there are limits to the use of force as a 
political act. In a nut shell, political motivations cannot be the only motivations to 
violence. 
 
Terrorism against humanity on its own will refer to a violent action or reaction   that 
is not politically motivated and thus becomes the private use of force or violence by 
the government or any other group on lives and property to advance a private or 
ideological agenda which may preclude rational justification. The major problem 
now becomes, how does one ahistorically determine when a violent reaction or state-
power crosses the boundary of politics? Any attempt to answer this question will 
first of all determine the limits of politics—the state—which invariably 
circumscribes political-force (power). 
 
Furthermore, the determination of the limits of politics and political force cannot be 
done without any articulation of the constituents (οντως, ontos) of politics. In other 
words, the determination of the limits of politics presupposes the articulation of 










 CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 POWER, GOVERNANCE AND THE STATE 
                                        SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
 
This chapter articulates the limits of political force (power), which invariably 
involves the articulation of governance and the state. The ontology of the state 
reveals a dual dimension of matter and form. While the formal condition refers to the 
promotion of order and progress (justice), the material condition refers to the people, 
territory and time. These dimensions act as checks to the use of any political force, in 
the sense that any arbitrary use of force against them is contrary to the common 
good. However, governance requires human actors and the problems of 
epistemology and allegiance imply that no individual possess an apriori entitlement 
to a political office. It is here that democracy reveals itself as the postulate of every 
government.   Democracy acts, not only as a procedure of determining occupants of 
political offices, of rectification of nisus, but as a way of escaping the entrapments of 
a uni-dimensional society. In all, the publicity requirement inherent in any 
democratic system creates a bulwark against revolutions.  
 
3.1 THE ONTOLOGY OF THE STATE 
3.1.1 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE STATE 
  The state is a form of unifying relationship—order—between human beings, which 
enables them to interact in an intelligent manner. The further question that arises will 
be why the need for such unifying conditions? The simple answer will be that the 
unifying conditions provide an atmosphere for the flourishing of the individual. 
Writing in The Limits of State Action, Humboldt says that “the true end of man, or 
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that which is prescribed by the eternal and immutable dictates of reason, and not 
suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious 
development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole.”96 However, given 
the limitations of the individual, he holds that every human being can act with only 
one dominant faculty at a time, or is disposed at any given time to some single form 
of spontaneous activity. In spite of this, man has it in his power to avoid being one-
sided, Humboldt says that he does this by: 
 
attempting to unite the distinct and generally separately exercised 
faculties of his nature, by bringing into spontaneous cooperation, at 
each period of his life, the dying sparks of one activity, and those 
which the future will enkindle, and endevouring to increase and 
diversify the powers with which he works, by harmoniously 
combining them, instead of looking for a more variety of objects 




This effort of the individual to surmount one-sidedness in his or her life is replicated 
in the society by the cooperation of its different members. The diversity of capacity, 
of interests and wants at a given time enriches others through cooperation. What this 
means is that the state is not an end in itself, rather a means towards the development 
of the citizens or its members. The cooperative atmosphere engendered by the state 
must be able to enrich the citizens in various forms for such a state to be worthy of 
its name. It is pertinent to point out here that the cooperation that is required by 
citizens ought not to depart from the dictates of reason as Humboldt mentioned. To 
                                               





depart from reason or to allow vague and transient desires to dictate the tune will 
amount to the subversion of the cooperation required for the integral development of 
the citizens and to initiate any form of cooperation based on the dictates of transient 
feelings or desires will amount to being unfair to the citizens or unsuspecting 
cooperating members. 
 
The establishment of a cooperative atmosphere that will enable individuals to attain 
full and integral development will require practical steps in the day to day activities. 
This means that certain distributive issues will arise. Issues of how to distribute 
opportunities, resources, taxes, roles, offices etc, and it will be utopian to think that 
these issues can be resolved unanimously. In other words, there will be a need for an 
authority.
98
 Certain citizen(s) will be in charge of distributing the burden and 
benefits that will make for an enriching cooperation of the citizens. Such individuals 
or a group of people are referred to as the government.  
 
The function of the government will then be to maintain the ensemble of conditions 
which will sustain a unifying environment in which the citizens will interact to 
develop and enrich themselves. The conditions that enable the citizens to flourish are 
generally referred to as the “common good.” What this means is that the function of 
the government, indeed, is a technical function, at least in large part—not moral. 
Like all technical functions, it is concerned to achieve a particular purpose, a state of 
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affairs which can be achieved by efficient disposition of means to ends. The 
particular end in this regard is the constant generation and maintenance of the 
enabling conditions that will enable citizens to flourish unhindered. This is to say an 
end that is open-ended. 
 
The idea of the common good is not limited to “common properties’ like parks and 
play grounds but it encompasses the whole operational material of the state for the 
wellbeing of its citizens. In other words the common good is “the factor or set of 
factors (whether a value, a concrete operational objective, or the conditions for 
realizing a value or attaining an objective) which, as considerations in someone’s 
practical reasoning, would make sense of or give reason for his collaboration with 
others and would likewise from their point of view, give reason for their 
collaboration with each other and with him.”99 The analogy of the “ship of the state” 
and those who navigate it come readily to mind to explain the idea of the common 
good.  In a ship, the major aim of the navigators is to steer the ship safely to its 
destination where the cooperation and the maintenance of the good conditions 
necessary for such cooperation is required for a safe arrival. 
 
To this effect, the people in-charge of the ship can distribute certain burdens and 
benefits to different individuals based on the need for a safe arrival of the ship. 
However, unlike the analogy of the ship that has a fixed destination, the state cannot 
be said to have a fixed destination, rather that the passengers—citizens—have 
different aims and goals for their development which requires the maintenance of a 
good condition for their achievement. The maintenance of this condition is what can 
                                               




be conveniently termed “fairness.” This act of distribution of burdens and benefits to 
specific individuals for the common good can then be called justice. It then follows 
that the function of the government is solely that of justice. However, justice 
implicates fairness since the government cannot distribute that which is in bad 
condition. Doing so will subvert the aim of justice in itself. 
 
 Often times, when the issue of justice arises, many think that it amounts to what 
H.L.A Hart calls “treat like cases alike and different cases differently.”100 However, 
as Hart himself pointed out, the differences among people do count. What this means 
is that in the distribution of burdens and benefits that are proper to justice, goods and 
duties may not be apportioned to individuals and citizens alike. Indeed, justice may 
not exclude treating different persons differently or different offices differently, but 
it requires only that the differential treatment be justified either by inevitable limits 
on one’s action or by intelligible requirements of the good of the polity. And given 
the fact that the development of the citizens of a state is multifaceted, there cannot be 
universal criteria for resolving the issue of distribution.  
 
In all cases, the government will rely on sound principles of reason that aims for the 
common good in distribution. The first among the criteria can be said to be that of 
need. Physical needs—food, shelter, etc—are always central to the common good. 
However, they are also subject to discretion and can be discounted, given cases 
where such needs arise based on the negligence or laziness of the individuals 
involved, or can also be discounted as a means of punishment for wrong doing. 
Apart from physical needs, there are other criteria for distribution which may include 
                                               




function, capacity, desert and contribution etc.
101
 It is pertinent to point out, that the 
multifaceted aspect of citizens’ development and the contingencies of the human 
condition that do not allow for comprehensive apriori criteria for distribution means 
that the issue of justice among citizens should be on a case by case basis. The nature 
of the goods to be distributed, to a large extent, determines the recipients. 
 
The issue of case by case does not mean that apriori rational principles do not play a 
part in the decision-making process. Therefore an arbitrary decision-making process, 
like throwing up a coin, rolling the lottery machine and any other process that can be 
summed up as  “just- making-a-choice,” has to be discounted.  In the “just-making-a-
choice” process, every person counts for one and only one and any act of double 
counting is deemed to be unjust. The reason for discounting irrational decision 
processes is to avoid making justice primarily a property of states of affairs and only 
derivatively a property of particular decisions of specific persons. In such case then, 
justice will no longer be a virtue, i.e., character determinant that takes into 
consideration the needs of the individuals concerned.  
 
The truth here is that everyone’s interest cannot count equally without prior 
commitments. If everyone’s interest is to count equally, it has to be based on the 
prior commitment each has made; the commitment of being a father, a mother, a 
wife, a teacher etc. apart from deciding which individual to allocate what benefit or 
burden, there is also the need to decide the amount of such benefit or burden to be 
allocated to the individuals.  Here, the idea of the common good although it is the 
guiding principle for decisions, cannot specify the amount of goods to be allocated to 
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each individual in any given moment. For instance, the common good may demand 
that certain people be employed as teachers or as nurses, but it does not specify the 
number of years or the amount of money that should be paid to them.   Here, there 
always arises the danger of favouritism, or of pettiness. Justice then implicates 
fairness in another way, i.e., an intelligent understanding of the condition of the 
recipient(s) of the said good(s). The authority who distributes must always have the 
guiding principle of doing to others what one wishes to be done to. This principle 
will always help the authority to put himself in the shoes of the receiving individual 
vis-à-vis the number of people and the amount of resources or burden that is to be 
distributed. 
 
The complex nature of distributive decisions and the contingent nature of the 
burdens and benefits that may accrue to the state have an implication for those who 
are entrusted or who shoulder the burden of authority. This implication can simply 
be said to be that of character— a certain kind disposition or capacity. In Book VII 
of the Republic, Plato suggests that the task of governing be left to the philosopher 
kings since they are the ones who are capable of grasping the ideal good, who have 
access to the forms which are the archetypes of reality and are capable of imitating 
such forms in the polity. Plato has been criticized by Popper for totalitarianism and 
historicism.
102
 This he argues is based on the principal elements of (a) the strict 
division of classes, (b) the identification of the fate of the state with that of the ruling 
class, (c) the monopoly of the ruling class on things like military virtues and training, 
(d) the censorship of intellectual activities and the promotion of propaganda that 
                                               




aims at unifying their minds and (e) the self-sufficient or autarchy aim of the state.
103
  
I am not trying to justify Plato’s view on the philosopher kings, but it is to Plato’s 
merit to be among the first people to open a dialogue and actually formulate the 
curriculum requirements for the philosopher kings which not only deals with the 
substantial aim of governing the state but also of moulding an excellent character 
that will assist them in executing their functions. 
 
 In part eight of book seven of the Republic, Plato initiates the discussion on the 
substantial curriculum of the education of the philosopher kings. Socrates opens the 
discussion thus “then you like us to consider how men of this kind are to be 
produced, and how they are to be led to the light… it is not a thing we can settle by 
spinning for it.” He continues “what should men study if their minds are to be drawn 
from the world of change to reality? Now it occurred to me that we said our rulers 
must be trained for war when they were young” Glaucon affirms in the positive. And 
Socrates opines that “the subject we are looking for must be relevant in war too.”104  
Socrates also reiterates the fact that they have arranged for the physical and literary 
training of the philosopher kings; a reference to the dialogue on the first stage of the 
education of the guardians that took place in part two and three of the book two 
where Socrates asserted that the properly good guardian will have the following 
characteristics: a philosophic disposition, high spirits, speed and strength and 
Glaucon agreed.  The dialogue subsequently takes a turn on how to bring up the 
guardians so that they embody such qualities. As Socrates comments: 
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So let us tell the tale of the education of our imaginary Guardians 
as if we had all the leisure of the traditional story-teller…what kind 
of education shall we give them then? We shall find it difficult to 
improve on the time-honoured distinction between physical 
training we give to the body and the education we give to the mind 
and character…And we shall begin by educating mind and 




    The undeniable truth then in Plato’s view is that certain groups of people, either 
by their training or capacity, are best disposed to carry out certain functions. In other 
words, the functions of the government can be best carried out by a group of people 
or certain individuals when compared to other groups or individuals. 
 
 We may not go all the way back to Plato to ascertain this fact, the practice of 
document or certificate authentication points to it. Why is there a need to 
authenticate the certificates of a jobseeker or an employee? The simple answer is that 
there is the belief that the possession of a certain document or certificate gives a 
putative proof that the person in question has a certain disposition engendered in him 
or her by the mere fact of him or her passing through the awarding institution of the 
degree. Such disposition will enable the person to carry out the functions of the 
office into which he is employed or being employed effectively. This assumption, of 
course, does not amount to the truth that the individual will in fact execute the 
functions of the office effectively. However, the putative assumption provides a 
foundation for liability in cases of dereliction. What this means is that when 
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government fails, some people are accountable for the failure. The whole idea is that 
to be an effective authority, one needs competence. 
 
The continuous effectiveness of an authority also requires the cooperation of the 
citizens or individuals for whom such authority is instituted. What this means, as 
Joseph Raz pointed out, is that “every citizen has a prima facie moral obligation to 
obey the law of a reasonably just state.”106 The denial of such authority automatically 
means the denial of the justice of the state. This belief, as Raz continued, can either 
be seen from an instrumentalist standpoint or on the grounds of fairness. From the 
instrumentalist standpoint, it can be said that the state will not be able to function if 
its citizens are not obligated to obey its decisions, i.e. the decision of those in 
authority, while from the view of fairness, it can be said that anyone who denies the 





It must be noted that no matter how widespread the obedience to an authority is, 
there is always the possibility of disobedience from citizens in certain matters and 
certain situations.  Intense feelings, for example, of self-love, of egoism and 
partiality are always ready to provide the basis for rationalization which may lead an 
authority to exceed its limits. Therefore, there arises the need to devise a mechanism 
to check the ever ready excesses of feelings to subvert authority. This mechanism 
ought to be coercive, i.e. it must be able to enforce compliance with regard to 
obedience. It is here that the issue of power arises.  Power is then seen as the 
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legitimate ability to inflict or threaten to inflict harm—bodily or in matters of 
interest—in order to achieve compliance without which the common good will be 
jeopardized. Summed up in the words of Ricoeur “the political sphere is related to a 
theory of the passions through the phenomenon of power that is essential to it.”108 
 
Power as the capacity to enforce actions becomes a complement of authority. In this 
sense the government wields power to maintain the demands of the common good.  
This is to say that “this physical power of compelling coincides or would coincide 
with a moral power of exaction.”109 Power is then seen to be at the service of 
authority. And given the effects of power on any person who is on the receiving end, 
the use of it will always have to be justified by recourse to the common good and to 
the extent that it serves the common good and also in line with the distributive 
principle of fairness. The use of power panders to one aspect of human nature which 
is the desire to avoid harm and this means that power will be ineffective if this desire 
for avoiding harm is extinguished.    
 
The investiture of power and authority on specific individual(s), coupled with this 
natural desire in man to avoid harm, poses a great risk. This risk lies in the fact that 
power can be used to subvert the foundation of the common good by subduing 
cooperation and communication, or inducing co-operation and communication that 
are to the detriment of the citizens. The individual or individuals who wield power 
are not immune to intense feelings that can subvert the common good, thereby 
putting   power at the service of the whims and caprice of the individual(s). Intense 
feelings such as anger and hatred towards certain individuals can shape decisions and 
                                               





actions that are meant to instantiate the common good, actions that are referred to as 
vengeful or spiteful. To avoid distributive decisions of the government being ruled or 
influenced by these kinds of feelings, ancient and medieval philosophers called for 
the desirability of the “rule of law and not of men.”110 What this means is that a right 
use of power does not tolerate an unregulated rule by rulers, i.e. rule of men, but 
calls rulers to be ruled by law, precisely because “law is a dictate of reason, while 
what threatens to turn government into tyranny…is their human passions, inclining 
them to attribute to themselves more of the good things, and fewer of the bad things, 
than their fair share.”111  
 
The necessity of regulating rulers then necessitates the codification of whatever 
principles or rules that are seen as the dictates of reason which will help guide the 
authority in decision-making. These codified rules or principles are generally 
referred to as the “law.”  These rules ought to be communicated to the people so that 
they will also be aware and be able to differentiate a tyrant from right authority, and 
if a tyrant, means of expelling him must be devised. Thus, the law brings specificity, 
predictability, clarity and in most cases defines the extent to which power can be 
exercised. Even in the medieval period, when political activities were dominated by 
religious affairs and kingship, philosophers and theologians alike were able to insist 
that kings must obey the law.  
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Writing as early as the twelfth century, John of Salisbury insists that the king must 
obey the law; he is neither above the law nor superior to it. The good prince loves 
justice and prefers the good of the whole, refusing to submerge that good to his 
individual will. He desires “to be loved rather than feared, and [to] show himself to 
them [his people] as such a man that they will out of devotion prefer his life to their 
own.” The tyrant on the other hand “oppresses the people by rulership based upon 
force, while he who rules in accordance with the law is a prince….The origin of 
tyranny is iniquity, and springing from a poisonous root, it is a tree which grows and 
sprouts into a baleful pestilent growth, and to which the axe must by all means be 
laid.”112  
 
In summary, the good use of power by the authority is to ensure that the right 
conditions for the common good are not subverted. This simply means that power 
aims at maintaining order; that dynamic tranquility that is necessary for the 
development of citizens. In other words, the functions of the government are nothing 
but the conservation of order and the promotion of progress. These functions can 
then be said to be limited in nature. It therefore discounts numerous other functions.  
 
Firstly, the conservation of order and promotion of progress does not amount to the 
communication of wellbeing.  The government is not providence which thinks for all 
and distributes to all according to his or her needs. Secondly, the common good does 
not amount to the sum of temporal goods. This means that the conservation of order 
and promotion of progress are not just the distribution of the available goods at any 
given time. If this is so, then the good will be identified with the present possible 
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goods. However, it should be noted that not yet realized goods are hopes but not 
effective goods. What this means is that “sociology” and “futurology” are the wings 
on which governance flies. While the former tries to ascertain the present state of the 
citizens and their needs, the later peers into the future to ascertain the extent to which 
the horizon of progress can be expanded.  
 
Thirdly, the common goods that are to be distributed to specific citizens by the 
government do not amount to the goods allotted to them as individuals—that is the 
concrete use that a single individual makes of private properties. In essence the 
government should also respect private means of acquiring properties. The function 
of government then is not to appropriate or absorb private properties. An individual 
private property in this sense can be more than that of the state. A business man can 
possess a fleet of 800 cars, while the state possesses only 400! 
 
In all its function, a good government ought to be guided by the principle of 
subsidiarity—from the Latin word subsidium, meaning help. This principle 
articulated by some Roman theologians holds that: 
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can 
accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the 
community, so also it is an injustice… and disturbance of right 
order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and 
subordinate organizations can do.  [Since]… every social activity 
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ought of its very nature to furnish help to the members …, and 




This means that the government, being the most powerful agent in the state, should 
only aim to help the citizens to help themselves through their initiatives of choosing 
commitments and of realizing them through personal inventiveness and efforts. It 
ought to be stressed that this requirement of the principle of subsidiarity is not just a 
requirement aiming at efficiency. Rather, it aims to respect the liberty and 
individuality of the citizens as such. The government cannot be an experience 
machine dispensing experience and initiative to the citizens, thereby enervating them 
and rendering them inauthentic. As Aristotle puts it, “no-one would choose to live 
with the intellect of a child throughout his life, however much he were to be pleased 
at the things that please children.”114  In a nutshell then, the government should not 
engage in usurpation.  
 
3.1.2 THE MATERIAL DIMENSION OF THE STATE 
The formal structure of the state that I have been discussing up to this point 
presupposes a material aspect. The state—by extension, the government—in order to 
function requires, on the one hand, a territory and time and, on the other hand, 
human subjects. This means that states have boundaries, they are physically marked 
out. We are familiar with such demarcations and clichés like 50 or 60 kilometers 
from the coast, depending on what claims the state makes.  In some cases nature 
creates the boundaries through some physical structures like mountains and rivers. 
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So the concrete life of a state requires dominion over the earth—be it air space, land 
or beneath the sea. The traversing of such boundaries thus requires permission from 
the state, and the government that shoulders the authority in such a state has the onus 
to grant or refuse. This need of granting and refusal of permission has resulted in the 
modern day idea of visa, international passport or diplomatic passage, airspace 
license etc. 
 
Boundaries that mark out a state or states presuppose cross-state cooperation, or 
what can be, using the contemporary language, termed international relations or 
diplomatic missions. International relations on its part, for it to reflect an intelligent 
cooperation, must not be devoid of the formal structure of the state as enunciated 
earlier. Hence, where international relationship is concerned, it must be remembered 
that it involves a convergence of various relationships. Yet this convergence cannot 
be intelligent, i.e., tending towards the common good, unless it is determined by a 
common intrinsic criterion of measurement, namely, justice. 
 
International relations must then not concern itself only with either the economic 
dimension of cooperation or the political. In short, international relations must also 
avoid any reductionism that looks at the citizens of the other states merely from a 
one-sided perspective of human flourishing. Rather, it must be integral in its outlook. 
This implies that diplomatic relations among states that take this integral flourishing 
into consideration will be impossible without politicians or men and women who are 
finely attuned to the requirements of the common good. Thus both professional 




The protection, maintenance and nurturing of such enclosure that is part of the 
material aspect of the state then becomes part of the common good. The authority 
who shoulders the onus and possesses the power to maintain the common good then 
directly acquires the duty to maintain, nurture and protect such territory from 
external encroachments. The entrance without permission, and especially when it 
involves any entity declaring him or herself a contrary authority, is called aggression.  
The defence of the state against aggression then warrants an authority to use 
power—force—on such contrary authority who is seen—in the language of 
international law—as assaulting the territorial integrity of the state.  
 
Some philosophers like Brian Orend, have actually raised a cogent question on the 
idea of territorial integrity, and by extension that of political sovereignty. He asks: 
     
Why exactly are state rights to territorial integrity and political 
sovereignty worth dying for? Why are they portrayed as the 
foremost values of the international system, the violation of which 
constitutes the only crime that states can commit against other 
states? Why should we believe that collective associations like 




From the foregoing, the only reasonable answer as I see it can be extracted from 
Fanon’s statement when he was talking about colonialism and the natives. He says 
that “for a colonized people the most essential value, because the most concrete, is 
first and foremost the land: the land which will bring them bread and, above all, 
                                               





dignity.” 116  The land—territory—provides food for the citizens of the state and the 
state has the duty to defend it. If the land is taken away, the citizens lose a means of 
sustenance and this loss threatens to make mendicants out of them. They then suffer 
the problem that is associated with mendicancy. Actually the problem associated 
with mendicancy—especially when the individual is not physically impaired—is that 
of indignity: a loss of the dignity that comes from labour.  
 
With regard to time as a material aspect of the state, the state, and by extension the 
government, endures until it is conquered, annexed, overtaken etc. What this means 
then is that the decisions of the government will have to conform to this idea of 
endurance. Is it little wonder that we see governments initiating projects that will 
outlast them? Governments like other human agents not only desire some good, but 
also the permanent enjoyment of it. This idea of the endurance of the state also raises 
the question of inter-seasonal or inter-generational justice.  The government to the 
best of its ability has to distribute the available goods with an eye for future citizens. 
 
The human subjects, above territory and time, are the basic material aspect of the 
state. However, we may raise the question, which ones are part of this material 
aspect? And for the sake of clarification, we can distinguish the remote material 
subjects—that is the child or children, in so far as they are born through the actions 
of a Father and a Mother, which can be conveniently termed a family—from the 
proximate material subjects, which are the people or the nation insofar as they are 
differentiated into groups with either a religious base, civil base, economic base etc. 
If any grouping dominates the state, it tends to qualify the state. Thus we hear of 
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theocratic states, communist or capitalist states. The grouping in a state can also arise 
based on natural facts like language. Here we may have the tribes, ethnic groups or 
nations. However, these groups are non-juridical as opposed to the nation-state. 
 
 Any function of the government cannot take place without this material condition. 
Thus the government that recognizes this fact must insist on the primacy of the 
sanctity of life, and a good government must go a step further to pay attention to its 
quality, irrespective of any grouping—gender, culture or religion vis-à-vis the 
available goods for such act.  Such a government then will have a special place for 
the more vulnerable components of that material – the old, the infirm or 
handicapped, and the underage. In the same vein, given the continuity of the state 
and the natural fact of death and exit,  it will be a dereliction of duty if the 
government does not pay more than a passing attention to the  mode and the 
prerequisite of entrance of future citizens to the state. 
 
 The human subject as the material foundation of the state, from what has been said 
so far, puts a limit to the functions of the government. In this sense the distributive 
actions of the governments does not extend to the termination or disruption of the 
life of the citizens. Any policy or actions designed to exterminate or eliminate a 
citizen or group of citizens—mass murdering, ethnic cleansing etc—are thereby 
prohibited, since no government can in principle will to commit suicide. And if such 
action or initiative emanates from other groups or citizens, the government will be 




The termination of the life of an individual who is a material aspect of the state  may 
only be justified by the state on the ground of loss of citizenship and given such loss, 
the individual also has the right to defend himself against such a government whose 
actions are aimed at eliminating him or her. As Hobbes puts it, “it is one thing to 
agree: if I do not do such-and-such by a certain date, kill me. It is another thing to 
agree: if I do not do such-and-such, I will not resist your killing me.”117 It is on the 
strength of this argument that one ought to agree with Walzer in his comment with 
regard to wars of intervention and the principle of self-help that “when a government 
turns savagely upon its own people, we must doubt the very existence of a political 
community to which the idea of self-determination might apply.” 118 
 
3.2 DEMOCRACY: “FUTUROLOGY” AND SUBSTANTIVITY  
 The utmost need to assign faces to offices and the corresponding need for 
competence and skill in distribution as I mentioned earlier, raises an epistemological 
problem. The question becomes, who is capable or who is competent enough to 
distribute the burdens and benefits of the state so that the common good can be 
secured and maintained? Or if we see it from Plato’s point of view, how are we to 
recognize the philosopher kings so that they can be put in-charge of the common 
good? Our inability to possess any apriori knowledge of this fact generates an 
answer of greatest lineaments. The answer can then be any mature citizen who 
knows what is fitting for the common good. Following this answer then, democracy 
becomes the postulate of every government. However, given the problems associated 
with unanimity in decision-making, this answer does not give any concrete solution 
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to the epistemological problem. The concrete solution will then be that any citizen 
who thinks that he or she knows how best to distribute goods and burdens should 
come forward for the office. 
 
 From another perspective, we can say that whenever the need for individuals to 
assume political offices arise, there will always be people who will suffer what 
Popper calls the “spell of Plato,” i.e., those who “believe that they have discovered 
laws of history which enables them to prophesy the course of historical events.”119  
However, to fall to this spell of Plato is to inherit the mistakes of historicism. The 
fundamental mistake of historicism is what Popper recognized as holism. This is the 
mistaken belief that concrete individuals can be identified with concrete wholes and 
then be subsumed under laws.
120
   
 
History, however, may embody the activities of communities or states, which is 
collective and universal, but more than that history embodies the activities of 
individual, concrete, particular persons, the history of a George W. Bush and that of 
Mary.J Black. Over and above the mistake of holism, historicism portrays distrust in 
man’s capacity for self-transcendence. By self-transcendence, I refer to that capacity 
of man to surpass himself. It is that constant tension in human action to go beyond 
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all the already-acquired results. It is that push in man to move from the production of 
bicycles to cars and to the airplane.  
  
If we accept, for the sake of argument, that certain people, either by the circumstance 
of birth, history or background, possess the required skill and competence to stir the 
ship of the state, we still encounter the problem of allegiance. A reviewer of Kant’s 
work which he acknowledges puts it this way: 
 
To our knowledge, no philosopher has admitted the most 
paradoxical of all paradoxes, namely, the proposition that the mere 
idea of sovereignty should necessitate me to obey as my lord 
anyone who has imposed himself upon me as a lord, without my 
asking who has given him the right to issue commands to me. Is 
there to be no difference between saying that one ought to 
recognize sovereignty and a chief of state and that one ought to 
hold a priori that this or that person, whose existence is not even 
given a priori, is one’s lord?121 
 
So in the bid to occupy political offices, many people will usually present themselves 
and the problem of choice arises. That is, who among the candidates will best 
perform the duty? It is here that the issue of campaign and campaigning are located 
in democracy. The prospective candidates for offices are given the opportunity to 
communicate to the citizens their knowledge of the “sociology” and “futurology” of 
the state. In other words how far do they understand the present and future needs of 
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the state and how capable are they to meet the said needs. The state thus benefits 
from the competition of ideas that goes on in campaigns.  
 
However, the citizens remain the arbiter of both the sincerity of the campaigners and 
the proposed future of the state and thus obliged to make the best choice for the state. 
Elections as a means of determining who takes the office become a very important 
aspect of democracy.  Hence, disenfranchisement is infradig. This is to say that 
anyone who is ruled out in the voting process is deemed unfit to make a good choice 
for the state and in extension unfit for the office in question. As early as the medieval 
era, Aquinas stated that the best arrangement of authority includes this, that 
“everyone shares in government, both in the sense that everyone is eligible to be one 
of the rulers, and in the sense that those who do rule are elected by everyone.”122  
The opportunity to decide on who is to be in government means that the citizen is not 
alienated in matters that concerns his or her well-being. In a democracy, the citizens 
become the demiurge fashioning every aspect of the state.  
 
What this means is that democracy as a form of government and its accompanying 
process of selection is substantively based on a philosophical anthropology that sees 
human knowledge as having some basic characteristics. These characteristics include 
worldliness, perspectivity, personalness and historicity. By worldliness, I refer to the 
ability of human knowledge to have a rapport with the external world. Barbotin in  
his work The Humanity of Man among other things writes: 
My gaze is a gaze at something, and the something is always 
situated within my sensible and intellectual horizon. The world 
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which my eyes conquer, interpret, and admire is inseperable from 
my gaze. This symbiosis of my gaze and my world is, in summary, 
the history of my existence; for it begins in the first days of life, 
proceeds with its intense and profound exchanges during youth and 
maturity, is stabilized in my old age, and ceases with death, which 
is a break between the world and myself….The face, like the word 
and the hand, undergoes a far reaching differentiation in the sailor, 
the peasant, the mountaineer, and the city dweller. As the sun 
leaves its scorching mark on the face of those who are constantly 
exposed to it, so do vision and contemplation, whether of the 
senses or of the intellect, exercise a transforming power…. Every 
man is thus transfigured in the image of what he takes to be 
reality…Every face is the mirror of a world.123  
The future direction which a prospective candidate envisages for the state must have 
some worldly reference. This reference means that it will matter to the citizens, if 
they are farmers or sailors, if the candidate knows anything about their world. 
 
Perspectivity denotes the incapacity of the human subject to gather the object of 
knowledge in only one impression, because, since it has many aspects, and since 
whoever observes the object must situate him or herself in a particular perspective, 
he cannot wholly perceive the object. Perspectivity then indicates that the human 
subject can only acquire a partial knowledge of reality. Some philosophers like 
Sartre and Ricoeur have done well to bring to light the perspectivity of human 
knowledge. Sartre shows that reality is always given from a situation. The idea of 
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knowledge without a point of view, of a “pure” knowledge, is contradictory in that it 
would be “knowledge of the world but on principle located outside the world.”124  
 
There exists nothing other than “engaged” knowledge starting from a being-there 
necessary for consciousness and indistinguishable from it: “for human reality, to be 
is to-be-there; that is , ‘there in that chair’, ‘there at that desk’, ‘there at the top of 
that mountain, with these dimensions, that orientation, etc.’. It is an ontological 
necessity.”125  The world, like the individual objects, never offers itself in the 
absolute of its global and unconditioned appearance, but always as a “seen from.” “It 
is not possible,” says Sartre, “for me not to have a place; otherwise my relation to the 
world would be a state of survey, and the world would no longer be manifested to 
me in any way at all.” 126  
 
Like Sartre, Ricoeur’s philosophical system aims to show this perspectivity of 
human knowledge. He opines that perception always has a perspectival limitation. 
This limitation “causes every view of… to be a point of view on….”127  And almost 
in the same terminology as Sartre he states “I was born somewhere: from the 
moment ‘I am brought into the world’ I perceive this world as a series of changes 
and re-establishments starting from this place which I did not choose and which I 
cannot find in my memory. My point of view then becomes detached from me like a 
fate that governs my life from the outside.”128 
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Personalness of human knowledge means that knowledge always takes place with a 
personal participation of the knower with the known reality, an interaction and 
immersion of the human being in the sphere of the known thing. By making allusion 
to the cyclist, the swimmer and the practice of connoisseurship, Michael Polanyi in 
his work Personal Knowledge  shows that the rules of an art is not enough to 
describe the knowledge of such art. He says that “the rules of art can be useful, but 
they do not determine the practice of an art; they are maxims, which can serve as a 
guide to an art only if they can be integrated into the practical knowledge of the art. 
They cannot replace this knowledge.”129   
 
Another dimension of this personalness of knowledge is that “no sincere assertion of 
fact is essentially unaccompanied by feelings of intellectual satisfaction or a 
persuasive desire and a sense of personal responsibility.”130 It then matters to the 
citizens if the prospective candidates not only know the rules of governance but also 
any practical knowledge in the art of governance. If they are sincere, their feeling of 
persuasion and responsibility will play a part in choice making and any attempt to 
convince others. 
 
Historicity on its own refers to the time-constituent of knowledge. Mondin observes 
that “just as time possesses three ‘stages’ (past, present and future), likewise our 
knowledge has a threefold dimension: that of the past, that of the present and that of 
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future (memory, apprehension and anticipation).”131 This quality of knowledge like 
personalness is also a determining factor for both the citizens and the prospective 
candidates. This means that it will also matter if the majority of the citizens are 
young people or aged ones. What are their anticipations, the memories they cherish 
and their apprehensions? 
 
The bearing of these aspects of knowledge on campaigns and interactions of 
prospective candidates with the citizens prior to the act of choice-making enables 
any democratic community to overcome the patterns of one-dimensional thought and 
behavior. This is a pattern “in which ideas, aspirations and objectives that, by their 
content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled 
or reduced to terms of this universe.”132 However, it must be acknowledged that 
these characteristics of knowledge engender fallibility. Each candidate despite his or 
her sincerity is capable of failing. But this capacity of failure does not imply that any 
candidate can suffice for any period. The issue of character noted earlier also plays a 
part in distinguishing the suitability of candidates for offices. 
 
 What this means is that, campaigns and campaigning with regard to individual 
knowledge embodies that aspect of morality which Lon Fuller calls the “morality of 
aspiration,” which has to do with our efforts to make the best use of our short 
lives.
133
 It is the recognition of the individual that despite the level of his personal 
knowledge whether in its perspective, worldliness or history, and his presumption 
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that it will progress the state, that he still owes the community the duty of 
communication to acquaint her members with his aspiration and content of such 
knowledge, rather than imposing himself or herself on the community. It is that 
morality which understands that in political or inter-relational matters, people should 
not “weigh and qualify their obligations by standards of their own [lest] we may end 
up with the poet tossing his wife into the river in the belief—perhaps quite 
justified—that he will be able to write better poetry in her absence.”134 
 
The fundamental aim of the morality of aspiration is then this attempt to avoid or 
eschew violence in the bid to progress the state. It is the attempt to avoid the 
irrationality of freedom. As Fuller sums it “if in the future man succeeds in surviving 
his own powers of self-destruction, it will be because he can communicate and reach 
understanding with his fellows…Communication is more than a means of staying 
alive. It is a way of being alive.”135  In any democratic community then, campaigns 
provide avenues not only of communication, i.e. the candidates rendering themselves 
present to other citizens but also an expressive function  that is meant to dissipate the 
worries of the citizens towards the future of the state. In other words, bewilderment 
and desperation concerning the future direction of the state can attack citizens not 
only when none speaks, but even when there is too much noise and confusion. And 
yet; even in these cases, campaigns provide avenues for a voice anew, a familiar 
voice, that reassures the citizens and puts their heart at rest.  
 
 
                                               







3.2.1 DEMOCRACY: THE CONSTANT EFFORT TOWARDS RECTIFICATION 
 The possibility of choice among candidates in itself makes it conceivable for a 
political community to make a wrong choice(s) or mistaken choice(s). In other 
words, the alternative candidates retain their promising competence. The practice of 
democracy, in principle, then, ought to be perpetual, since an “unrectified nisus 
toward the eternal disturbs every people’s purpose…”136  Democracy then becomes a 
ritual that must be reenacted. The perennial cases of birth and death, of immigration 
and exit, of changing aims and aspirations in the state make it imperative that the 
ritual of campaigns and voting must be continuously reenacted. What this means is 
that every generation has the task of engaging anew in the arduous task of 
ascertaining the competence of electoral candidates, of comparing the skills of 
different candidates and of eventual selection by assent of the will. The task is never 
simply completed. Each generation must also shoulder the burden of seeing that its 
decision will be able to help the following generation as a guideline for the proper 
use of freedom. 
 
 It then follows that any argument against the reenactment of any democratic process 
based on the mere fact that the government of a particular period has developed good 
structures and policies that enhance the wellbeing of the citizens and promote the 
efficiency of work will be mere vacillation of the one-dimensional man. The one-
dimensional man, Marcuse argues, “will vacillate throughout between two 
contradictory hypotheses: (1) that advanced industrial society is capable of 
containing qualitative change for the foreseeable future; (2) that forces and 
                                               




tendencies exist which may break this containment and explode the society.”137  It is 
the case then that the right state of human affairs and the moral-well being of citizens 
can never be guaranteed simply through structures and governmental policies alone, 
however good they are. 
 
The establishment of good structures and mechanisms for the efficient working of 
the state by a government are not only important, but necessary; yet they cannot and 
must not marginalize the freedom of the citizens to constantly assent to the workings 
of such structures. Even a supposed best government and its policies can only 
function when the citizens are animated by convictions capable of motivating people 
to assent freely to such policies. Therefore, freedom requires conviction; conviction 
does not exist on its own, but must always be gained anew by the citizenry. If we put 
it in another way, we can simply say that governance is based on trust and trust must 
be constantly earned by transparent legitimacy. However, since man remains free 
and freedom is not always rational, any government that promises the best structure 
and policies for the right state of affairs is making a false promise. If there is a 
government who can irrevocably guarantee a determined assent to its good policies, 
the free assent of the citizens would be denied, and hence such a government would 
not be a good one at all.  
 
 This inherent opportunity for peaceful rectification rather than violence is the 
strength on which C.A.J Coady may have relied to argue that there may be a moral 
case for revolution against a dictator but never against a democracy.
138
   Though the 
argument sounds plausible, its plausibility is sustained by the elimination of one 
                                               
137 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, p.13. 
 
138 Coady, Morality and Political Violence, p.168. 
93 
 
strand of the freedom fighter’s argument, namely that of prior equal rights to the 
benefits that accrues from the government. Therefore, the implicit fallacy of the 
argument is that it assumes a one to one relationship with the form of government—
here democracy—and its functionality.  
 
In practice, a monarchy or an oligarchy can be more functional than a democratic 
government. The individual authorities in a democracy are not immune to the 
circumvention of the rule of law nor to the intense feelings, I pointed out earlier, 
which leads to the abuse of power. When a governor or group of governors decide to 
observe the law when it suits them and reject them when not, then nothing stops a 
state from falling apart through the instrumentality of violence, especially when such 
individuals can and often escape the supposed consequences of the state’s 
disapprobation.  
 
 If the reign of Gorge W. Bush and the recent release of memoirs from the United 
States justice department have taught us anything, it is that it is possible to bypass 
legal requirements even in a democratic setting without incurring the consequences 
of illegality.  The falling apart of the state may become necessary given the amount 
of power associated with such a democratic government.  However, it should be 
noted, that  modern democracy, with its idea of separation of powers  have sought to 
limit the powers  which elected governments can exert on the citizens, but this in 
itself serves as no fool proof to revolution. The obvious truth in Coady’s argument is 
that the overt acceptance of revolution as a means for leadership change will not only 
make democracy impossible but also jeopardize any future revolution. This is so 
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since the acceptance of revolution will be contrary to the principle of publicity that 
underlies democracy. 
 
Publicity as the ultimate foundation of democracy, on the one hand, secures the right 
of every citizen to political offices. As Immanuel Kant observes, “all actions relating 
to the right of other men are unjust if their maxim is not consistent with publicity.”139 
This means that the acceptance of revolution as the legitimate means of leadership 
change will generate a contest of might. A group or set of people that are more 
powerful will continue to dominate political authority to the exclusion of those who 
cannot muster the required force for consequent overthrowing of the government in 
power. On the other hand, publicity ensures the smooth functioning of the 
democratic state by spelling out who issues the orders at any given time. On the 
contrary, an overt acceptance of a maxim for revolution will jeopardize the power 
relation in the state and thus stall the smooth operation of government. Again we 
may buttress this point by referring to Kant who says: 
 
…a people would ask itself before the establishment of the civil 
contract whether it dare publish the maxim of its intention to revolt 
on occasion. It is clear that if, in the establishment of a constitution, 
the condition is made that the people may in certain cases employ 
force against its chief, the people would have to pretend to a 
legitimate power over him, and then he would not be the chief. Or 
if both are made the condition of the establishment of the state, no 
                                               









   Given the freedom fighter’s discourse, the argument espoused by Coady is then, 
not only wrong in principle, but also practically false.  The historical fact of political 
dynasties and that nearly all government of the world stretching from Latin America, 
Europe, Africa and Asia declare themselves democratic, irrespective of the flagrant 
abuse of power, attest to this. An objection may be raised at this point, namely, that 
Coady’s argument should be seen in the context of an ideal and functional 
democracy which will obviously preserve the publicity principle. This objection 
however fails since there is no way to prove or accept the argument of a (putative) 
ideal or functional democracy without a historical or palpable existence. If one 
should accept the argument of the ideal or functional democracy, the following 
question will be, why restrict it to only democracy? What of ideal and functional 
monarchy or oligarchy? It implies then that either non-functional states that declare 
themselves democratic are not democratic and thus liable to revolution or that they 
are democratic but not functional. In any case, then, Coady’s argument fails. 
 
  However, the truth maybe, as Aristotle asserted in the Politics V 1 15, that 
“democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution…” than other forms of 
government.  It becomes imperative that periodic elections as a means of constant 
rectification of wrongs are part of any democracy to avoid overdue wrongs 
clamouring for rectification. Such ritualistic attempt at rectification will be more 
effective if there is a clear and public understanding of the time of such supposed 
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rituals. This will eliminate impatience and guess work which if allowed can lure the 
impatient into revolution.  
 
When we defend the cause of democracy, then, our minds goes beyond what can be 
termed the ritual of the polling booth and the change of office at the end of an agreed 
period of time. We consider also a dispensation that upholds citizens right to general 
and clear information, enables the citizens to breathe freely, to think freely, to 
worship or not to worship without any threat to their existence and without 
discrimination in social rights.  In a democracy then, this implication of freedom of 
association can take another turn. This means that the right to collective association 
in the state also implies the right to collective dissociation, despite how difficult it 
may be. And if violence can be used to defend any right then the defence of the right 
to such dissociation can also turn violent. However, it will amount to sheer political 
naivety if any attempt at dissociation does not take into consideration the viability 
and sustainability of the material conditions of the state. 
 
In contrast to democracy are then all forms of government that aims to hoard 
authority and power.  Historically, the state was once identified with the will of the 
monarch. The monarch in effect became the embodiment of the state (L’etat cest 
moi). He is the philosopher king who knows the ideal goodness and can diffuse it to 
the citizens. In fact the end of that era generated the word “terrorism.” Camus, 
writing in the Rebel, puts it thus “the monarchy supported the concept of a God who 
in conjunction with itself created all laws.”141  
 
                                               




The notion of the state as an embodiment of an ideal, or spirit, à la Hegel, to which 
it’s unraveling, will be manifest in the dialectics of history, also ran its course, with 
the ideal being often merged with the monarch, the enlightened citizens, or the 
supreme pontiff and sometimes a combination of the either groups. Stalinism and 
millions of people who were sacrificed to this philosophy of Spirit-idealism bore a 
palpable witness to the effects of power-hoarding.  
 
In the contemporary era, different states at different times continue to exhume and 
refurbish this anti democratic dream of Spirit-idealism whose earthly agents parade 
themselves as the supreme interpreters of divine will. The era of the Taliban and 
their vestige in Afghanistan and the warlords of Somalia remind us of the effects of 
power-hoarding. During the 2010 World Cup, some of these self-appointed 
interpreters of the divine will shot some people watching the football tournament, the 
reason being that the tournament is contrary to the dictates of the divine will which 
they interpret. The hoarding of power often leads to the eradication of initiatives and 
diversity among the citizens, which, in effect is the subversion of the subsidiarity 
principle and the usurpation of functions and commitments of the citizens by the 
government.  This usurpation can even go as far as that of attire and outward 
appearance, as was seen in China under Mao Zedong, or in Mengistu’s Ethopia. 
 
In such a situation, where the individuals or a group of people feel besieged by the 
whims and caprice of the people in government who threaten to turn them into 
machines or toys to be played with as desired, then the use of organized violence 
becomes an inevitable option and in line with the Machiavellian dictum, such a 
group will assert that “where there is only hope in arms, those arms are holy.” This 
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means that the endurance of authority can only be achieved by the constant winning 
over of the citizens by goodness, and anything contrary to that will continue to stress 
the domain of such authority. In essence, citizens of a state are first of all economic, 
linguistic and cultural beings before becoming political ones, and when politics fails 
them, they retreat—like a tortoise to its shell—from where they can challenge the 
threat to their lives. 
 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
    This chapter set out to articulate the limits of power which invariably commits it 
to the ontology of the state. This ontology reveals the formal condition of the state as 
a movement towards justice. However, the movement towards justice rules out lots 
of functions as proper to the government and thus, improper to the exercise of 
political force. In other words, politics rules out lots of human activity and ought not 
to totalize.  The material conditions of the state also limits the power of a 
government since using power against such conditions will in principle amount to 
political suicide.  
 
What this means is that any violent reaction against a government can point to these 
conditions for putative justifications. However, since nation-states are historically 
rooted, any justification and reaction against the state must be progressively minded. 
The next chapter then examines the likely methods and justifications of a violent 
reaction that might be termed progressive. It also points out the danger of 







4.0 TERRORISM AGAINST THE STATE: JUSTIFICATION AND METHOD 
 
                                           SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This chapter engages the issues of justification and method of any violent reaction 
given the historical rootedness of nation-states. Any violent reaction for it to qualify 
as rational and progressive has to be based on specific claims against injustice. Such 
violent reaction, given the nature of the claims and the nation-state in question may 
not have revolutionary aims but merely seek for rectification. In other words, the 
chapter makes a distinction between terrorism against the state and revolutionary 
violence. The nation-state as a historical entity implies that the reclamation of a 
history can also serve as a justification for a violent reaction. However, the chapter 
following Paul Ricoeur raises the question whether history serves as a remedy or 
poison? The chapter also calls for the retention of the idea of non-combatant 
immunity despite the shifting nature of the material subject.   A violent reaction can 
run into a quandary, a situation which involves the forfeiture of the cause, on the one 
hand, with its fatal consequences or the intentional targeting of non-combatants, on 
the other. Here, Walzer’s idea of Supreme Emergency comes to play. However, the 
chapter calls for an overcoming of this danger of intentional attack of non-
combatants by invoking the idea of friendship. 
 
4.1 SELF DETERMINATION 
 The issue of self-determination and terrorism against the state often arise through a 
group’s internal process of self-recovery, a process through which the group creates 
or recognizes the opportunity for self-renewal. In fact any individual or inhabiting 
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group of any state must surely, at some moment or the other, reflect upon the 
significance or insignificance of its identity as it relates to the existing authority, or 
historical definition of that state, since, as the saying goes “from my mother’s arms I 
fell into the state.”142 This questioning may just have a simple focus, say the 
economic well-being of the group, or the issue of language  or a general cultural 
awareness—a restless sense of identity.  In this process of self-recovery, certain 
questions may arise; questions that interrogate the present state of affairs with regard 
to the focus of determination. This is to say that “progress” is not a neutral term. It 
moves towards specific ends and these ends must be defined by the possibilities of 
ameliorating the sufferings of the human entities. 
 
 With regard to economics, such a group may ask, “is the government’s economic 
arrangement working? Or are they working against us? In fact does this state 
harmonize or conflict with our given priorities?” The recognition of unsatisfactory 
aspects, which is often, expressed in the language of “unfair revenue allocation” 
“unequal development,” “regional or zonal neglect” etc triggers an alarm in the 
minds of the group. Oftentimes the resolution of such perceived inequalities lays 
such issues to rest. However, when the agitation for the rectification of such 
inequalities are met with combative responses from the government, dismissing the 
agitators as enemies of the state or government, then the agitators will come to feel 
that they are being colonized, a state whereby they cannot control what concerns 
                                               
142 This is the place where certain historical detachment and restitution are made either from the 
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render apology for what happened in their state or domain in the past. Certain authors and writers 
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sanction those acts and therefore we dissociate ourselves from them.” As Herbert  Marcuse observes 
“remembrance is a mode of dissociation from the given facts, a mode of ‘mediation’ which breaks, for 
short moments, the omnipresent power of the given facts.” See: One Dimensional Man, p.87. 
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their well-being, and colonialism, many will argue, loosens its hold only when the 
knife is at its throat.   
 
This is the place for terrorism against the state.  Therefore, to posit the idea of 
terrorism against the state is to recognize, on one hand, that “under the guidance of 
moral scientia, just conduct must often first be made possible by prior acts, and by 
the patient play of moral reflection upon actual political conditions.”143 This is to say 
that the affirmation of a political act as just or unjust presupposes an organized body 
of principles, norms or laws and a historical context in which the careful application 
of these principles etc., can be applied. A good example is the law court with its idea 
of the law, precedents and facts of the case.  On the other hand, it is to recognize the 
fact that “a contradiction at the heart of a body politic can elicit violence.”144 In other 
words, an incongruity in the actions of certain individual(s) with regard to the body 
of norms, laws or principles can induce the victims of such incongruous act to react 
violently. 
 
In effect then, terrorism against the state is the use of organized violence as a last 
resort to rectify a perceived injustice in a state. This rectification is first and foremost 
a contention with the authority in a given state. What this means is that those who 
are or who become legitimate targets changes. That is to say that the material 
identification of combatants and non-combatants in the traditional conception of war 
also changes with a given history as I showed earlier.  Combatants and legitimate 
targets then become any person whose function engenders or defends the policies of 
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the government that threatens the well-being of such a group with regard to the focus 
of agitation.  Of course, the function of such individuals or group of people does not 
imbue them with moral guilt, just as in war, where soldiers are often not guilty of 
any crime. 
 
In war, soldiers who do the fighting are legitimate targets since they are defending a 
status quo in contention and are liable to be killed in order to upturn the status quo. 
Likewise in the case of terrorism against the state where functionaries and office-
holders with regard to the focus of determination are likely to be killed or attacked 
by the group contending with such authority. In this case, police officers or ministers 
of certain ministries, who are engaged in the enforcement and maintenance of 
policies that are inimical to such a group, become targets of violence, where in actual 
warfare between states they are conferred with immunity. This shifting nature of 
legitimate targets renders the definition of terrorism as “the intentional attack of non-
combatants or innocents” implausible, without any historical qualification.  In other 
words, such definition becomes mere rhetoric.  
 
Following this implausibility, it also becomes a mistaken argument to deny any 
justification of attacks, save the ones involving soldiers—combatants. From what I 
have said so far, it ought to be noted that the justification or non-justification of 
terrorism against a state lies in the given answer to the stock-taking questions of such 
a group and the response by the government of such a state. These answers cannot be 
reached through any mysterious text or the pious intentions of anyone, but rather by 
an honest sociological analysis of the given state with regard to the focus of 
determination. That is to say an objective analysis of the state of affairs in such a 
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state will ascertain the truthfulness or mendacity of the agitations of a group. In this 
regard, I wish to say that to condemn or justify a priori any terrorism against a state 
without any sociological enquiry, will be highly biased since it will be treating such 
group as mere kids or fools who are not capable of determining when a policy or 
policies have been designed to systematically marginalize them or, on the other 
hand, to deny like the naïve humanist of Camus, that certain rats are carriers of 
bacillus. 
 
 An objection may arise here that what I am referring to as terrorism against the state 
is the same thing as revolutionary violence. What is the difference between terrorism 
against the state and revolutionary violence? At first sight, the distinction seems a 
difficult one to make, but the ideas of intention and agency provide the needed tools 
for such a distinction.  First, the similarity between revolutionary violence and 
terrorism against the state lies in the fact that both contend with authority, while the 
distinction lies in the intention of each struggle.  The distinction between terrorism 
against the state and revolutionary violence can be said to be akin to that of a set and 
a sub-set.  
 
In essence, a revolutionary is by necessity a terrorist against the state—here the state 
is identified with a state which he or she inhabits or is a citizen—and the actual 
intention is the deposition  of the person or people that directs the authority of the 
state. This is to say that the revolutionary either wants a new state with a new set of 
people or an individual being in authority, say the division of the physical space of 
the current state—secession—or the abdication of the persons directing the affairs of 
the state.  Terrorism against the state, generally, may or may not bear this specific 
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imprint of the revolutionary. A similar illustration can be seen in the Aristotelian 
Politics where he expounds the causes of revolution. He says that: 
…here then, so to speak, are opened the very springs and fountains 
of revolution; and hence arise two sorts of changes in governments; 
the one affecting the constitution, when men seek to change from 
an existing form into some other, for example from democracy into 
oligarchy, and from oligarchy into democracy, or from either of 
them into constitutional government or aristocracy, and conversely; 
the other not affecting the constitution, when, without disturbing 
the form of government, whether oligarchy, or monarchy, or any 
other, they try to get the administration into their own hands.
145
    
 
Terrorism against the state is content with saying that there is a wrong in government, 
a wrong which on its own justifies the use of violence for rectification but refrains 
from going to the extent that revolutionary violence goes in asserting that the wrong 
is total and irremediable without the exit of the government in question, or the 
carving out of new authority. The idea of terrorism against the state without the 
conclusive assertion that the government should be removed is not just a theoretical 
conjecture but has been historically experienced. It was Martin Luther who wrote: 
 
I am not conscious of any inconsistency….The jurist first alleged the 
maxim that force might be repelled with force, which did not satisfy 
me; then they pointed out that it was a positive imperial law that “in 
cases of notorious injustice the government might be resisted by force, 
                                               




to which I merely replied that I did not know whether this was the law 
or not, but that if the Emperor had  thus limited himself we might let 
him remain so…and, as the law commands, resist him by force.146 
 
 In Nigeria, to give an example from my own African background, between 2002 and 
2009, an armed group, named Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, 
engaged in an armed agitation against the state. The aim of the violence was to 
rectify what they deemed unfairness in revenue allocation without any conclusive 
assertion that the government should be removed or that a new authority be carved 
out. 
 
This idea of terrorism against the state without the revolutionary imprint is not 
historically limited to Africa. In the United States, during the era of segregation and 
white supremacists, there was the Ku Klux Klan(KKK) and the  Black Panthers who 
engaged in terrorist activities. Their major aim was to influence public policies, in 
other words to rectify what they deemed a wrong by the present government. Of 
course if such rectification leads to the exit or abdication of the authority at the time, 
the rectification may also be achieved, but the aim of the violence is not to remove 
the government. 
 
This distinction between terrorism against the state and revolutionary violence is not 
just a distinction aimed to explain a certain state of affairs, but it can also be of help 
in conflict resolution. A historical fact may buttress this point. In 2008 some Tibetans 
engaged in what can be termed an armed-struggle against the Chinese government.  
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Most of the rioters and agitators feel that the only resolution to the Chinese-Tibetan 
issue is the complete severance of relationship with China, that is to say, that Tibetan 
affairs be directed by an independent authority. However, the Dalai Lama, who is 
seen as the revered figure in Tibet, argued that the issue is not about a complete 
severance of Chinese authority, rather a more autonomous Tibet.
147
 In other words, 
the Dalai Lama can be said to be referring to a political arrangement that is 
commonly known as a federation or federal states. This kind of political arrangement 
cedes a substantial power to the federating units while the center or the federal 
government retains other governing powers.      
 
What this means is that given different historical, cultural and economic needs and 
priorities of a group of people, and the need for the stability and security of lives, the 
use of violence may not always aim, like a revolution, at the abdication of the people 
in government or the secession of the group, but rather in the rectification of the 
wrong that generated the violent reaction. Policy-formation and governance-decisions 
are done by human subjects who are prone to error and misjudgements. However, 
error and misjudgement oftentimes vitiate the authority of the government in 
question, but that does not automatically generate the conclusion that such 
individuals in government are totally inept and incompetent and are not capable of 
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107 
 
4.2 SUPREME EMERGENCY: THE NATION-STATE AND HISTORICAL-
RECOVERY 
The justification of terrorism against a state based on the objective state of affairs in 
such a state does not automatically justify the means by which consequent violent 
acts will be carried out.  The notion that there should be rules and restraints even 
within an acceptable mandate of justifiable violence in the cause of a people’s 
liberation is not simply a concept that is too abstruse—one that identifies the lackeys 
of the colonialist authority—to be ignored. This recalls the issue of non-combatant 
immunity in war, the idea of double effect and that of innocent shield. It should be 
emphasized that despite the shifting nature of combatants in terrorism against the 
state, they have to be identified. And any identification of the combatants 
automatically grants others who are non-combatants immunity from attack. In this 
way those who are fighting against the state maintain the morality necessary in the 
use of violence. History is riddled with cases of terrorism against the state and 
revolutionary wars where actual discriminations were made in the use of violence. 
 
 Some historical references have been pointed out by C.A J Coady where 
discrimination was employed in the use of violence in revolutions. He mentions the 
case of Che Guevara who wrote in his diary that they even give political lectures to 
captured soldiers and government officials before releasing them. Another case is the 
Cypriot revolution which General George Grivas, a participant, reported in his 
memoir that the EOKA (Ethnikí Orgánosis Kipriakoú Agónos, Greek for National 
Organisation of Cypriot Struggle) was discriminatory in its use of violence. He says, 
“we did not strike, like the bomber, at random. We shot only British service men who 
108 
 
would have killed us if they could have fired first and civilians who were traitors or 
intelligence agents.”148  
 
 Like the case of the mercenary obtainable in war, an external nation-state or multiple 
of nation-states may, in connection with the government of a given state, be 
responsible for the state of affairs that generated the armed insurrection. The question 
will then arise, is such a nation-state liable to attack, or does such nation-state(s) 
acquire a combatant status? The simple answer is in the affirmative, since like the 
mercenary who is liable to attack, such state is also liable to attack. However, the 
same caution and rules still apply towards such an external state. The implication of a 
state in the wrong against a group of people does not implicate all the citizens. This is 
to say that care also need to be taken in identifying who the mercenaries are as 
opposed to the all-encompassing idea that all the members of such a state are 
culpable.  
 
Even with all the care and caution, it cannot be ruled out that non-combatants may 
die in the process of the armed-struggle.  Therefore the idea of double effect or 
foreseen death as applied in war also applies to the case of terrorism against the state.  
It follows then that the death of non-combatants does not, on its own, vitiate the 
cause, nor does it provide the basis for the derogatory status acquired by the word 
“terrorism.”  
 
 The direct and intentional targeting of non-combatants in the case of terrorism 
against a state, or in revolutionary wars, can hasten or be believed to hasten the 
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rectification of the wrong—be it secession or change in public policy. In such a case 
the direct targeting of non-combatants will be utilitarian in nature, that is, it will be 
extremely useful in the pursuit of the cause. However, the criticism of the argument 
also rests on the general Kantian principle that human beings ought not to be used 
merely as a means to an end. Therefore the killing of human beings to achieve a state 
of affairs is not permitted given the absolute value attached to them.  However, the 
prohibition of the intentional killing of non-combatants as an absolute principle or 
rule when pursued to its logical conclusion will in some cases render choice-making 
impossible. That is to say, a time comes when it will only be a decision between 
forfeiting the cause—which involve the loss of human lives—or intentionally 
targeting non-combatants. 
 
Such cases of inevitability of choice, with regard to the killing of non-combatants 
(innocents in the ordinary sense of self-defence), has been referred to by Michael 
Walzer as the case of “Supreme Emergency.” However, before Walzer, Immanuel 
Kant has raised the same point when he was discussing the purported issue of “right 
of necessity.” He holds that there is nothing like an alleged right to take the life of 
another who is doing nothing to harm me, when I am in danger of losing my own life 
since the person is not a wrongful assailant who should be forestalled by the 
deprivation of his life. Rather, he says that it is a matter where violence is permitted 
on someone who has not used violence against me, and this assertion ought not to be 
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 What Kant is saying is that the situation that may necessitate the taking of the life of 
the innocent person is not an external law governing situation. Rather, it is a case 
where the law is incapable of aiding the chooser in any decision; he or she has no 
external guide. Thus, the subjectivity Kant is referring to is that of choice, an 
evaluation from the point of view of the chooser—without any prior directive—and 
such evaluation will either be to prefer one’s life to that of the innocent person or 
vice versa. There is always an ethical choice of preferring not to inflict the harm, but 
this is not about morality or right. To construe such decision as emanating from 
morality or right is to imbue the situation that generated the decision with the 
qualities it does not have namely that of continuity and generality.  By doing so, the 
individual imposes a moral law on it and thus requires every individual that ought to 
obey the law to act the same way. Socrates once said that “it is better to suffer a 
wrong than to inflict it.” Despite the fact that the injunction is ethically sound, it is 
limited in its application to an individual and not when such choice will involve 
others.    
 
 Therefore, the state of Supreme Emergency on its own does not connote or imply  
utilitarianism, i.e., where the choice to kill non-combatants will be an attempt to 
hasten or advance the cause for which armed struggle is aimed at, rather it is a 
situation where the prosecution of a cause runs into a quandary.  Two different 
unpalatable choices present themselves and each amounts to killing or an intentional 
destruction of human lives. The first choice will be to directly kill non-combatants 
and through such process remove the threat or situation, or human beings who are 
actually destroying lives, or, on the other hand, simply allow the destruction of the 
lives, culture and spiritual heritage of the group.  The problem here is that inertia is 
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not an option; a choice had to be made. Kant’s example of a situation generated by a 
shipwreck can suffice. This is a situation where someone in a shipwreck, who, in 
order to save his own life, shoves another, whose life is equally in danger, off a plank 




Walzer’s idea of Supreme Emergency was originally developed with reference to the 
historical character of Hitler and Nazism and their actions in the Second World War 
which required the intentional attack of non-combatants as the only means of 
stopping them.  Such cases he says lies at the outer limits of exigency, where fear and 
abhorrence are meant to unite. As he puts it: 
 
Nazism was an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an 
ideology and a practice of domination so murderous, so degrading 
even to those who might survive, that the consequence of its final 
victory were literally beyond calculation, immeasurably awful. We 
see it-and I don’t use the phrase lightly-as evil objectified in the 
world and in a form so potent and apparent that there could never 




However, we cannot say that the argument of Supreme Emergency will be limited to 
a historical figure or individuals, if so then the issue of Supreme Emergency will not 
be worth exploring since Hitler and his cohorts are dead and long gone. It is a 
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situational argument. Walzer pointed out that such a situation arises when our deepest 
values and collective survival are in imminent danger. It is: 
 
…when our community is threatened, not just in its present 
territorial extension or governmental structure or prestige or 
honour, but in what we might think of as its ongoingness, then 
we face a loss that is greater than any we can imagine, except for 
the destruction of humanity itself. We face moral as well as 
physical extinction, the way of lives as well as a set of particular 
lives, the disappearance of people like us. And it is then that we 
may be driven to break through the moral limits that people like 




Walzer’s argument on the ongoingness of a community depends on a conception of 
community, not limited to the present people inhabiting such community, nor a 
conglomeration of individuals that can be likened to a business community, rather as 
an unbroken and unbreakable chain between those who went before, those who are 
still alive, and those who are yet to be born. He actually made a reference to Edmund 
Burke, who, writing in Reflections on the Revolution in France, says that a political 
community can be likened to a contract between “those who are living, those who are 
dead, and those who are yet to be born.”153  
 
                                               






The issue however remains whether there can be a situation—created by the state or a 
mercenary-state—that warrants such an argument for terrorism against the state. But 
we must accept that there is always the possibility of such argument. In this line of 
thought, I think that Osama Bin Laden raised such an argument in 1996 when he 
declared a Fatwa on America which exhorts Muslims to kill Americans both civilian 
and military. However, whether the situation is such that it warrants the argument is 
another thing. He says: 
 
…The youths hold you responsible for all of the killings and 
evictions of the Muslims and the violation of the sanctities, carried 
out by your Zionist brothers in Lebanon; you openly supplied them 
with arms and finance. More than 600,000 Iraqi children have died 
due to lack of food and medicine and as a result of the unjustifiable 
aggression (sanctions) imposed on Iraq and its nation. The children 
of Iraq are our children. You, the USA, together with the Saudi 
regime are responsible for the shedding of the blood of these 
innocent children…154 
 
And in 1998 he argued: 
 … for over seven years the United States has been occupying the 
lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, 
plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, 
terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into 
a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim 
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114 
 
peoples.  If some people have formerly debated the fact of the 
occupation, all the people of the Peninsula have now acknowledged 
it.  The best proof of this is the Americans' continuing aggression 
against the Iraqi people using the Peninsula as a staging post, even 
though all its rulers are against their territories being used to that 
end, still they are helpless. Second, despite the great devastation 
inflicted on the Iraqi people by the Crusader-Zionist alliance, and 
despite the huge number of those killed, in excess of 1 million... 
despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the 
horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the 
protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the 
fragmentation and devastation.  So now they come to annihilate 
what is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim 
neighbors.
155
   
 
We should not overlook the implicit argument in Bin Laden’s use of the terms 
“Lands of Islam” and “Arabian Penisula,” an argument that can be termed 
historical-self rediscovery which may eventually lead to revanchism. In Bin 
Laden’s words, “our history is being rewritten.”156 The cautious admonition in any 
act of historical rediscovery will always be in line with Ricoeur’s question of 
historical sickness. This is to ask the question whether the remedy is actually 
poison, by reason of its alliance with the justice that condemns.
157
  In other words, 
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does this quest for a return to the historical past or a pristine state not amount to 
distrust in the human capacity to forge into the future; a distrust that may eventually 
yield to a totalitarianism best put in the words of Popper as the “perennial revolt 
against freedom.”158 The Khmer Rouge and the killing fields of Cambodia provide 
us with an historical example. The question of historical sickness should also not be 
oblivious of the fact that any fight against history might just be a fight “against a 
dimension of the mind in which centrifugal faculties and forces might develop-
faculties and forces that might hinder the total coordination of the individual with 
the society?” In other words “remembrance of the past may give rise to dangerous 
insights, and the established society seems to be apprehensive of the subversive 
content of memory.”159 
 
   In all, the danger in the historical-rediscovery argument will always be that of 
opportunism clothed in the garb of irredentism. However, it can be said that Bin 
Laden was not the first person to raise such argument; he expanded the geography 
of its implementation. This irredentist argument was implicit in Saddam Hussein’s 
misadventure in Kuwait in 1990 when he set out to reclaim Kuwait as an integral 
province of Iraq. If we take the speculation further, one can argue that what gave 
Saddam the impetus for such revanchist policy towards Kuwait occurred a year 
before. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 united East and West Germany into one 
nation; and in Saddam’s mind, if such unification can happen in Germany, why not 
in Iraq. However, the United Nations, spearheaded by the United States, deciphered 
Saddam’s opportunism and rejected it in the UN resolution 660 which led to 
“Operation Desert Storm” that liberated Kuwait from Saddam’s clutch. 
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Indeed, historical self-rediscovery is possible because of two conditions. (1) That 
history itself is characterized by movement and in movement there is a surfeit; 
something which remains and of course another which changes. (2) Because the 
past is not extraneous to us. Memory as an intrinsic part of the human species will 
continue to play the game of amnesia and retrieval; and the human memory has 
been augmented by the science of record-keeping. Therefore, depending on when 
and through whom history is rediscovered, it has a tendency of leading groups to 
violent reactions. Many writers have actually questioned the identification of 
“Arabian Peninsula” with “the land of Islam.”  Historically speaking, Islam has not 
always been the dominant religion in the Arabian Peninsula. And in the 12
th
 
century, the crusaders, a Christian liberation movement, invaded Jerusalem in the 
bid to liberate the land from Islamic stronghold. However, people also identify the 
ancient Babylonian religion with the Arabian Peninsula. So the danger in historical-
rediscovery is that of opportunism masking as self-determination. 
 
However, the more pressing philosophical question that arises from the argument of 
historical-self rediscovery is that of the nation-state. The question can be phrased in 
different ways. For instance we can ask when is there a nation-state? What mores 
define a nation-state? Or what does the assertion mean, nation-state? History points 
to the fact that the nation-state has no natural essence. A nation-state may just be a 
coerced state, a passive unquestioned co-habitation. It may even exist as a mere 
sentimental concept. As Raz observes, “affective and symbolic elements may well 
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be the crucial cement of society, and to these one has only to add the little power 
individuals have to affect societal affairs.”160  
 
Therefore, the nation-state may just exist through the will of an individual as was 
seen in Franco’s Spain, and since the death of Franco, the Basque and Catalonia 
have been engaged in violent struggles for independence or more autonomy. In 
recent times, it may be said that the membership of the United Nations confers any 
group with the status of a nation-state; pending when the organization chooses to 
admit a group into its fold. But what then is Taiwan which has not been admitted 
into the UN but possess all the apparatus of a nation-state? What was the then 
apartheid South Africa when it was expelled from the UN?  The truth then is, any 
claim to absolutes in matters of the nation-state’s existence or identity which may 
warrant the declaration of supreme emergency is simply false. Every nation-state is 
unique in multiple ways and thus no single law or body of criteria can validate or 
invalidate any clamour for an independent nation-state. 
 
The rhetoric on the issue of nation-states that often emanate from different leaders is 
therefore fictitious and lacks any rational basis.  We often hear that some national 
boundaries are inviolable or that to keep such nations as one remains a task that must 
be done. Most of such comments are born out of opportunistic thinking and possess 
no foundation in reality. And over the world today different groups are recognized as 
nation-states by some nations and are also repudiated by others. These include the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Western Sahara, Taiwan, South Ossetia and 
Kosovo. Other groups are presently engaged in mainly violent struggles for 
                                               




independence;  these include Tibet, Quebec, Basque country, Kashmir, The Kurds 
bestriding Iraq and Turkey, Niger Delta and the Biafra region of Nigeria, Chechnya 
and Northern Cote d'Ivoire, Southern Philippines to name just a few.  Following 
from this historical fact then, it becomes reasonable to accede to Laqueur’s advice 
that “any classification of terrorist groups is bound to simplify a complex reality. It is 
impossible to provide for terrorism the kind of typology Cuvier and Linné gave to 
Biology in the nineteenth century. Terrorism knows no eternal fixity.”161 
 
This shifting nature of the nation-state may have prodded David Luban, as I 
mentioned earlier, to refer to it as a romance. And as I see it, the nation-state is the 
romantic-oil that is poured on the tracks of humanity. Without such romance, 
humanity will be grounded or halted on the tracks of life by life-generating frictions. 
But like any romance or track that is not constantly lubricated, reality steps in, to 
remind the parties involved of the need for a constant oiling of the romantic 
machine. This means that for any nation-state to endure internally, efforts must be 
made to factor in the interests of all parties involved, and such effort must be 
continuously renewed.  
 
It then follows that whenever the validity of a nation-state is being questioned 
through the instrumentality of violence, the government of such a geographical 
enclosure must make honest efforts to understand the nature of the problem and not 
simply engage in evasive or opportunistic declarations of the inviolability of such 
enclosure. Such inviolable declarations are futile and politically subversive. They 
only serve to hinder intelligent confrontation with the very issues whose resolution is 
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essential to guarantee the emergence of a new nation-state or the continuity of such 
geographical enclosures as progressive-minded nation-states. In effect consolidating 
unjust geographical boundaries is not merely stagnating in essence and effect; but 
sterile and retrogressive, even in a democratic enclosure, since it constantly denies 
the attempt to ground nationalism in things that promote the wellbeing of the people 
and are thus durable. 
 
4.2.1 SUPREME EMERGENCY: SUPEREROGATION AND FRIENDSHIP 
The Supreme Emergency argument as Walzer presented it generates a real problem. 
The problem is the fear that political communities or groups who are in danger of 
defeat can raise the argument to attack non-combatants. In this way, the situation of 
Supreme Emergency becomes an opportunity to indulge in the utilitarian use of 
violence. C.A.J Coady actually accuses Walzer of presenting a tendentious 
argument with regard to Nazism. His argument is that Walzer is biased by 
presenting Hitler and Nazism as more dangerous when compared to Japan during 
the Second World War.
162
 Coady’s arguments against Walzer are mainly arguments 
that are based on the factual need for the Supreme Emergency argument and he 
thinks that Walzer engaged in a post facto legitimation. However, he also says that 
the Supreme Emergency argument suffers from a grave defect, namely “that it 
undervalues the depth and centrality of the prohibition on killing the innocent.”163 
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Coady’s argument emphasizes the axiological absoluteness of the human person 
which when tampered with generates “an [im]balance and incoherence in moral 
thought and practice…”164  Walzer is not likely to reject Coady’s position. 
However, his problem lies in the direction of force. This is to say that the issue is 
not only the problem of morality but of political morality. In other words, the 
Supreme Emergency argument on its own does not undervalue the prohibition on 
killing innocent people by elevating the permission to kill the innocent over the 
guilty. As I said earlier, it is a case where the cause which is violently prosecuted 
runs into a quandary. However, the truth in Coady’s assertion is that though the 
cause runs into a quandary, the direction of any further violent reaction has an 
ethical significance. This significance is what may be termed supererogation. 
Supererogatory actions are those actions that have the force of moral exemplars 
without being obligatory. It is here that we locate heroism, kindness, bravery and all 
other political virtues. The group fighting for a cause should not only be concerned 
about the state of affairs that generated their reaction, but ought to be seen as people 
who truly believe that such  a state of affairs is unjust no matter who is on the 
receiving end. As Patrick Devlin puts it, “to fight is to suffer. A willingness to 
suffer is the most convincing proof of sincerity. Without the law there would be no 
proof. The law is the anvil on which the hammer strikes.”165  
 
 This means that the denunciation of the law by a group that has been driven to a 
situation of supreme emergency or the absence of any law translates into the group 
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putting themselves in the way of the hammer. A good example is the case of 
Socrates and the thirty tyrants. As Socrates narrates the story: 
 
The Thirty Commissioners summoned me and four others to the 
round Chamber and ordered us to go and fetch Leon of Salamis 
from his home for liquidation…their object being to implicate as 
many people as possible in their evil…When we came out of the 
Round Chamber the other four went off to Salamis and arrested 




Socrates, by his very act put himself in harm’s way. Had the tyranny of the Thirty 
Commissioners not collapsed, his act would have earned him the very same fate as 
Leon of Salamis. Socrates’ action is an example of heroism, since he accepts death 
or harm rather than be a part to its infliction on an innocent person.  The implicit 
argument in Socrates’ action is that justice is primarily or basically not a question of 
a state of affairs, rather a matter of conviction. It emphasizes that choices and 
actions have both transitive and intransitive effects. The transitive effects of choice 
and action consists in the state of affairs which such action will engender while the 
intransitive effect is that such action or choices will make one or portray one as a 
certain kind of person. It simply means that choices and actions are identity or 
character determinants. This intransitivity can simply be called integrity or fidelity. 
 
It is here that we locate the issue of suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism, such as 
suicide bombing, then becomes an expression of the conviction to suffer for the 
                                               




cause. As one of the Chechen rebels, a cousin of the noted rebel leader Arbi Barayev, 
declared, “I am going willingly to my death in the name of Allah and the freedom of 
the Chechen people.”167 From this declaration, one thing becomes clear, namely, that 
suicide terrorism often make sense due to the alliance of the quest for freedom with a 
metaphysical dimension. Suicide terrorists often make allusion to a supernatural deity 
to support the motive of their action. And there are too many organizations that are 
presently using suicide terrorism as an expression of fidelity to their causes. Such 
organizations like Hamas, Al-Qaeda, the PKK, LTTE etc. 
 
However, there is a palpable danger of exploitation where irrationality is transformed 
into a supererogatory act. Here, the intention to “sacrifice” one’s life by primarily 
putting forth one’s will  towards some good goal may be as suspect as the intention to 
“sacrifice” the life of another man—just or unjust, as one good effect beside another, 
good effect.  In both cases, the rectitude of the will seems not to be sufficiently 
determined by a “merely inward, conscious turning of the intention away from the 
secondary evil known to come to pass because of a deed done primarily for another 
purpose.” 168 Recruiters of suicide terrorists always allude to the reward awaiting the 
“martyr” after his mission, thereby tantalizing them with some metaphysical benefits. 
And such benefits have the power of suspending rational judgement or a 
dispassionate evaluation of facts.  As Sprinzak observes, “recruiters will often exploit 
religious beliefs when indoctrinating would-be bombers, using their subjects’ faith in 
a reward in paradise to strengthen and solidify preexisting sacrificial motives.”169  
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The major issue then becomes, how do we forestall ourselves from reaching this 
point? Or to put in other words, how do we know when communities or political 
groups are raising such arguments just to advance their cause so that they will not be 
making crypto-utilitarian arguments under the guise of Supreme Emergency?  
 
Since the situation of Supreme Emergency lies at the outer limits of exigency, a 
place where morality is bound to be suspended due to the wellbeing of a political 
community, I think we can always pull ourselves back from reaching such a point 
by exploring the facts that make morality possible in the first place. Writing in The 
Concept of Law, Hart says that “…no individual is so much more powerful than 
others, that he is able, without co-operation, to dominate or subdue them for more 
than a short period. Even the strongest must sleep at times and, when asleep, loses 
temporarily his superiority.”170 This statement of Hart can be translated from the 
individual level to that of the state. This means that states and political communities 
are not so singularly powerful that defeating them drives any other group to the 
suspension of morality itself.  The history of the Second World War has been 
recounted by different groups and different individuals depending on their bias, so 
one may not really claim that Walzer’s argument with regard to Hitler is true; that is 
to say that Hitler and Nazism were so strong that their only means of defeat 
warrants the direct targeting of non-combatants. However, one thing remains true, 
that Hitler and Nazism were defeated by the allied forces. 
 
                                               




Meanwhile, my raising the question of Supreme Emergency is not with regard to 
Hitler or Nazism, rather with regard to terrorism against the state. The question is 
whether such arguments can be validly raised by any group carrying out an armed 
insurrection against a state. I think that the argument in theory can be sound, but the 
factual reference that permits action against non-combatants must be examined 
carefully. And in that examination, the question of reaching out toward a co-
operation that will help and explore the vulnerability of such a state must always be 
raised. In this sense then we can examine the factual claim made by Osama Bin 
Laden in the above cited statements. Even if Bin Laden’s statement contains some 
elements of truth, has it reached a stage that no co-operation is possible between the 
Arab states and all other allies that Bin Laden can raise to attack American 
combatants, other than to accept that “the ruling to kill the Americans and their 
allies--civilians and military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it 
in any country in which it is possible to do it….”171 I seriously think that it has not. 
 
The idea underlining the arguments of Supreme Emergency can be couched in 
another way—say in the language of rights and justice. The philosopher Virginia 
Held has argued, using the language of rights, that attacking non-combatants can be 
justified on the premise that the group whose basic human rights have been violated 
to the extent that the burden has become so heavy can, in the spirit of distribution of 
such violations, attack non-combatants (innocent) with the view that such violations 
will be equalized which will probably usher in a transition to the respect of the 
rights of all. In her words: 
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It is reasonable to conclude that, on grounds of justice, it is better to 
equalize rights violations in a transition to bring an end to rights 
violations than it is to subject a given group that has already 
suffered extensive rights violations to continued such violations, if 
the degree of severity of the two violations is similar…if we must 
have rights violations, a more equitable distribution of such 
violations is better than a less equitable one.
172
    
 
Held has been criticized by Igor Primoratz, and his criticism centers mainly on the 
idea of separateness of persons. He holds that a person faced with Held’s justification 
of terrorism will likely retort that “she finds the justification unconvincing and 
unacceptable; for it too does not take seriously the separateness of persons, but rather 
sacrifices her basic human rights for the sake of a more just distribution of violations 
of such rights within a group of people….”173 
 
The issue as I see it is that Held’s justification of the attack of non-combatants or 
“innocents” by a group whose basic human rights has been violated to the utmost 
level suffers from two problems. Firstly is that the justification is arguing for an 
usurpation of authority and power, and secondly, is that it misunderstands the idea of 
burden which a legitimate authority distributes for the common good. Human rights 
in Held’s view are conceived as upholding a moral order and not just an ethical 
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 As I pointed out earlier, it is only injustice that connects force to the moral 
order. Any moral order for it to be political, i.e., using physical force must have 
distributive-authorities. Those authorities must be held liable for dereliction of duty. 
In other words, Held’s argument does not understand the essence of distributive 
justice; hence the crypto-utilitarianism in her argument since it makes or sees justice 
primarily as a state of affairs without responsibility, and also does not consider the 
incommensurability of the attack on innocent people which is seen as a lesser evil 
when compared to the violations of the rights in question.  These misunderstandings 
may have blinded her from understanding and exploring the true essence and 
meaning of friendship or allies and co-operation with regard to suffering.  
 
The true measure of friendship is essentially determined in relation to suffering and 
to the sufferer. An ally or a friend who is unable to render a helping hand to a friend 
in need will only be a fair weather friend and hence not a true friend. Therefore, it 
becomes an obligation in justice and friendships to reduce the suffering of a friend by 
helping him or her confront the cause(s) of the suffering and giving other kinds of 
assistance when necessary. Here, it must be noted that what applies to individuals 
also applies to states or nations. And there are no shortages of examples where allies 
have come to the aid of their friends who are in deep need or, to use Held’s language, 
whose basic human rights have been violated.  
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 During the Berlin blockade of the cold-war era, the Western Allies, comprising 
mainly of the US and the UK, airlifted food and other human necessities to the 
people of Western Berlin. In our contemporary era, Turkey and other ally nations 
continue to supply the people of Gaza with food and other necessities which even 
resulted in the death of nine activists aboard MV Mavi Marmara when they clashed 




 Furthermore, the capacity to accept suffering for the sake of freedom and justice is 
an essential criterion of humanity, because if the human community is indifferent to 
repression and injustice, then might becomes right, and violence and injustice 
becomes the order of things. Therefore, to accept suffering or to undertake risky 
ventures for the freedom of others in order to enthrone justice is a fundamental 
element of humanity. Thus we can talk of humanitarian intervention whose examples 
can be seen in the intervention that occurred in Kosovo, East Timor, Liberia, Libya 
etc.    
 
In effect, the citizens of a state that are beleaguered can choose to cry out to 
humanity—that is to say, a class that can simply be referred to as the human 
community or international community whom they have been relating to or can relate 
to; a community typified by the United Nations, or seek the help of their friends or 
buy the services of individuals or groups.  These confrontational-options open to the 
beleaguered-citizens, however, implicate prudence. In other words, the prudential 
recommendation will be; “given these options, do not start what you cannot finish.” 
Hope-for-success then will not be an empty wish if the citizens, having taken time to 
study the ways of their adversary vis-à-vis the available options, put one or more of 
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the available options in use. Spies, moles, infiltrators etc, as means of 
confrontational-option ascertainment can then be of benefit.  
 
 Therefore, by choosing to attack non-combatants, any group whose basic human 
rights are violated usurps the power of an authority to distribute burdens for the state. 
This usurpation evades the fact that there is an existing authority whose distributive 
actions have engaged in injustice which ought to be rectified. What such a group 
needs to do is either it denies allegiance to such an authority, thereby constituting a 
new authority for itself, in other words, seceding or it targets the existing authority 
with violence in order to rectify the distributive injustice and not target non-
combatants. Again, by targeting non-combatants in the guise of distribution of 
burden, such a group mistakes what constitutes burden. The group distributes harm in 
the name of burden.  Burdens are distributed for the sake of the common good by a 
legitimate authority while harm is that which an individual suffers qua individual. 
This is so since I pointed out earlier that the dynamism of politics is always towards 
the better. But following the usurpation of authority, such a group will be distributing 
harm to individuals who are separate persons. This then is perhaps the idea of 
separateness that Primoratz is referring to, or a dimension of it.  
 
However, what Virginia Held’s argument amounts to, as I see it, is what Jeremy 
Waldron refers to as “ethical terrorism,” that is to say where a group of people—non-
combatants (innocents)—are attacked based on the main reason that they “…often 
perceived to languish in complacency and self-satisfied indifference to what happens 
in less prosperous parts of the world [a state of affairs engendered or fostered by their 
government that in turn benefits them]: their mentality is inauthentic and 
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irresponsible….”175 This violent attack will amount to a lesson in responsibility. The 
attackers will be saying nothing less than “sit up, you bunch of irresponsible fellows, 
you cannot be benefiting at our expense.”  Violence in essence becomes a 
pedagogical method. The very problem of the idea of ethical terrorism is the 
collectivization of crime. It expands the habitual avenue of escape for the politics of 
opportunism, namely, anonymity. The violation of human rights now becomes a 
collective crime that possesses no faces, identifiable features, individual psychologies 
etc. As Jeremy Waldron points out, “we seem to puke or chill at different things.”176 
In other words, there are individual reactions to what amounts to crime and this is 
often based on their temperament, conditioning etc. To attack individuals based on 
their mental disposition which does not amount to crime, to use the words of Popper, 
will amount to the “equalization not of human rights but of human minds,[which] 
would mean the end of progress.”177 This idea of individual psychologies may then 
be the other dimension of the separateness of persons which I pointed out earlier. 
 
This method and Held’s argument in general can also be likened to Rousseau’s 
pedagogical story on the respect for property which Waldron also related and which 
will be worthwhile to repeat here despite it being lengthy: 
The child, living in the country, will have gotten some idea of field 
work…he will not have seen the gardener at work more than two 
times-sowing, planting, and growing vegetables-before he will want 
to garden himself….I will not oppose his desire; on the contrary, I 
                                               
175 Jeremy Waldron, “Terrorism and the Uses of Terror,” The Journal of Ethics, Vol.8, no.1 (2004), 
p.29. 
176 See: “Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House,” Columbia Law Review, 
Vol.105, no.6 (Oct., 2005), p.1695. 
 
177 Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, p.159. 
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shall approve of his plan, share his taste, and work with him…I 
shall be his under-gardener, and dig the ground for him till his arms 
are strong enough to do it. He will take possession of it by planting 
a bean, and this is surely a more sacred possession, and one more 
worthy of respect, than that of Nuňes Balboa, who took possession 
of South America in the name of King of Spain by planting his 
banner on the coast of the Southern Sea. We come to water the 
beans every day, we watch them coming up with the greatest 
delight. I increase this delight by saying, those belong to you. To 
explain what the word “belong” means, I show him how he has 
given his time, his labour and his trouble, his very self to it; that in 
this ground there is something of himself which he can claim 
against anyone else, just as he could withdraw his arm from the 
hand of another man who wanted to hold it against his will. 
One fine day he hurries up with his watering-can in his hand. What 
a sad scene! All the beans are pulled up, the soil is dug over, you 
can scarcely find the place. Ah, what has become of my labour, my 
work, the beloved fruits of my care and sweat? Who has stolen my 
property? Who has taken my beans? The young heart revolts; the 
first feeling of injustice brings its sorrow and bitterness. Tears come 
in torrents; the devastated child fills the air with sobs and cries. I 
share his sorrow and anger; we look around us, we make inquires. 
At last we discover that the gardener, hearing our complaint, begins 
to complain louder than we: What, gentlemen, was it you who 
wrecked my work? I had sown some Maltese melons; the seed was 
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given me as something quite precious and which I meant to give 
you as a treat when they were ripe. But you have planted your 
miserable beans and destroyed my melons, which were coming up 
so nicely and which I cannot replace. You have done me an 
irreparable wrong, and you have deprived yourselves of the 




Rousseau’s pedagogical story raises a fundamental problem in the philosophy of 
education. The problem is not whether terror can teach or not, rather whether it is an 
appropriate method of teaching?  Some philosophers like Martha Nussbaum, toeing 
this line of Rousseau, affirm that “terror has this good thing about it. It makes us stir 
up and take notice…can be at least the beginning of moral progress.”179 However we 
must also add that terror can be the beginning of moral progress just like any other 
encounter. Dreams and accidents can also stir up the moral emotions. The 
inappropriateness of terror as a proper teaching method is the inability of the terror 
inducing agent to factor in the psychology of the recipients of such terror. 
 
Compassion as Nussbaum rightly observes “is not just a warm feeling in the gut…it 
involves a set of thoughts, quite complex.”180 This means that any form of education 
that incorporates terror as a pedagogical tool must first study the psychology of the 
students. The psychological element in teaching and learning cannot be overlooked. 
Most psychologists have done lots of work in this aspect. Worthy to mention is the 
                                               
178  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile, or on Education, Book II, paragraphs 289-293. Quoted in Jeremy 
Waldron, “Terrorism and the Uses of Terror,” p.30-31. 
 
179 Martha Nussbaum, “Compassion and Terror,” in  James .P. Sterba(ed.) , Terrorism and 
International Justice, p.251. 
 
180 Ibid., p.234. 
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psychologist Jean Piaget who has done an outstanding work in this area. Some of his 
works include; The Language and Thought of the Child, Psychogenesis and the 
History of Science, Intelligence and Affectivity: Their Relationship during Child 
Development. The necessity of matching psychology with education is also behind 
the idea of curriculum development. A curriculum requires appropriate teaching 
strategies to be effective and conversely, a teaching strategy reflects the teacher’s 
conception of the learning process and of the nature of the learner. It is here that the 
problem with Rousseau example comes to light. The problem is that it does not 
specify the curriculum requirements of such a child for whom terror is a pedagogical 
strategy.   
 
 In all, citizens ought to be concerned with what affects fellow citizens and other 
human beings—it is always a noble thing that fosters harmony and friendship.  
However, it must be noted that freedom, as difficult as it is to accept, implies 
freedom to indifference. The darts against the violation of human rights must be 
aimed at those who have the duty to maintain and promote them. 
 
From the foregoing, it can be deduced that terrorism against a state which aims at the 
rectification of a wrong can be justified given the ascertainment of the wrong itself. 
Such justification extends to the application of violence to mercenary nation-states. 
However, such moral justification will have to exclude the intentional targeting of 
non-combatants   (innocents) in the sense I have been using it. Therefore, any 
intentional violence meted out to an individual or a group of people based on 
utilitarian justification, or any invocation of the Supreme Emergency argument in 
defiance of objective facts and the co-operative efforts to attack combatants, or any 
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attack based on the idea of distributive justice, a la Virginia Held, subverts the cause 
of the freedom fighter, and such terrorism lapses into the “terrorism against 
humanity.” 
 
4.3 TERRORISM AGAINST HUMANITY 
4.3.1STATE-TERRORISM AND STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM 
The intentional targeting of non-combatants by groups or by the state is normally 
rationalized by many writers, and especially by agents of the state in question. For 
these writers, the idea that some human beings or the state will set out to directly 
and intentionally target non-combatants (innocents) is ridiculous since no sane 
human being will do so. These groups of people can be likened to Camus’s 
humanists I mentioned earlier.  The narrator in Camus novel acquaints us with the 
attitude of his townsfolk with regard to the idea of pestilence and its dangerous 
implication. He says: 
 
In this respect, our townsfolk were like everybody else, wrapped up 
in themselves; in other words they were humanists; they 
disbelieved in pestilences. A pestilence isn’t a thing made to man’s 
measure; therefore we tell ourselves that pestilence is a mere bogey 
of the mind, a bad dream that will pass away. But it doesn’t always 
pass away and, from one bad dream to another, it is men who pass 
away, and the humanists first of all, because they haven’t taken 
their precautions. Our townsfolk were not more to blame than 
others, they forgot to be modest-that was all-and thought that 
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The reality as history teaches us is that groups have often times intentionally targeted 
non-combatants based on the abhorrence of their belief, their race or their history. 
The KKK, I mentioned earlier, interahamwe—the Hutu militia during the Rwandan 
genocide, the Janjaweed in Sudan, the Serbian group attack on Ethnic Albanians, the 
continuous attacks on the Gypsies in Russia, all point to the fact that intentional 
targeting of non-combatants or innocents is not just a fiction but a reality . 
 
In 2008, Ahmadinejad, the president of Iran, called for the annihilation of Israel; this 
call can put the mind of the fanatic to work and, the annihilation of Israel will then 
mean the annihilation of any Israeli wherever and whenever he or she is found. 
Ahmadinejad may not be alone and definitely is not the first in this attempt of 
incitement to terrorism against humanity. Having fallen out with his former allies and 
faced with an internal rebellion in 1994, the then president of the Republic of Congo, 
Laurent Kabila, began, with or without justification, by accusing the Rwandan 
Government of sponsoring the rebels. Subsequently, in a deceptively innocuous shift 
of language, he blames a bunch of Tutsi for his woes and spoke of the ''Tutsi 
menace.''  Adolf Hitler, in 1920 talked about the “Jewish contamination.” And 
General Mladić told the Serb TV crews to “remember that tomorrow is the 
anniversary of our uprising against the Turks. The time has now come to take 
revenge on the Muslims.”182  
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These reckless and seemingly innocuous statements have oftentimes been used to 
draw the conclusion that there are “no innocents” with reference to a state or an 
ethnic group; a conclusion that puts the fanatic in motion. These heads of states may 
not be said to have directly inaugurated any killing that emanates or will emanate 
from their utterances, but they surely fueled the homicidal propensity of fanatics and 
in that case they must be regarded as the precursors of any terrorism that 
subsequently occurs based on their utterances. It follows then that we must insist that 
the crime of incitement to terrorism, especially by a head of state, ranks as heinous as 
the supply of terrorists groups with funds and ammunition.  
 
Some governments may not just be content with incitements to terrorism or murder, 
but go further in taking up the role of terrorists themselves. It is in this respect that 
we hear of the era of the “midnight knock” and that of “sudden disappearance.” The 
dictatorial governments often storm the home of political dissidents, carting away 
victims with total disdain, as has been documented in Ethiopia of the Dergue and of 
Mariam Mengitsu, of Idi Amin’s Uganda, of Iran under Shah Palahvi and the 
Ayatollahs prior to the reformist movement, or of Stalin’s Russia, or Milosevic 
Albania, or the Afghanistan of the Taliban etc. What is often at stake here, is 
tolerance and the place of dissent within a social order. However, it must be pointed 
out that any government with its underpinning ideology, no matter how equitable, 
remains open to contestation. 
 
Terrorism against humanity has often arisen or arises wherever the idea of the nation-
state becomes a notion that negates the primacy  of human livelihood or wherever the 
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idea of the nation-state becomes conflated with notions of ideological purity—racial, 
economical or political—or other forms of extreme nationalism. When this happens, 
we encounter exclusivist policies that go beyond the expelling of other human beings 
beyond a specific space of the state. The new imperative demands that they should be 
excluded from the category of humanity, and thus from the physical world altogether. 
Racism, ideological rigidity, religious extremism and other forms of xenophobia, 
when they emanate from the government, have dire consequences for any people and 
they cannot be justified, but only confronted. 
 
4.3.2 HIERACHY INDUCED VIOLENCE 
 Exclusive policies and attitudes are not limited to governments. Oftentimes, 
extrusive violence by non-state groups is merely the physical actualization of 
hierarchical mindsets that have been carefully inseminated and tended gradually and 
purposefully. This is where it is necessary to decry a misplacement of emphasis by 
those who argue or submerge all violence of non-state groups under class struggles. 
The class struggle, it must be admitted, is only a fraction, a significant fraction of the 
totality of causative factors and it will be a dangerous oversight for any society to 
overlook this. We then have to confront specifically all propositions that the root 
cause of any social eruption and organized violence, wherever it involves the group 
we generally identify as the under-privileged, will be found solely in social 
inequality. These propositions sound nicely radical, but how do we reconcile them 
with—to take one blatant feature of Bin Laden’s “Lands of Islam” and “Arabian 
Peninsula”—a supposedly corrective proposal against an exploitative and dominating 
order, that nonetheless relegates half of its citizens, its women folk, to a subservient, 
socially invisible role, turns them into mere pliant vessels for the dictation of the 
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other half? This, going by the history of the world, does not constitute a radical, or a 
liberating manifesto, but a reactionary immersion into the pool of tyranny.   
 
The question that might follow is, how do we determine when this hierarchical 
mindset is at work? Despite how difficult an answer may appear, my response is that 
to detonate bombs in a wedding ceremony as happened in the June 10
th 
 2010 Afghan 
bomb attacks that killed up to thirty-nine people, or to explode bombs on worshippers 
as happened in the May 28
th
 2010 Ahmadi Mosque attacks in Pakistan, counts 
nothing less than acts of contempt for humanity itself. In fact, at the basic minimum, 
we can assert that any act of violence directed against individuals immersed in 
functions that are purely social or religious, and are devoid of any political 
significance, must count as terrorism against humanity and must be fought against. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
   By way of recap, this chapter argues that the historical context of nation-states 
implies that any justification for violent action identify concrete claims as 
justificatory basis. What this means is that just conduct must often first be made 
possible by prior acts that are historical and by the application of moral principles 
upon actual political conditions with the aim of improving or progressing the political 
community. It also points out the politics of opportunism that often masquerade as 
progress, in which non-combatants become intentional targets of violence. This 
opportunism can be couched in different languages like supreme emergency a là 




The chapter also suggests the need to factor in the idea of friendship and alliance in 
order to overcome this politics of opportunism. The next chapter takes up this idea of 
alliance and its corresponding aim of intervention to ascertain its justification and 
feasibility in the face of the international rule of sovereignty for nation-states, if 























          CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 ALLIANCE, ARMED-INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
                                          SUMMARY 
The stability of nation-states is necessary for the flourishing of the citizens of such 
state. However, this need for stability, coupled with the requirement of non-violation 
of states sovereignty provides a loop-hole, not only for governments who engage in 
terrorism against humanity to consolidate their power, but also for groups who seek 
to acquire power to destabilize an existing government to the detriment of other 
citizens. But a closer look at the charter of the UN uncovers an affirmation of a faith 
in fundamental human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person. This 
affirmation provides a justification for armed-intervention that is not encumbered 
with the problem of superior-inferior or master-slave relationship in international 
affairs. But again, armed-intervention based on human rights can be opportunistic, in 
the sense that intervening states can have other exploitative or domineering motives. 
The need to prevent interplay of motives in interventions might have been the reason 
behind Article 39 of the UN charter which confers on the Security Council the 
burden of armed-intervention in states. Though this burden does not amount to that 
of sovereignty determination, it often provides, through its language and idea of 
peace keeping and peace enforcement, an opportunity for terrorism against 
humanity. The preceding facts of the U.S invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, provide   
the UN with moral lessons of the need to be vigilant against the violation of human 
rights if it is not to be accused of complicity in the crimes of history. 
 
5.1 SOVEREINGTY AND STABILITY 
The opportunistic use of force is not the prerogative of governments. Groups who 
seek opportunities to acquire power for their own ends may engage in terrorist acts 
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against the state, and given the capacity of groups to forge alliances or die for their 
causes, the stability of states may be in danger. It is only in a stable environment that 
the citizens of any state can flourish, and the government has the onus of ensuring 
that such stability is assured for the citizens to flourish. This function of the 
government provides an opportunity for any government that engages or is engaging 
in acts of terrorism against humanity to consolidate its power. This opportunity is 
further orchestrated by the demand of non-violation of states’ sovereignty. Indeed 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, Resolution 2625(XXV) (24 October 1970) states that: 
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external 
affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all 
other forms of interference or attempted threats against the 
personality of the State or against its political, economic and 
cultural elements are in violation of international law.  
 
However, when the idea of international law is mentioned with regard to states, there 
seem to be a quandary or concern as expressed by many theorists. Kant was worried 
that the idea of international law if not seen as a law that respects the independence 
of states will end up in a universal monarchy where laws will lose their vigor to a 
soulless despotism.
183
  But the independence of states generates skepticism 
concerning the validity of international laws. Kant himself opines that “a state 
                                               




implies the relation of a superior (legislating) to an inferior (obeying).”184 If this is 
the case then international law cannot be valid in the sense that no state can be said 
to be superior to the other and thus international law will have no obligatory power. 
This worry is reaffirmed by Hart when he says that “one of the most persistent 
sources of perplexity about the obligatory character of international law has been the 
difficulty felt in accepting or explaining the fact that a state which is sovereign may 
also be ‘bound’ by, or have an obligation under, international law.”185 
 
The attempt to dissipate such worry culminates in the idea that the ground norm of 
international law can only come from the agreements or pacts entered by states. 
Hence, the saying, “pacta servanda sunt.” The problem, as history attests, is that not 
all states ratify many protocols of the United Nations. Thus if “pacta servanda sunt” 
is the only source of international law, international law will not be effective. Some 
protocols of the UN borders or will border on armed-intervention in nation-states.  In 
this way, the stability of states, which the idea of sovereignty aims to engender, will 
be eroded.  
 
The maintenance of avenues that will bolster the sovereignty of states remains the 
most plausible option for stability. However, the above quoted resolution of the 
United Nations poses two different palpable dangers. Firstly, it has the tendency of 
making other states mere spectators in the plight of the citizens of a state when the 
government of the day is engaged in terrorism against humanity.  Secondly, it has the 
capacity of ossifying the states that were in being prior to the coming into force of 
the declaration. This means that groups seeking secession from any state will be seen 
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from a hostile lens. These dangers will work against the rationale of the charter of 
the UN and the justification for the creation of such states like the state of Israel.  
 
The very reason why the United Nations came into being, following on the heels of 
the Second World War, is not only to foster international relations, but above all to 
ensure that the horrors of the Second World War, where a government turns on its 
citizens based on any ideology be it race or religion, do not repeat themselves.  In 
fact the opening sentences of the United Nations lays down this aim. It says: 
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to 
mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions 
under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, 
and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom… 
 
One crucial thing to note from the above excerpt of the UN charter is that it mentions 
“other sources of international law.” These are sources outside treaties made by 
sovereign states.  A closer look at the excerpts also uncovers the reaffirmation of a 
“faith in fundamental human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person.” 
This statement on a closer look is not encumbered by the problem of states’ 
sovereignty in the sense that such affirmation does not amount to a command from a 
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superior state to another. It is then not a coincidence that three years after the coming 
into being of the UN charter, it adopted a declaration on human rights titled 
“UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS” and in the declaration also 
made reference to its earlier affirmation in its charter.    
 
An outstanding article in the declaration as I mentioned earlier is Article 21 
especially (3) which says that “The will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of the government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine 
elections which shall be by universal suffrage and shall be held by secret or by 
equivalent free voting procedures.” What this means is that the sovereignty of a state 
now belongs to the people of such state who lends it to the government and can also 
be withdrawn when such governments turns out to be tyrannical or anti citizens.   
 
This idea of state sovereignty being based on the people, as opposed to the idea of 
sovereignty belonging to the government, has gained a foothold in international law. 
As Reisman points out: 
International law is still concerned with the protection of 
sovereignty, but, in its modern sense, the object of protection is not 
the power base of the tyrant who rules directly by naked power or 
through the apparatus of a totalitarian political order, but the 
continuing capacity of a population freely to express and effect 
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It follows that, the violation of the sovereignty of a state can either come from an 
external or internal force. And the confrontation and consequent liberation of such 
usurping power can also come from an internal or an external source.  It is only on 
this basis of human rights that any humanitarian intervention can be plausibly 
justified. In other words, human rights are simply other faces of freedom and justice, 
and thus the obverse of power and domination. In a complicated world like ours 
where the demands for justice are often hazy, the language of human rights provides 
a supple and potentially precise instrument for sorting out and expressing the 
demands of justice. History has often shown that neglecting human rights by some 
governments often turn out to be a boomerang. The history of Russia under Stalin 
and post Stalin bears witness to such consequences, and the contemporary 
revolutions in the Arab world that saw the ouster of Mubarak of Egypt and Ben Ali 
of Tunisia remain pointers.   
 
Armed-intervention, either on the side of the government of a state or the group 
challenging its authority, can then be taken and evaluated based on the human rights 
declaration. Historical examples abound where such interventions have been taken 
by states. In 1983, the United States intervened in Grenada to liberate it from 
fratricidal maniacs who murdered the then Prime Minister Maurice Bishop.  In 1979, 
Tanzania under Julius Nyerere intervened in Uganda to liberate the people from the 
tyranny of the then President of Uganda, Idi Amin. Such interventions can also assist 
or speed up a people’s quest for secession, like the case of India in the then East 
Pakistan that brought about the existence of Bangladesh, or NATO’s intervention in 
Bosnia that assisted the secession of Kosovo, whose declaration of independence 
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was affirmed by the ICJ as not violating any international law.
187
 These actions 
buttress the point of Vattel that “if tyranny becomes so unbearable as to cause the 
nation to rise, any foreign power is entitled to help an oppressed people that has 
requested its assistance.”188 
 
The noble cause of intervention must be extolled but the danger that comes with it is 
the danger of would-be intervening states mixing the motive of intervention with 
other motives like the opportunity to exploit natural resources, etc. This potentiality 
of mixed intentions might have been anticipated by the United Nations in its attempt 
to curtail state intervention in others territory through Art 39 of its Charter. The 
article confers on the Security Council the onus of determining a threat to peace and 
also cases of aggression. It says: 
 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
    
This article follows from Art 24 (1) which states that the members of the UN “confer 
on the Security Council the primary responsibility of the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”  However, it should be 
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noted that the reservation of such powers to the Security Council is also fraught with 
many problems. Among such problems are the politicization of the Security Council 
itself, the power to veto resolutions by permanent members and the non-possession 
of independent armed forces.   
 
5.2 THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE IDEA OF PEACE KEEPING 
In line with the maintenance of the principle of self-determination that is enshrined in 
its charter, the United Nations humanitarian intervention in states is termed 
“peacekeeping.” The terminology is significant in the sense that it distinguishes the 
actions of the UN as an attempt to help maintain the peace of an Order rather than 
enforcing an Order or creating an Order. It means that we cannot strictly talk of “Pax 
United Nations” as people often talk about “Pax Romana or Pax Britanica.” The 
United Nations department of peacekeeping operations clearly outlines the 
distinctions between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement. It states 
that, while “peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress 
and usually involves diplomatic actions to bring hostile parties to a negotiated 
agreement… Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however 
fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements 
achieved by the peacemakers.”189   
 
Peace enforcement, on the other hand, “involves the application, with the 
authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the 
use of military force.” Such actions, which the department says, “are authorized to 
restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has 
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determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression”.190  What this means is that the United Nations is not a sovereignty 
generating body even when it applies force. The sovereignty of a state or the 
statehood of a group or people inhabiting a territory does not depend on the said state 
being a member of the UN. This is also made explicit in the Charter. Article 35 (2)  
explicitly states that “a state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring 
to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to 
which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the 
obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.”  
 
The application of force by the UN is then a principled action that is designed to 
maintain an Order that has been reached through other means, preferably through 
negotiations. It recognizes this by stating that: 
 
..although the line between “robust” peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement may appear blurred at times, there are important 
differences between the two. While robust peacekeeping involves 
the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host 
authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, peace 
enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic or 
international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States 
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It then follows that peace enforcement can only come when an international or 
strategic line has been drawn. In a territory whose historical lines are not defined, this 
can come about through a unilateral secession or a partition based on the agreement 
of the parties involved.  A historical example is the United Nations intervention in 
East Timor carried out mainly by Australian contingents. East Timor and her 
relationship with Indonesia were fraught with colonial and decolonization hangover 
from Portugal. However, an attempt to resolve the issue resulted in a referendum 
initiated by the then Indonesian President, Habibie, which attracted a high turn-out of 
98.6 per cent. On 4
th
 September 1999 the UN announced the result: 78.5 per cent in 
favour of independence. This self-determining action can be said to have established 
a strategic or international line. However, sections of the Indonesian army and the 
militia began to kill and attack the East Timorese people which resulted in the 




Many countries in conflict or where Human Rights abuses are rife have complicated 
histories and attempts towards a strategic demarcation of territories are difficult and 
oftentimes elusive. These often result in long-term violations of human rights, 
genocides and ethnic cleansing.  In effect, the government of countries with 
complicated histories, can and often take advantage of the United Nations’ idea of 
peacekeeping with its operational principles of “consent of parties, impartiality, non-
use of force except in defence and defence of the mandate”193 to continue the 
terrorization of humanity in their territories.  The UN and its peacekeeping 
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department should be aware of the historical background of conflicts prior to 
intervention to avoid ending up in complicity with the violation of human rights.  
 
Genuine peace can only be a product of justice. This means that every effort must be 
made to identify the criminal and the victim in order to know who to be protected 
from whom. Indeed, the problem that bedevils the peacekeeping efforts of the UN is 
the failure to clearly articulate who is to be protected from whom or what. This has 
often led to the abandonment of peacekeeping in certain countries that are then left at 
the mercy of power besotted individuals or groups. In the case of Somalia, the hasty 
pull-out of the American troops after the proverbial “Black Hawk down” only 
succeeded in making Somalia a pariah and a bandit of the world where piracy looms 
large.  
 
In a specific reference to the case of Sierra Leone, Robertson observes that “its 
fundamental peacekeeping failure has been its ‘reluctance to distinguish victim from 
aggressor.’ Adherence to the shibboleth of neutrality had once again-as at Kigali 
resulted in ‘complicity with evil.’”194  As in the case of Rwanda and Sierra Leone, so 
was that of Srebrenica. The Dutch contingents who were supposed to protect the 
Bosnian men and boys ended up in handing them over to the Serbian army who 
eventually massacred them, while the negligence of the UN contingent to, at least, 
shut down the radio station in Kigali through which the Hutu militia were instigating 
and diffusing hate, unwittingly led to the increased massacre of the Tutsis.    
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5.3 THE “WAR ON TERROR” AND COMPLICITY IN THE WRONGS OF 
HISTORY 
5.3.1 INDIFFERENCE AND ENERVATION: THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN 
 
After the September 11 attack on the United States, the indignation of the attack was 
enormous, and by 7 October, the United States invaded Afghanistan with the 
argument that the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan provided a safe haven for 
Al Qaeda who masterminded the attack. Most writers argued that the invasion of 
Afghanistan did not breach any international law, given the fact that the Taliban-led 
government made its territory available for Al Qaeda. In effect, the Afghan 
government is complicit in the crime of aggression. 
 
Legal precedents from the rulings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) were 
used to buttress this point. The test or argument is that, a country ought to have 
control of its territory. In other words, the government shoulders the burden of 
policing its territory and thus ought to exercise due diligence in making sure that its 
territory is not used as a base to attack other states. On 9 April 1949, the ICJ ruled in 
United Kingdom v. Albania that every state has a duty to prevent its territory being 
used for unlawful attacks on other states.
195
   On 24 May 1980, the ICJ also ruled in 
United States v. Iran on the case concerning United States diplomatic and consular 
staff in Tehran that “(1) Iran has violated and [was] still violating obligations owed 
by it to the United States (2) that these violations engage Iran’s responsibility…”196  
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Also, the court, in accepting the merit of the case brought against the United States 
by Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), made a distinction between controlling 
forces that carried out an unlawful act, and mere training of such forces. In effect, the 
United States was not only responsible for the training of the paramilitary troops that 
carried out operations in Nicaragua but has a measure of control over them.
197
 The 
conclusion from these cases as Robertson puts it is that: 
Afghanistan’s duty imposed by international law was, in effect, to 
exercise due diligence: to take whatever steps were reasonable to 
stop al-Qaida furthering its conspiracy by launching attacks on 
Americans, or to arrest them as soon as there was reason to suspect 




The irony of this legal precedent is that the United States withdrew from the 
obligation to obey the judgment of the ICJ in Nicaragua’s case. However, this near 
unassailable argument cannot overlook two crucial facts.  First is the nationality of 
the attackers. None of the nineteen hijackers was an Afghan citizen. While fifteen of 
them were from Saudi Arabia, two were from United Arab Emirates, one from Egypt 
and the other from Lebanon.
199
 Secondly, the airplanes were not coming from 
Afghanistan but were United States domestic flights. Despite these facts and how 
they impinge on international law, we cannot overlook the complicity of the United 
Nations in the conditions that made these speculations and invasion of Afghanistan 
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The UN was complacent and did not firmly condemn or take actions with regard to 
the actions of the Taliban prior to the attacks of September 11. The Taliban under 
Mullah Omar, on capturing Kabul in 1996, violated the UN’s compound where the 
immediate president Mohammed Najibulla Ahmadzai took refuge. They seized him, 
tortured him, castrated him and dragged his body behind a jeep and finally hanged it 
on a lamppost. As Ahmed puts it, “blunders by the UN were partly responsible for 
his death.”201  In 1997, the Taliban, sensing a defeat in their attempt to capture 
Kabul, engaged in a massacre in the town of Mazar-E-Sharif. They “poisoned water 
wells and blew up small irrigation channels and dams in a bid to ensure that the local 
Tajik population would not return in a hurry.”202  
 
 The Taliban, between 1998-1999, not only carried another massacre in Mazar, but 
showed their religious intolerance by blowing up the statues of the ancient Bamiyan 
Buddha which clearly portrays a religion that flourished before the coming of Islam. 
Ahmed’s presentation of eye witness accounts of the Taliban’s massacre in 1998 
says: 
The Taliban went on a killing frenzy, driving their pick-ups up and 
down the narrow streets of Mazar shooting to the left and right and 
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killing everything that moved -shop owners, cart pullers, women 
and children shoppers and even goat and donkeys. Contrary to all 
injunctions of Islam, which demands immediate burial, bodies were 
left to rot on the streets. They were shooting without warning at 
everybody who happened to be on the street, without discriminating 
between men, women and children. Soon the streets were covered 
with dead bodies and blood. No one was allowed to bury the 
corpses for the six days. Dogs were eating human flesh and going 




The means and method by which the Taliban executed their victims were horrible. 
Ahmed recalls an eye witness account that “people were shot three times on the spot, 
one in the head, one in the chest and one in the testicles.” While a Tajik widow 
whose husband and brothers were killed reported that when the Taliban stormed into 
their house, they shot her husband and two brothers on the spot. “Each was shot three 
times and then their throats were slit in the halal way.”204  These massacres Ahmed 
said were aimed at cleansing the north of the Shia. Taliban Mullahs after taking the 
city were proclaiming from the city’s mosques that the Shia has three options 
“convert to Sunni Islam, leave for Shia Iran or die” and all prayers conducted by the 
Shia in Mosques were banned.
205
 After the Taliban rampage, the UN and the Red 
                                               








Cross, having no independent observers around, estimated that between five thousand 




  The Taliban’s obsession with religious conformity led them to opening a 
“Department of the promotion of Virtue and prevention of Vice.” The department 
issued edicts for women and measured the length of men’s’ beard for conformity. 
One of its edict states that “after one and half months if anyone observed who has 
shaved and/or cut his beard, they should be arrested and imprisoned until their beards 
get bushy.”207  And women were banned from wearing high heels, making noise 
with their shoes while they walked or wearing make-up.  The Taliban’s treatment of 
women was so bizarre. They banned women from working, from sitting near a man 
even in a car, and above all from acquiring a formal education. These requirements 




 The gross violation of human rights by the Taliban did not meet with any forceful 
reaction from the United Nations apart from the constant outbursts of the United 
Nations humanitarian based organizations that were working in Afghanistan. The 
constant frustrations engendered by the Taliban led to the resignation of UN 
mediators in Afghanistan, namely, Mahmoud Mestiri, Nobert Holl and Lakhdar 
Brahimi. It was not until  15 October 1999 that the United Nations Security Council 
adopted resolution 1267 imposing limited sanctions against the Taliban in response 
to the continuing violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights, 
particularly against the discrimination of women and girls. 
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This atmosphere of terror and impunity that flourished under the Taliban enabled 
Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to flourish discreetly in Afghanistan. It was after 
the 7 August bombing of American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania linked to Al-
Qaeda, that the United States deemed it fit to launch cruise missiles on Afghan 
camps and a pharmaceutical company in Sudan through an operation codenamed 
“Operation Infinite Reach.”  These strikes led to anti-American demonstrations in 
different parts of the World, especially in Islamic countries like Yemen, Sudan and 
Libya.  
 
The Taliban themselves were outraged and Mullah Omar criticized the then 
president of the United States, Bill Clinton.  In reference to the Monica Lewinsky 
affair, he said, “if the attack on Afghanistan is Clinton’s personal decision, then he 
has done it to divert the world and the American people’s attention from that 
shameful White House affair that has proved Clinton is a liar and a man devoid of 
decency and honour.”209  The Taliban insisted that they will not hand over Bin Laden 
to the US since he was a guest, not just of Taliban, but of Afghanistan, and is owed 
hospitality under the Pashtun tradition. Omar added that “America itself is the 
biggest terrorist in the world.”210  This hospitality of course goes beyond the Pashtun 
tradition since Bin Laden was among the Mujahedeen that fought the Soviet Union 
and forced their exit from Afghanistan.  
 
The September 11 attacks thus handed the United States a justifiable case, not just 
for missile attacks on Afghanistan, but for its outright invasion. However, I see the 
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invasion of Afghanistan from a bifocal lens. First, the invasion can be seen as a 
reaction of mass hysteria that enveloped the United States after the September 11 
attacks. The government of the United States, though having clearly failed in its 
function of crime prevention, ought not to be seen as a failure and one that is 
incapable of protecting its citizens from terrorists. The perpetrators of a crime of 
such magnitude must be held accountable and accountability implies the imputation 
of guilt on some living agents, given the fact that the hijackers were dead. Those 
living agents cannot be any other person or government other than those who have a 
link with Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. Therefore the Taliban becomes guilty by 
association. 
 
Any other argument to impute guilt on the Taliban based on the fact that they knew 
that Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda were planning to bomb the Pentagon and World Trade 
Centre is what I regard as mere rationalization and post facto argument. Robertson 
has argued that given the fact that the Taliban knew of Bin Laden’s fatwa on 
America and the permission given to him to run training camps for Kashmir fighters 
near Kandahar, there was interdependence between them. Therefore, they are guilty. 
He says: 
 
The Taliban, in other words, knew that Bin Laden was the linchpin 
of a continuing conspiracy to murder Americans, whether civilians 
or diplomats or soldiers, conducted systematically and pursuant to a 
racist policy. With that knowledge, they gave him every possible 
assistance, ranging from physical protection to the use of state 
facilities. The Taliban would not have known precisely the time or 
157 
 
nature of the 11 September attacks, but they obviously knew that a 
crime of this dimension was imminent, which they deliberately 
assisted, and politically and ideologically approved. There is, in 
other words, a compelling case against the Taliban leaders for 





Robertson’s case against the Taliban can be faulted. First, Bin Laden is neither an 
Islamic scholar nor a teacher, and thus has no moral or legal authority in the Islamic 
world to issue fatwas, and any serious minded Islamic follower knows that. Thus his 
“death to America” carries no moral weight in the Muslim world.212  Secondly, the 
permission given to Bin Laden to train fighters for the purpose of Kashmir liberation 
can be seen as a return of favour or as the continual attempt by the Mujahedeen to 
liberate their claimed lands from infidels or usurpers. The Taliban themselves were 
able to run Afghanistan through the help of such assistance by the Mujahedeen. In 
other words, there is no reason to believe that the Taliban knew that Bin Laden was 
planning an attack on the United States rather than on Kashmir. 
 
The second lens of the bifocal viewing of the Afghan invasion is humanitarian. In 
this sense then, the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan can be seen as a 
humanitarian intervention that was long overdue. The plausibility of this view not 
only stems from the atrocities of the Taliban regime, but also from the compounding 
sanctions issued on them by the Security Council.  This may account for  the near 
acceptance of most members of the Security Council of the invasion of Afghanistan 
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through the adoption of Resolution 1368 which condemned the September 11 attacks 
and  “regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to 
international peace and security” and also expressed “its readiness to take all 
necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to 
combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the 
Charter of the United Nations.”   
 
Article 3 of the resolution gives a general authorization for action to bring the 
perpetrators to justice. It thus: 
Calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the 
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and 
stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring 
the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held 
accountable. 
 
This was followed by the adoption of Resolution 1373 which enjoined states to “take 
the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts” and to “cooperate, 
particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to 
prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such 
acts.” However, any justification of the invasion of Afghanistan on humanitarian 
bases must not overlook the fact that it took the shocking acts of September 11 to 
push the United States and the UN to action. 
In this sense, the words of Ahmed, before the attacks, were as appropriate then as 
they are after the attacks and now. As he puts it, “the USA was now paying the price 
for ignoring Afghanistan between 1992 and 1996, while the Taliban were providing 
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sanctuary to the most hostile and militant Islamic fundamentalist movement the 
world faced in the post-Cold War era.”213 The US through the CIA engaged in a 
proxy war with the Soviet Union by arming the Mujahedeen and American oil 
companies, especially Unocal, were romancing with the Taliban in its bid to 
construct oil and gas pipelines passing through Afghanistan by which the oil and gas 
from the Caspian Sea and its surrounding oil wells can be exported to the West and 
the World Market.
214
   
The huge lessons for the United States and the United Nations at large that can be 
drawn from the September 11 attacks and the consequent invasion of Afghanistan are 
that: (1) armed invasion of a nation-state as a product of mass hysteria cannot 
successfully disguise the ineptitude of the security apparatus of a nation and the 
insensitive consequences of attracting war on a chequered people. (2) They ought to 
remain vigilant in the protection of Human Rights. These rights include the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The infringement of these rights, 
especially by the government of a state becomes the collective responsibility of all 
and must be sternly addressed. The movement towards international terrorism begins 
with seemingly innocuous violations of human rights. The signs were increasingly 
ominous in Afghanistan.   
5.3.2 NEGLIGENCE AND EQUIVOCATION: THE CASE OF IRAQ 
The 2003 American invasion of Iraq is an egregious violation of states sovereignty 
whose pre and post factual justifications have turned out to be hollow. The only 
plausible justification for the invasion can be attributed to the ever increasing 
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paranoia that enveloped the Bush-led administration after the September 11 attacks. 
As Zainuddin puts it, “the attacks of September 11, 2001 had been disconcerting to 
the hyper-power that virtually anyone holding a grudge against the U.S. was a 
potential terrorist and hence must not be left unpunished…this was when war 
advocates mixed spin and fact in their presentation.”215 This paranoia was seen in 
George W. Bush’s attempt to link Iraq and Saddam with the terrorists.  
 
In his 7 October 2002 address, George W. Bush mixed spin and facts by claiming 
that Iraq habours some Al-Qaida members. He said: 
 … the source of our urgent concern about Saddam Hussein's links 
to international terrorist groups. Over the years, Iraq has provided 
safe haven to terrorists such as Abu Nidal, whose terror 
organization carried out more than ninety terrorist attacks in twenty 
countries that killed or injured nearly 900 people, including 12 
Americans. Iraq has also provided safe haven to Abu Abbas, who 
was responsible for seizing the Achille Lauro and killing an 
American passenger. And we know that Iraq is continuing to 
finance terror, and gives assistance to groups that use terrorism to 
undermine Middle East peace. We know that Iraq and the al-Qaida 
terrorist network share a common enemy -- the United States of 
America. We know that Iraq and al-Qaida have had high-level 
contacts that go back a decade. Some al-Qaida leaders who fled 
Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior al-Qaida 
leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and 
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who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological 
attacks. We have learned that Iraq has trained al-Qaida members in 
bomb making, poisons, and deadly gases. And we know that after 
September 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the 
terrorist attacks on America. Iraq could decide on any given day to 
provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or 
individual terrorists. Alliances with terrorists could allow the Iraqi 




However, as Zainuddin pointed out, the Al-Qaida remnants Bush was referring to is 
the Ansar al-Islam group. And among them were 150 battle-weary Arabs fleeing 
Afghanistan who were captured by the Kurds who controlled Northern Iraq, and 
much to their dismay, the United States was not interested to talk to them.
217
 And 
while it is true that Mussab al-zarqawi did visit Iraq, he was there for medical 
treatment as President Bush also alluded.
218
  Tariq Aziz, Saddam’s deputy and 
foreign minister, had previously gone on air to make it clear that Iraq and Al-Qaida 
have varying ideologies and some writers like Daniel Benjamin argued that: 
 Iraq and Al Qaeda are not obvious allies. In fact, they are natural 
enemies. A central tenet of Al Qaeda's jihadist ideology is that 
secular Muslim rulers and their regimes have oppressed the 
believers and plunged Islam into a historic crisis. Hence, a 
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paramount goal of Islamist revolutionaries for almost half a century 
has been the destruction of the regimes of such leaders.
219
  
He concluded that  the claims of the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, and 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that senior  al-Qaeda officials have been in 
Baghdad and that there is evidence of cooperation on weapons of mass destruction 
represent a dramatic departure from the record and, as such, ought to be aired as 
comprehensively as possible.
220
  Also, Baathism, as George Parker reported, is 
nominally secular like its European progenitors.  Michel Aflaq, the founder of the 
Baath party in Damascus (whose tomb is in Baghdad), Parker says, was deeply 





The case of Abu Nidal who was a member of the Fata Revolutionary Council, an 
organisation that seeks the annihilation of Israel and the promotion of the Palestinian 
cause and had carried out assassinations of PLO members in different countries, was 
also weak. Abu Nidal was dead by August 2002 in Baghdad, supposedly assassinated 
by the Mukhabarat—Iraq’s internal security and intelligence service.222 And it has 
been reported that Al Fatah offices in Baghdad were closed long ago presumably to 
curry favour from United States in Iraq’s war with Iran in the 1980s.  Baghdad also 
stopped financial assistance to the PLO itself, seized Al Fatah arms factories, and 
confiscated substantial quantities of arms in Iraq that were in transit from China to 
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PLO forces in Lebanon, and most of the principal members of the so-called 
Palestinian Rejection Front  evicted from Iraq. These groups, according to Count de 
Marenches and Alderman included “George Habash’s Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine(PFLP), under Wadaei Haddad; and Fatah—the Revolutionary 
Council, led by notorious Abu Nidal.”223   
The most plausible argument for the invasion of Iraq seem then to be that of the 
weapons of mass destruction that has some factual and historic background which 
Bush referred to in his speech when he said that “Eleven years ago, as a condition for 
ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of 
mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons, and to stop all support 
for terrorist groups.”224  Earlier in the same year, in his state of the union address he 
grouped Iraq together with Iran and North Korea as the axis of evil. In his 2003 State 
of the Union address he said, “The dictator of Iraq is not disarming. To the contrary, 
he is deceiving.”225 
 
Though some writers have argued that the invasion of Iraq has been on the table prior 
to the September 11 attacks, the attacks seem to have given the required impetus for 
the act. As Robertson reported, In September 2001, George W. Bush convened a 
White House meeting to consider Iraq’s refusal to comply with UN disarmament 
requirement despite sanctions which had beggared the country.  When the White 
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House meeting reconvened a few weeks later, the post 9/11 mood was very different 
and it was impossible for the president to believe “that there was no connection 
between that atrocity and the man ‘who tried to kill my dad’ (by a car bomb planted 
by Iraqi agents when Bush senior visited Kuwait).”226 
 
  Indeed, Parker, while arguing that the Iraqi war is a product of fevered minds, 
reported that Bush once said of Saddam, “He tried to kill my dad” and by February 
2002, he ordered General Tommy Franks of the central Command to begin shifting 
forces from Afghanistan to the Gulf. In March, he interrupted a meeting between his 
national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, and three senators by saying “Fuck 
Saddam, we’re taking him out.”227 Parker also reported the rude shock of Richard 
Haass, the director of policy planning in the State department. In June, Haass went to 
see Condoleezza Rice at the White House for their regular meetings on key foreign-
policy issues. When they came to Iraq, he began to give the State Department’s 
reasons for misgivings about a war and he was interrupted by Rice, “Save your 
breath, the President has already made up his mind.” Parker reported that this was 
news to Haass. “It was an accretion, a tipping point,” Haass said. “A decision was not 
made—a decision happened, and you can’t say when or how.”228  
 
Parker argued that throughout 2002 WMD remained the Bush administration’s 
rationale for a war, but “it had in all likelihood decided upon as early as November 
2001,” so it didn’t matter that there was no strong evidence to back up the decision. 
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In essence, “the administration had boxed itself in by deciding to go to war before it 
knew exactly why.”229 However, despite any speculation or mixed intentions, the 
Bush administration argument was not plucked from thin air. The United Nations 
bears a greater portion of the blame for the conditions that gave a seeming credence 
to the arguments of weapons of mass destruction. 
 
After the 1991 Gulf war, the UN passed a series of Resolutions that require Saddam 
Hussein to disarm. Apart from the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam had in 1988 used 
biological weapons on the Kurdish people in Halabja, which is now referred to as the 
Halabja massacre.
230
 Resolution 687 of 1991 required Iraq to declare, destroy and 
remove under UN or IAEA supervision and not to use, develop or construct all 
chemical and biological weapons etc. Resolution 707 of 15 August 1991 requires Iraq 
to allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to any site they 
wish to inspect; demands Iraq to provide full, final and complete disclosure of all 
aspects of its WMD program etc. Resolution 715 of 11 October 1991 requires Iraq to 
submit to UNSCOM and IAEA long-term monitoring of its programs etc. Resolution 
1051 of 27 March 1996 established the Iraqi export/ import monitoring system, 
requiring UN members to provide IAEA and UNSCOM with information on 
materials exported to Iraq that may be applicable to WMD production and requiring 
Iraq to report imports of all dual-use items. 
 
Resolution 1060 of 12 June 1996 demands that Iraq cooperate with UNSCOM and 
allow inspection teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to facilities 
                                               
229Ibid., p.61-62.  
 




for inspection etc. Resolution 1154 of 2 March 1998 demands that Iraq comply with 
UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and endorses the Secretary General’s memorandum 
of understanding with Iraq, providing for “severest consequences” if Iraq fails to 
comply. Resolution 1194 of 9 September condemns Iraq’s decision to suspend 
cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. Resolution 1205 of 5 November 
reaffirms the condemnation. By  17 December 1999, the UN, in the bid to restart the 
inspection adopted Resolution 1284 which established the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification, and inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), replacing the 
earlier United Nations Special Commission( UNSCOM).
231
   
 
Scott Ritter, the chief inspector of UNSCOM in Iraq who believed that Saddam 
Hussein proved himself to be “a master of deceit” in armament concealment, 
resigned from his job out of frustration after Tariq Aziz made it known to the 
inspectors that Iraq had decided to stop cooperating with UNSCOM. “There would 
be no more UNSCOM inspections.”232 In his resignation letter, he said: 
This investigation [I went on] has led the commission to the doorstep 
of Iraq’s hidden retained capability, and yet the commission has been 
frustrated by Iraq’s continued refusal to abide by its 
obligations...[and] the Security Council’s refusal to effectively 
respond to Iraq’s actions, and now the current decision by the 
Security Council and the secretary general, backed at least implicitly 
by the United States, to seek a “diplomatic” alternative to inspection-
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driven confrontation with Iraq, a decision which constitutes a 
surrender to the Iraqi leadership that has succeeded in thwarting the 




Though Ritter argued against the invasion of Iraq, he said in 2002 that “I have never 
given Iraq a clean bill of health! Never! Never! I've said that no one has backed up 
any allegations that Iraq has reconstituted WMD capability with anything that 
remotely resemble substantive fact.”234  His stand reflects what he said in 1999 that 
Operation Desert Fox, a reference to the four day bombing (16-19 December 1998) 
of selected targets in Iraq by the United States in a bid to “degrade” Iraq’s ability to 
manufacture and use weapons of mass destruction, did achieve some goals.  He said 
that “precision bombardment with cruise missiles made many walls crumble. They 
fell precisely as targeted, but few today will argue that there was anything of 
substance within those walls, and cement even in Iraq, is cheap.”235  
 
However, he equally complained of the negative consequence of Desert Fox, namely 
that UNSCOM crumbled with the building in Bagdad and renewed the world’s 
sympathy for the plight of the Iraqi people. “UNSCOM is dead” he says “the shards 
of the inspection regime lie on the floor of the Security Council, where a new regime 
is being constructed that whitewashes Iraq’s failures to disarm with vague language 
about a future monitoring system.”236  
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Indeed, the consequence of Saddam’s cessation of cooperation with UNSCOM and 
Operation Desert Fox is that inspections ceased in Iraq for four years. By November 
when the Bush administration argument on Iraq grew louder, the Security Council in 
a bid to restart inspections, on 8 November 2002, adopted Resolution 1441 which 
gives Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under 
relevant resolutions of the Council.” Some writers have actually pointed out that the 
language of the resolution as crafted was so spongy “that each of the contesting 
parties was going to interpret freely.”237  In this respect, Zainuddin points out that 
John Negroponte, the United States Ambassador to the UN, said after the two UN 
weapons inspector chiefs briefed the UN Security Council on 27 January
, 
2003, that 
all the Resolution had sought to achieve were (1) whether Iraq will submit accurate 
reports on WMD, (2) whether it would cooperate unconditionally, but overlooks the 




The latent danger created by the language of Resolution 1441 was heightened by 
Hans Blix’s, the executive chairman of UNMOVIC, presentation to the Security 
Council on 27 January 2003, a presentation that can best be described as 
equivocation and laced with innuendo. He affirmed that “Iraq appears not to have 
come to a genuine acceptance – not even today – of the disarmament, which was 
demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world 
and to live in peace.”  But through the presentation, he affirmed that on the process, 
“Iraq has on the whole cooperated rather well so far with UNMOVIC in this field.  
The most important point to make is that access has been provided to all sites we 
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have wanted to inspect and with one exception it has been prompt.” He also said that 
they “have further had great help in building up the infrastructure of [their] office in 
Baghdad and the field office in Mosul.” 
 
With regard to the substance of the inspections, he said that Iraq submitted a 
declaration of over twelve thousand pages, in which it declared that “it only 
produced VX[a nerve agent, chemical weapon] on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and 
that the quality was poor and the product unstable.  Consequently, it was said, that 
the agent was never weaponised.  Iraq said that the small quantity of agent remaining 
after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.” However, he 
argued that “there are also indications that the agent was weaponised.  In addition, 
there are questions to be answered concerning the fate of the VX precursor 
chemicals, which Iraq states were lost during bombing in the Gulf War or were 
unilaterally destroyed by Iraq.” In conclusion, Dr Blix said that they have an 
inspection apparatus that can send multiple teams all over Iraq and such apparatus is 
at “the disposal of the Security Council.”239 
 
By 14 February 2003, Dr Blix gave another presentation to the Security Council, a 
more specific but not helpful presentation. He emphasized that his team took hold of 
more than 200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples from different sites.  
They also screened them using their own analytical laboratory capabilities at the 
Baghdad Centre (BOMVIC), and he declared that “the results to date have been 
consistent with Iraq's declarations.” He also said that they commenced the process of 
                                               




destroying approximately “50 litres of mustard gas declared by Iraq that was being 
kept under UNMOVIC seal at the Muthanna site.” One-third of the quantity was 
already destroyed.  He added that “the laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard 
gas precursor, which [they] found at another site, has also been destroyed.” 
However, he emphasized that as at the moment of the presentation UNMOVIC had 
not found any weapons of mass destruction, only a small number of empty chemical 
munitions, which should have been declared and destroyed.  But then, “another 
matter - and one of great significance - is that many proscribed weapons and items 
are not accounted for. To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, 
suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were "unaccounted for".” 
Another thing was that some missiles declared by Iraq had the capacity of exceeding 
the 150 kilometres in range. The missile system, Dr Blix said, “is therefore 
proscribed for Iraq pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) and the monitoring plan 
adopted by resolution 715 (1991).”240 
 
Dr Blix was aware of the time factor implicit in the whole project. With regard to 
that he said “UNMOVIC is not infrequently asked how much more time it needs to 
complete its task in Iraq.,” and argued that “the answer depends upon which task one 
has in mind - the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and related items and 
programmes, which were prohibited in 1991 - the disarmament task - or the 
monitoring that no new proscribed activities occur.” The latter task, he says, though 
not often focused on, is highly significant - and not controversial. It will require 
monitoring, which is ‘ongoing’, that is, open-ended until the Council decides 
                                               





otherwise.  By contrast, he emphasized that “the task of ‘disarmament’ foreseen in 
resolution 687 (1991) and the progress on ‘key remaining disarmament tasks’ 
foreseen in resolution 1284 (1999) as well as the ‘disarmament obligations’, which 
Iraq was given a ‘final opportunity to comply with’ under resolution 1441 (2002), 
were always required to be fulfilled in a shorter time span.” He finally concluded 
that “the period of disarmament through inspection could still be short, if 
‘immediate, active and unconditional cooperation’ with UNMOVIC and the IAEA 
were to be forthcoming.”241 
By 7 March in his quarterly presentation to the UN Dr Blix asked for more time, 
months he said. He stated that “disarmament, and at any rate verification of it, cannot 
be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude induced by continued outside 
pressure, it will still take some time to verify sites and items, analyze documents, 
interview relevant persons and draw conclusions. It will not take years, nor weeks, 
but months.”242 Unfortunately George W. Bush and his counterpart Tony Blair were 
running out of patience, coupled with the firm mistrust Saddam entrenched in their 
minds. On Saddam’s part, there was also hubris in not accepting the amnesty deal 
granted by the United States, a deal repeated on 17 March, requiring him and his 
sons to leave Iraq within 48 hours.
243
  By midnight of 19 March, “Operation Shock 
and Awe” hit Iraq. 
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After the fall of Saddam and the installation of an interim government led by Prime 
Minister Ayad Allawi, the US and UK sponsored Resolution 1546 (2004) which the 
UN adopted and which has an appendix of a letter  in which he sought for “a new 
resolution on the Multinational Force (MNF) mandate to contribute to maintaining 
security in Iraq, including through the tasks and arrangements set out in the letter 
from Secretary of State Colin Powell to the President of the United Nations Security 
Council.”244  Through this Resolution, Herman and Paterson argue that the United 
States managed to secure “a retroactive legitimation  of its military seizure of a 
sovereign country,” while Allawi’s  letter added to “the Council’s de jure seal of 
approval to the U.S. invasion-occupation, the gravest violation of the UN Charter in 
recent memory.”245 
 
The pre and post happenings of the Iraqi invasion portray the very fact that if the 
United Nations is not to become a paper tiger, it must have the courage and will to 
effectively implement its decisions. Without that, international law and international 
relations risk being conditioned by the balance of power among states. In this respect 
then, the “war on terror” will simply amount to the enforcement of an order of the 
strongest nations in blatant defiance of international humanitarian law and the 
requirements of human rights. 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter set out to show that the idea of friendship proposed earlier to overcome 
terrorism against humanity can run into a hitch. This hitch comes through the 
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international law of non-intervention or states sovereignty. This law, the chapter 
observes is necessary for stability of nation-states which is necessary for the 
flourishing of citizens. However, this international law requirement poses two 
palpable dangers of making other states mere spectators in the face of violence being 
meted out to citizens of other states and that of ossifying nation-states. 
 
In all, the human rights requirements provide a justification for armed-intervention 
that is not undermined with the superior-inferior command chain in international 
relations. But the UN must be proactive in her defense of human rights in order to 
forestall terrorism against humanity. Afghanistan and Iraq provide historical 
examples where the inaction of the UN led to the sustenance of terrorism against 
humanity and the destabilization of a nation-state. 
 
Apart from the invasion of Iraq on specious reasons, the cases of torture that 
accompanied the war on terror are flagrant disregards of the humanitarian 
international law and the international law of armed conflict with regard to prisoners 
of war. The next chapter takes up these violations and philosophically argues against 











6.0 THE “WAR ON TERROR”: BETWEEN TORTURE AND PUNISHMENT 
                                                 SUMMARY 
The Bush-led administration sought to rationalize the torturing of terrorist suspects 
by claiming that such acts cannot be regarded as torture or that the suspects are not 
contracting parties to the Geneva Convention. However, these rationalizations fly in 
the face of the real meaning of punishment, the definition of torture and above all 
article 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention. The torturing of prisoners in Guantanamo 
and Abu Ghraib led to philosophical debates on the justification of torture—either as 
an occurrence that can be excused or as a substantive justification. The arguments 
often take place under the “ticking bomb scenario.”  The significance of the scenario 
is that it conjures up the idea of maximum harm due to the being or nature of the 
weapon. In other words, it is an imagined case of dire or outmost emergency and has 
the possibility of generating a humanitarian catastrophe. Among the defendants of 
torture are Alan Dershowitz and Uwe Steinhoff. However, I argue that their positions 
are untenable since they misunderstand the philosophical problem with torture and 
the idea behind punishment and preventative actions that does not amount to torture 
in matters of state security. Above all, the separation of powers inherent in a 
democracy, the non- provision of extra legal justification for exceptional cases and 
the inherent wrong in penalizing a virtuous act vitiates their arguments. 
 
6.1 TORTURE AS DISASTER AVERTING MECHANISM 
6.1.1 JUSTIFICATION; PROCEDURAL NON-SUBSTANTIVE  
In 2004, the world was shocked by the media when the photographs from Abu 
Ghraib prisons were broadcast, coupled with the acts of torture in Guantanamo. 
American soldiers were engaged in torturing prisoners. The Bush-led administration 
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however denied that the United States engages in torture. In a visit to Panama in 
2005, President Bush categorically told reporters, “we do not torture.”246   The 
United States is a signatory to the UN Convention Against Torture and Article 5 of 
the Human Rights Declaration states that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”   
 
However, many states, while affirming that torture is wrong, deny that they do 
engage in it. After September 11, some US officials tried to make a distinction 
between torture and some inhuman or degrading treatment which does not amount to 
torture. They argued that “certain intentional forms of suffering, euphemistically 
called ‘augmented techniques of coercive interrogation,’ may be inflicted upon 
terrorist suspects.”247 These techniques often include forced standing for hours on 
end, environmental manipulation like adjusting temperature and dietary 
manipulation (temporary starvation), sleep deprivation, isolation for up to thirty days 
etc.  Such techniques, which were also referred to as “mild, non-injurious physical 
contact,” were approved by the United States Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld 
for use in Guantanamo.
248
   
 
Article 1 of the UN Convention Against Torture, however, clearly spelt out what 
amounts to torture. It states that: 
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torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted 
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does 
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions. 
 
From this definition then, there is a distinction between pain or suffering emanating 
from lawful sanctions which can be properly referred to as punishment and the pains 
and suffering which emanates from the actions of a public official that are in 
themselves unlawful.  Sanctions are not regarded as lawful if they are not part of any 
statue of the state or international court; furthermore, penal sanctions are imposed on 
criminals after they have been found guilty through a public trial. This corresponds to 
Article 11(1) of the Human Rights Declaration which states that “everyone charged 
with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law in a public trial at which he has all the guarantees necessary for his 
defence.” 
 
In this respect, as the Schlesinger-led panel observes, “no approved procedures called 
for or allowed the kinds of abuse that in fact occurred. There is no evidence of a 
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policy of abuse promulgated by senior or military authorities.”249 It then follows that 
what happened in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo can be called by no other name than 
torture.  The Bush led administration, however, sought other ways of circumventing 
the charge of torture. This circumvention came through the Geneva Conventions 
which states how prisoners of war ought to be treated. The argument was that the 
suspected terrorists are not “High Contracting Parties” to the convention and thus not 
qualified for the application of the requirements of the convention.  In his 7 February  
2002 Presidential Memo, George W. Bush argued that: 
 
 Based on the facts supplied by the Department of Defense and the 
recommendation of the Department of Justice, [he] determines[s] 
that the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, 
do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva. [He] 
note[d] that, because Geneva does not apply to [the] conflict with al 





This attempt at a self-serving reading and interpretation was disingenuous and hence 
untenable. Article 4 of the Geneva Convention recognizes “members of other 
militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized 
resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside 
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied” provided that they have a 
commander, have a distinctive sign, carry arms openly and adhere to the laws and 
customs of war. However, an argument may be made that the Taliban and Al-Qaida 
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have no distinctive sign or carry arms openly. Such arguments can be disputed based 
on the fact that George W. Bush already acknowledged that the conflict is 
“international in scope.” If that is the case and such fighters can be distinguished 
from all other international citizens, then they already have a sign.  
 
 Article 5 of the Convention clearly states that “should any doubt arise as to whether 
persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the 
enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall 
enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has 
been determined by a competent tribunal.” At no time did the Bush-led 
administration bring the supposed Taliban or Al-Qaida members to a tribunal in 
order to determine their status under the Geneva Convention, and it cannot 
unilaterally make such a determination. If the conflict is international in scope, an 
international tribunal ought to be the best place to make such determination, but such 
action did not occur.  
 
 The United States  Supreme Court ruled against the arguments of President Bush by 
affirming that the detainees in Guantanamo have the right to bring a suit against the 
government and that the United States has the jurisdiction to entertain such cases.
251
  
The recommendation of the independent panel led to the demotion of Colonel Janis 
Karpinski who was the head of Abu Ghraib Prisons. The Guantanamo and Abu 
Ghraib events ushered in philosophical debates on the permissibility or justifiability 
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of torture with regard to terrorism. The philosophical debates often take place in the 
context of what is normally referred to as the “ticking bomb terrorist or scenario.” 
The hypothetical scenario asks one to imagine a case where there is a ticking bomb 
hidden somewhere and the only way to save the mass casualties that will  result from  
the explosion of the bomb is by torturing the supposed terrorist or a member of the 
terrorist group. Wouldn’t such scenario justify torturing the terrorist? Such cases it 
must be added are exceptions. 
 
  Alan Dershowitz, while declining to take a position on the normative issue of 
torture, has argued in favour of an anticipated judicial or executive warrant for 
torture in such exceptional cases. This argument he says is to avoid the danger of 
vested interest and also to preserve civil liberties and human rights above that of 
securing the lives of the individuals that will be endangered by the ticking bomb.
252
  
In other words, the courts or the judiciary can always review the authorization and its 
limits to determine if the torturer exceeded the bounds of his or her authority. The 
driving force behind the argument is that of accountability in a world where torture is 
in fact practised instead of being hypocritical by assuming that it does not occur. 
 
The major thing to note here is that the argument skirts the whole idea of 
justification and embraces the fact that it does occur. As Dershowitz argues: 
 
If torture is, in fact, being used and/or would, in fact, be used in an 
actual ticking bomb terrorist case, would it be normatively better or 
worse to have such torture regulated by some kind of warrant, with 
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accountability, recordkeeping, standards and limitations?...it is not 
so much about the substantive issue of torture as it is about 
accountability, visibility and candor in a democracy that is 




The whole line of reasoning is that, it is better to confront evil than to pretend that it 
does not exist. Furthermore, confronting evil in a democracy is better done in an open 
way.  From this line of reasoning, it becomes clear that a post facto confrontation will 
not suffice since in a post facto review, there cannot be accountability, rather excuse. 
As he puts it, “after-the-fact ‘necessity of defense’ might be available in extreme 
cases is not an adequate substitute for explicit advance approval.” In post facto 
reviews, Dershowitz’s worry is that a pardon might amount to a precedent. He 
referenced Judge Jackson who, in a dissenting opinion in a case of the Japanese 
detention camps, cited Judge Cardozo’s description of the “tendency of a principle to 
expand itself to the limit of its logic.” As Jackson puts it, “…a military commander 
may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review 
and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the constitution. There it 
has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image.”254 
What Dershowitz is saying in essence is that since necessity has no law, any attempt 
to approve or make legal what obeys no law has the tendency of expanding beyond 
the limits of reasonability which the law has. In short we will be standing on a 
slippery slope. 
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Dershowitz has been seriously criticized by Elaine Scarry who also took a swipe at 
the ticking bomb example. Her argument firstly is that the plausibility of the 
imaginary ticking-bomb scenario rests on the false notion that the population or 
audience whom the argument addresses are morally impaired, i.e. to say that they do 
not comprehend acts performed from a good intention or motive from ones based on 
malice.  It also has the power of sanctioning thousands of torture cases which are not 
in fact cases of dire emergency which are exceptional cases.  In earnest, Scarry’s 
argument amounts to nothing more than the observation of Devlin that “there is 
something wrong with a State which penalizes virtue,”255 i.e., actions done with the 
good of the state and her citizens in mind. This is to say that the burden of proving 
the exceptional—dire emergency situation, rests on the torturer whose peers will be 




Her second argument pertains to the test of fairness. In essence, this amounts to the 
weighing of one’s own imprisonment with the disaster waiting to happen. Common 
sense and fairness requires that one accepts imprisonment and saving-the-city rather 
than being free and letting the city perish. Here, the aversion to torture is juxtaposed 
with the aversion of imprisoning or infringing on the freedom of the individual.  It 
then means that doing something wrong someday does not entail that the act ceases 
to be wrong or punishable. Scarry’s second argument emphasizes that “it is unlikely 
that any saviour of the city would actually be inhibited by the lack of pre-existing 
moral and legal assurances of immunity.” 
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The third argument is based on what can be referred to as episteme-temporal 
deficiency. What it means is that we lack the omniscience to know if the actual 
terrorist we have is the one that knows exactly where the ticking bomb is.  In a given 
case where many terrorists are apprehended, what gives us the assurance that we are 
holding the right person who knows where the bomb is? If we have a claim to such 
omniscience why can’t it direct us to where the bomb is?  Scarry argues that since 
September 11, over five thousand foreign nationals suspected of being terrorists have 
been detained. In a ticking bomb scenario are we going to get the information by 
torturing one person, or will it stretch to the last man, or in between. If such is the 
case then “will the ticking bomb still be ticking?”257  
 
It can be argued here that our lacking omniscience as Scarry holds does not mean that 
we do not have some information or some specific knowledge regarding the bomb or 
the planter. However, what I think Scarry is arguing here is that having a piece of 
information does not amount to the veracity of such information or at worst a case of 
unreasonable doubt. If we posses omniscience, we will not only be in possession of 
some information but can actually attest to the veracity of such information. This will 
enable us to thwart the attack and avoid false alarm that can generate mass hysteria in 
the state and also act on time before the ticking bomb explodes.  
 
Apart from the above arguments against the ticking bomb scenario, Scarry argues 
that “Alan Dershowitz credits the warranting system with a power to provide 
documentation and accountability that it does not appear to have,” and also “that his 
proposal greatly undercredits the forms of documentation and accountability already 
                                               




available to us.”258 I think that Scarry is right since Dershowitz’s argument is 
referring to democracies especially that of the United States. In this case then, 
Dershowitz forgets that in a democracy, especially that of the United States, there is 
separation of powers. The power to make a law rests with the Legislature, Parliament 
or Congress. The function of the Judiciary is that of interpretation and that of the 
Executive execution. A judicial warrant for torture, where no bill has been passed to 
such effect by the Legislature, Parliament or Congress, amounts to usurpation of 
powers by the Judiciary. And overall, for any torture warrant to acquire the power to 
enforce accountability, it must first nullify any law whose sphere of influence affects 
the very same substance for which the warrant seeks to affect; if not, it cannot 
acquire such power since the power of the pre-existing law supersedes. 
 
 Dershowitz seems to have tried lifting himself up by his bootstraps. He falls into the 
same charge of hypocrisy he is raising.  This I think is why Scarry dismisses him 
with some harsh words, saying: 
He critiques the “necessity” defense, accurately identifying it as 
“the most lawless of legal doctrines” and warning us that it is so 
elastic it can accommodate any person and any position; yet his 
warrant system gives center stage to the necessity defense, bestows 
on it a material form, and turns it into a formal procedure. Through 
this method of repudiating, then using, phrases, forms of 
sequencing, and ideas, he protects his arguments by giving them 
deniability….No  one should take[him] lightly(even when face to 
face with his light, bright spirit). He means business. He intends to 
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open a debate. He intends that debate, in turn, to reopen the law, to 





6.1.2 JUSTIFICATION; SUBSTANTIVE NON-PROCEDURAL 
 Standing directly opposite Alan Dershowitz is Uwe Steinhoff who argues that in 
some cases torture can be justified, not merely excused. But unlike Dershowitz, he 
says, it should not be regularised or institutionalized. As I stated in chapter one, the 
willing of a political good is also willing the permanent enjoyment of it. In other 
words, the individual or group who wills such good aspires that the real enjoyments 
of such good transcend them. Only in this sense can the good be common, hence 
political. The idea behind the establishment of institutions is therefore to nourish and 
maintain a good so that its continuous existence and enjoyment can be ensured 
beyond any particular individual or group who possess the skills to actualize such 
desirable good for the citizens. Institutions therefore, possess basic mandates from 
the inhabitants or government of a people. Thus, specific institutions have moral or 
fiduciary obligations to the community or government that established them. 
Following this then, to will a good—here torture—and not will its institution maybe 
desirable but cannot qualify as a political act, hence cannot be morally justified but 
excused. 
 
 However, Steinhoff insists that “a compelling argument for an absolute moral 
prohibition of torture cannot be made. Under certain circumstances, torture can be 
                                               




justified. Justified, not only excused.”260 He went a step further to state that “moral 
absolutism is a dangerous and mistaken view.... Fiat justitia, pereat mundus is an 
irrational and immoral maxim.”261 In other words, that consequences of actions count 
and cannot be ignored simply because of some absolute position. 
 
From the statements of Steinhoff, one can decipher the first misstep that will 
undermine his whole paper. He equates morality with justice. As Kant already 
pointed out: 
 “Fiat justitia, pereat mundus(Let justice reign even if all rascals in 
the world should perish from it”), is a stout principle of right which 
cuts asunder the whole tissue of artifice or force. But it should not 
be misunderstood as a permission to use one’s own right with 
extreme rigor (which will conflict with ethical duty); it should be 
understood as the obligation of those in power not to limit or to 
extend anyone’s right through sympathy or disfavour.262   
 
In other words, the maxim of “fiat justitia…” is primarily a legal maxim that insists 
on the absoluteness of the right of people. However, it also urges those who are in 
authority to maintain the decorum or ethics that is necessary for the office and also 
makes them good people. For instance, the maxim will exhort those in authority to 
eschew lying or actions that might involve self-immolation. It is therefore a maxim 
that presupposes the existence of institutions for the distribution of goods.  
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However, the seeming plausibility of Steinhoff’s argument rests not only on the 
“ticking bomb scenario,” but also on the idea of “innocent threat.” Steinhoff’s take 
off point is that torture cannot be as bad as killing, in other words killing is worse 
than torture. If killing can be sanctioned sometimes, especially in war, then torture 
can also be sanctioned. In war innocent people or civilians are sometimes killed to 
advance the cause, not necessarily because they are combatants or supporters of the 
war, rather because their position will undermine the cause. If their killing is 
absolutely immoral, then the troops will be in danger. Here Steinhoff is referring to 
what is normally called the doctrine of double effect. For him then: 
Being a member of certain groups that collectively undertake 
aggressive acts or intentionally pose a threat to innocent people 
makes one liable to severe countermeasures. Consequently, a 
member of a terrorist group might be liable to torture in the ticking 
bomb case, even if he does not know where the bomb is.
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His argument is that the issue goes beyond mass casualties normally presumed in the 
ticking bomb case, for even a case involving an individual will suffice. He provides an 
example from the Don Siegel movie Dirty Harry where someone kidnaps a female child 
and puts her in a place where she will suffocate if not rescued on time. And since there 
was not much time left, a police officer Harry was to deliver the ransom to the 
kidnapper. The police officer did as required only to be waylaid and told that the girl 
would die anyway and he himself will be shot. Harry’s partner intervened and was shot. 
The kidnapper escaped wounded but was caught. Finally, the kidnapper surrendered and 
                                               




was being questioned about the girl only for him to be shouting about his rights. 
However, Harry who saw the wounded leg of the kidnapper, capitalized on that to 
torture him by stepping on it in the bid to elicit the information needed.  Then the movie 
scene went on to show a saved girl. 
Steinhoff argues that the Dirty Harry case seems to him “a case of morally justified 
torture.”264  The first thing to point out is that his so-called justification rests on the 
same earlier presumption of virtue, i.e. acts performed from a good motive, pointed 
out by Scarry and also that the action of the policeman can be seen as being on a 
continuum of protecting the citizens rights. The policeman “knows that he is on the 
continuum and that there is a point at which his conduct might be stigmatized as 
criminal [but]... he has a legitimate interest in being able to move as close to that 
point as possible.”265 This legitimate interest is what is then seen as the good motive 
in cases of dire emergency that warrants the torture of the offender(s)  
However, his idea of torture and argument for its justification becomes seriously 
flawed when one turns to his criticism of Dershowitz. He says that Dershowitz 
claims that torture warrants will annul the normal excuse of torturers that they did 
what they had to do does not hold. “Why shouldn’t state agents who do not get a 
warrant torture anyway?” he questioned. And he affirms that people who escape 
detection are not in need of excuses to wriggle out of punishment and that the 
problem with Abu Ghraib, Afghanistan and Guantanamo is that they had nothing to 
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do with ticking bombs or hostages who are about to die. He argues that “Dirty harry 
cases are exceptions.”266 
What Steinhoff misunderstands is that exceptions only prove the rules and are not 
provided extra-legal justifications. His argument descended more into the ridiculous 
when he questions Dershowitz’s argument against the fear of the slippery slope in 
approving torture warrants.  Indeed, Dershowitz has argued that the fear of slippery 
slope does not imply that we can never consider the use of nonlethal infliction of 
pain, if it were to be limited by acceptable principles of morality. He says that “after 
all, imprisoning a witness who refuses to testify after being given immunity is 
designed to be punitive—that is painful. Such imprisonment can, on occasion, 
produce more pain and greater risk of death than nonlethal torture.”267 
In his response, Steinhoff agrees that “it does indeed follow that we can never 
consider the use of non-lethal infliction of pain.” However, he insists that “it does 
follow that institutionalising torture—for example with torture warrants—is a bad 
idea. In particular, the analogy with the practice of coercing witnesses through 
imprisonment into testifying is misleading. The practice is designed to be punitive, 
yes but that is not the same as being designed to be painful.”  He added that “ not 
every  aversive treatment causes pain.”268 From such response it becomes clear that 
Steinhoff follows Dershowitz in misunderstanding the actual problem with torture 
and the idea behind the institution of punishment and preventative actions not 
amounting to torture in matters of state security. The problem with torture is not that 
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it is painful or aversive, rather that it is a process that requires the active cooperation 
of an agent in a practice and at the same time negates his free assent to such practice. 
In other words, it is intellectually absurd. 
Mutual masochism involves pain. However, it cannot be referred to as torture since 
the active participants of such practice consent to it. It may be considered aversive or 
repulsive but not torture.  What torture does, as a matter of necessity, is the negation 
of free choice. A choice is free if and only if it is between open practical alternatives 
(i.e. to do this or that) such that no factor but the choosing itself closes the openness 
of choice. The victim of torture is not permitted to choose either to divulge the 
required information or to accept the action targeted at him or her—actions that 
inflict, often, but not necessarily physical pain. In a Kantian language, what happens 
is the negation of the victim’s autonomy.  
However, punitive actions can be considered part of a state’s procedure for the trial 
of offenders who are aware of the existence of such trial procedure and also have a 
choice of not divulging the required information. What the punitive action, and 
indeed what punishment does is to limit the range of choices one can make through 
the instrumentality of the state. In this respect Hobbes affirms that “but although one 
is not obliged by any agreement to accuse oneself, one may be compelled by torture 
to reply in a public trial. Such replies are not evident of fact, but a means of 
investigating the truth.”269  Two key ideas emerge from Hobbes’ affirmation. (1) is 
that torture can be justified by a legal system with the consent of the citizens (2) is 
that justice is not only substantive but procedural. In fact, in the Leviathan Hobbes 
                                               




confirms this when he states that there is a difference between “justice of manners 
and justice of action.”  
What it all implies is that the state can impose punitive actions either as a part of 
procedural justice or that of substantive justice. Furthermore, the state whose job is 
to see that justice is done also has the prerogative of mercy. This mercy can either be 
shown at the procedural or the substantive level depending on other factors. For the 
state to dispense justice which involves the narrowing of an individual’s practical 
alternatives compared to other citizens, it must have a justification otherwise it treats 
such individual as not ab initio free. Such justification can only be found in the law. 
Procedural justice is an attempt to confirm an evidential presumed breach of the law 
while substantive justice is an imposition of sanction based on the truth of a 
breaching of the law or at worst a case of an unreasonable doubt. Any procedural 
mercy shown to an individual by the state is called excuse while substantive mercy is 
called pardon and both cannot be shown or given without justification. 
The capacity of the state to show mercy in matters of justice means that the concern 
of the state does not consist solely of justice. The concern of the state is more than 
justice. Justice is only a part, a necessary but not sufficient part of the state’s 
functions. The prerogative of showing mercy by the state through those empowered 
or authorized to do so can be justified by these other aspect(s) of the state. One such 
aspect can be safety or morality. It is here that one can locate the argument of R.A 
Duff that “the criminal law and criminal trials are like moral criticism...”270 In other 
words, the demands of justice points to morality, safety etc., to argue that, since 
justice is a necessary part of the state, without it morality cannot endure. The wider 
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demands of morality in some cases may justify partial mercy (substantive non 
procedural), or in its totality (procedural and of necessity substantive). 
The major flaw in Steinhoff’s rejection of the institutionalization of torture is that it 
liberalises power and with it liberalises the prerogative of mercy. This in turn renders 
his justification of torture ineffective. He therefore unwittingly sabotages that which 
he justifies. The seeming plausibility of his Dirty Harry’s case, apart from the 
background of virtue, rest on the fact that Harry is assumed to be a police man whose 
job is required to prevent crime. Now, we can imagine a situation where another 
police man defends the kidnapper by arguing that Harry is short-sighted and should 
consider that the kidnapper has been out of a job, owing a large sum in mortgage and 
hospital bills etc. And that he did what he ought to do to save himself. Harry will 
have no answer since the other police officer can equally challenge him on the 
alleged right to torture the kidnapper and not to show mercy.  
Apart from the idea of the police force as a crime preventing institution and 
kidnapping a crime, Steinhoff’s argument vis-à-vis the contrary argument of short-
sightedness of his counterpart fails. This is based on the same reasons that vitiates 
any consequentialist political morality, namely that of incommensurability and 
incoherence in the demand of two simultaneous but incompatible actions. Steinhoff’s 
policeman will be required to (1) make a morally significant choice—saving the 
child or helping(saving) the kidnapper(not torturing) and (2) identify one option—
saving the child or saving the kidnapper—as offering unqualified greater good or 
lesser evil for the state. But these two conditions are incompatible. And in requiring 
that they be met simultaneously the policeman would be incoherent except he is a 
determinist, i.e pre-wired to act in a certain manner. If this is so, then the argument 
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becomes a mere art in persuasion other than morality or downright emotivism in the 
mode of Logical Positivism and the Vienna Circle.
271
  
The incoherence which Steinhoff’s policeman will face is like “telling someone to 
prove a point, but only the most obvious point: as a matter of practical logic, one can 
only prove a conclusion from premises more obvious than that conclusion.”272  In 
deciding to help save the child other than saving the kidnapper, the policeman will 
have to formulate a premise on his side of choice, perhaps that the child will 
suffocate. If such is the case we then make a circle and are back to Scarry’s earlier 
argument about omniscience. How do we know that the innocent child will die, if 
from the kidnappers own mouth, don’t we think it is a mere bluff that is aimed to 
raise money. It may be that the kidnapper is the one actually facing an imminent 
death. He may have borrowed from a loan shark or the “mob” that are ready to shoot 
him if he does not pay up on the actual date. And in contrast to his claim that the 
child will suffocate, he has put the child in the care of his mother for proper feeding. 
If we carry this reasoning over to Steinhoff’s analogy of killing in war, where he 
thinks that killing is worse than torture, then it exposes his analogy and attempt to 
balance presupposed evils in a scale as faulty.  The advance warrant required for 
permitted killing in war is normally granted by the state. The army as an institution is 
meant for the defence of the state and when such defence involves killing, it is done 
in the name of the state and for the good of the state. The state through post war 
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trials can question individual officers who have exceeded the required limits. Just 
war reasoning also requires the President to declare war and in a democracy like that 
of the United States, the Congress has to authorize it. 
To justify torture or institutionalize it will require a legal system and a public that 
will consent to it unless the legal system is that of a totalitarian order. It means that 
we cannot just infer or presume that torture and the killings that happen in war are of 
the same scales. The intention of going to war from just war reasoning is not to 
impose the will of the state on another, rather, it is to defend itself or to ward off 
aggression which is seen as morally bad, as I pointed out earlier. In contrast, torture 
is an action of contrary intent. As Waldron puts it “it involves the use of pain to 
break the will of the subject.”273 And unless we require advance warrant for torture a 
la Dershowitz, then torture and killing in war(just war)—the breaking of the 
aggressor’s will—cannot be on the same scale. 
Steinhoff’s attempts to cover his faulty reasoning  of balancing the issue of torture and 
killing in war on the same scales by citing Jeremy Waldron also comes out weak and 
contradictory.  He quotes Waldron who argues that the legal prohibition of torture as a 
legal archetype has “a significance stemming from the fact that it sums up or makes 
vivid to us the point, purpose, principle, or policy of a whole area of law.”274 Thus: 
...even where law has to operate forcefully, there will not be the 
connection that has existed in other times or places between law and 
brutality. People may fear and be deterred by legal sanctions...they 
may even on occasion be forced... to do things or go places against 
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their will. But even when this happens, they will not be herded like 
cattle or broken like horses; they will not be beaten like dumb animals 
or treated as bodies to be manipulated. Instead, there will be an 
enduring connection between the spirit of law and respect for human 
dignity—respect for human dignity even in extremis, where law is at 
its most forceful and its subjects at their most vulnerable.
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Steinhoff really forgot that six pages before this citation of Waldron, he derided the 
idea of human dignity put up by David Luban. In response to  Luban who argues that 
torture “strip[s] away from its victim all the qualities of human dignity that 
liberalism prizes,” he retorts that “most importantly, liberalism is not about 
‘dignity’—which is a quite elusive concept, anyway...it is called liberalism not 
‘dignism.’”276 How then can the above citation of Waldron help his case? I really 
don’t see it.   
Waldron who expanded the ideas in the quoted article in a latter one prior to the 
writing of Steinhoff has argued that “there are some scales” the law should not be 
on.
277
 What he means is that the rule against torture, i.e. against justifying it, is 
archetypal—embodying the spirit of the law especially American Legal System. He 
sums it up thus: 
Law is not savage. Law does not rule through abject fear and 
terror, or by breaking the will of those whom it confronts. If law 
is forceful or coercive, it gets its way by non brutal methods 
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which respects rather than mutilate the dignity and agency of 
those who are its subjects.
278
 
Any one holding this view of Waldron cannot then be used to justify the 
position of Steinhoff.  
It must be pointed out, that since justice does not swallow up the whole concern of 
the state, the state can narrow practical alternative choices in situations where an 
individual is unintentionally placed in a position such that the non-constraining or 
narrowing of his or her open practical alternative course of actions threatens the 
safety or morality of the state. In other words, the individual becomes an innocent 
threat. The state in self defence can narrow such practical alternatives by 
constraining the sphere required for alternative practical choices which may 
invariably constrain the will of the individual or individuals involved. Such 
narrowing of practical alternative choices does not amount to torture in the sense that 
they are not engaged with the intention of eliciting information from the person.   
To express this idea in another way is to say that there are other coercive actions 
such as imprisonment or confinement that does not amount to torture. They are 
actions that have to be justified by other concerns of the state that goes beyond 
justice, one of such concerns may be safety or security of the citizens. It is here that 
we can locate other preventative or pre-emptive actions of the state like quarantining 
and seclusion of individuals who are suspected of carrying or have been infected by 
deadly and highly contagious diseases. So is the incarceration of lunatics and the 
mentally deranged or incapacitated.     
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6.2 DETERRENCE IS NO PUNISHMENT 
By accepting that the war on terror is international in dimension and at the same time 
denying that the prisoners held in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib qualify to be called 
prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention, the onus falls on President Bush to 
justify why such people, especially those that are citizens of other states, can be 
imprisoned without trial. Of course they are not slaves and slavery is a crime in 
international law and an infringement on Article 4 of the Human Rights Declaration. 
It will follow that if such justification cannot be given, then the war on terror in itself 
cannot be justified. 
The moral justification of the Geneva Convention with regard to prisoners of war  
rests on an understanding that certain individuals at certain moments can pose great 
dangers to the state despite their being unarmed and also that punishment remains an 
indelible part of the state when such grave dangers have been averted. Prisoners of 
war are detained or barred from exercising the alternative practical choice of being 
among their warring groups because such an option provides an opportunity for them 
to rejoin their group in the hostile activity (war) against the state. This particular act 
of detention or barring does not determine whether the individual will in fact rejoin 
the fight or acquire a change of heart (repentance) through the act of mercy shown 
him. In effect, by not confining a member of a warring group simply because he or 
she is unarmed as at the time of capture puts the defensive state in a precarious 
position of not closing an avenue of risk for the state. However, this barring or 
detention does not amount to torture or punishment. 
When the danger has been averted, i.e. after the war and the return to normalcy, 
punishment is restored to its prime place in the affairs of the state and that of 
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international relations. In effect, without any presumption, the prisoners of war as 
envisaged by the Convention are required to undergo a trial in order to give them an 
opportunity to exonerate themselves from being punished. This idea agrees with the 
spirit of Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Human Rights Declaration which 
requires that an individual be provided an impartial avenue of defending himself 
against penal accusations that are brought against him.  What this means is that war 
does not nullify justice and punishment that comes through it. Rather it suspends it 
for a time. 
Given the fact that it will be wrong for any society to penalize virtue, trials as 
avenues for the individual to exonerate him or herself only invites the alleged 
criminal to offer reasons especially moral or virtuous reasons why he is to be 
exonerated. In other words, an alleged offender is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty. To be proven guilty in turn means that one cannot proffer a moral or virtuous 
reason why the state should not penalize him or her. This means that to prove 
somebody guilty is an attempt by the state to show that the defense is morally 
unacceptable. It is here that we can locate Duff’s argument that criminal trials like 
moral criticisms are “communicative enterprises which seek the assent and 
participation of those whom they address.”279 In effect any consequent punishment 
that is imposed on the defendant will be letting him or her know that his moral 
presumptions or arguments are wrong and he is required to repent and desist from 
such act in the future. If an individual assents to such criticism, the following 
punishment will only be serving as penance.
280
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However, repentance, first of all, is a mental act, i.e., that phase of exploration, 
research and inquiry about the object of acquisition by the will, while crime in the 
last analysis an act of the will. i.e., the actual acquisition that renders the individual 
liable for punishment. Therefore, if the individual does not accept the criticism of his 
moral position by the law, penance cannot take place. The ensuing punishment does 
not serve as penance and there is no guarantee that he or she would not engage in 
such action(s) in the future. Penance occurs only when the individual accepts the 
moral criticism of the law. In this sense then, Duff is right to the extent that 
punishment “aims to induce repentance and self-reform.”281  Now, what happens if 
the individual does not assent to the criticism of the law? Does the punishment 
imposed by the law cease to be of any significance or does it become superfluous in 
the case of a genuinely repentant criminal who will not commit such crime again 
when let off the hook? 
Since crime, in the last analysis, is an act of the will and not of the intellect, 
punishment cannot be forward looking but backwards. The burden of mind-
readership and fortune-telling or clairvoyance cannot be imposed on the state and her 
agents. This renders penance a mere side effect of punishment and not its focus, 
since certain individuals may be so scrupulous that they find the punishment of the 
state not commensurate with the crime. It is also the basis which engenders 
skepticism on any theory that purports to make repentance a central focus of 
punishment.  In this view, Ten Chin Liew, in reference to Duff, has affirmed that “it 
remains unclear why a court-imposed punishment will be a suitable penance.”282    
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Penance as a side effect of punishment means that punishment has the power of 
deterring criminal(s) from future crimes in the sense that it provides an opportunity 
for the criminal to understand that his morally indefensible actions which led to 
punishment are wrong. This is the sense in which the law is referred to as a teacher 
(leges est magister). The law teaches the citizens through laid down rules that certain 
actions are morally indefensible. The conscience of the individual may disagree 
though but it doesn’t exonerate him or her from the law. Here, the moral demand of 
following one’s conscience clashes with the direction being pointed by the law. 
Therefore, in so far as penitential aims find a place in the law, deterrence—either 
that of the individual or others—cannot be placed as part of the law since the law 
cannot give what it does not have, namely the individual will. Rather, it appears as 
the consequence of an individual’s decision through the enlightenment of the law. 
The state presupposes that those whom the law addresses are capable of evaluating 
such law and then assent to it. In other words, they are rational or moral agents 
which in turn imply the existence of conscience. 
This presupposition also entails that punishment which is attracted by a breach of the 
law is an attempt to make the criminal see the irrationality and unfairness behind his 
or her action.  An attempt by those in authority to deter other people by imposing a 
disproportionate punishment on the criminal, only amount to the treatment of such 
people with indignity; that is of lesser value than those imposing the punishment. If 
the law is higher than all citizens, then the talk of deterrence is futile. Therefore, 
when we talk of dignity we refer to the acceptance by a given state or society of the 
ensemble of attitudes that characterizes someone’s social profile. The authorities 
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who impose harsher or disproportionate punishment in order to deter others only 
succeed in conceiving their targets as lower in social status than them. 
In the making of laws, especially in democracies where it amounts to passing a bill 
in Congress or Parliament, the bill is read for the representatives of the citizens in 
order for them to evaluate its reasonability and fairness before a vote is called for.  
The act of bill-reading before voting is not just symbolic. Rather, it is a reflection of 
the presupposition of the citizens as rational.  Without rationality the capacity for 
deliberation will be lacking, hence the inability of the willing, i.e the passage or 
failure of a bill. As Hobbes opines, “will is the final act of deliberation.”283 The 
intermittent stage being “judgement”. In other words in law making we pass through 
different stages of deliberation, judgement and election (willing). Without the 
required conditions for deliberation, the making of a law will be impossible and 
where one already exists, the free assent of the citizens. The required conditions for 
deliberation are what Lon Fuller calls “the morality that makes law possible.”284 
  The imposition of a punitive action, either as torture or deterrence in the end 
succeeds in denying the dignity of those whom such action targets. Whereas the 
imposition of sanctions that come from punishment denounces a completed action as 
unfair and at most irrational. When a criminal act becomes irrational and requires 
denouncement, the only full denouncement involves the excision of the very source 
of irrationality. It then follows that retribution is the only focal or central point of 
punishment. In retribution the alternative open practical choices of the criminal is 
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narrowed or closed while at the same time taking cognizance of the very fact that 
justice and punishment are not the only concern of the state.  
What retribution does is that, it restricts the criminal’s wayward will in its freedom 
by subjecting it to the “representative ‘will of society’ (the will which [the criminal] 
disregarded in disregarding the law).”285  This restriction of will can stretch from 
mere gratuitous pieces of advice, to compulsory employment, community services, 
incarceration or being put to death. Any choice of punishment solely depends on 
those authorized by the state to do so and such choices will also have to be justified 
by the law. Based on this restriction of will, the criminal is disadvantaged in any 
order that emerges after the imposition of punishment. By this way the balance of 
fairness is returned. 
 The other concerns of the state can justify mercy or preventative actions that do not 
amount to torture from legal authorities. The state pre-empts such conditions by 
authorizing in advance such non-punishment based institutions to act when the need 
arises. However, on a post facto review, the excesses of such merciful or 
preventative action which amounts to injustice can be punished or excused. This is 
the reason why a commander of a squad, platoon or military unit, on the one hand, 
may decide not to kill a combatant who is taking a shower while still armed or 
another who is sleeping and, on the other, a police officer whose duty is to prevent 
crime can allow a robber or pilferer to continue his action.  
The burden which will undermine any theory of punishment that seeks to justify 
deterrence is that of preventative action. In essence, such theory cannot justify the 
incarceration of the mentally sick, children or the quarantining of sick citizens 
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without lapsing to indignity. Furthermore, law enforcement agents cannot exercise 
the prerogative of mercy without being unjust. What this means is that torture, or 
deterrent-non-preventative actions in international affairs reach beyond its immediate 
physical terrain and are experienced as gestures of disdain against the community 
which such a people form a part, namely the human community.  
The factual experience of Jen, a female soldier who served in Iraq and engaged in 
prisoners’ abuse, buttresses this point.  According to her, she once told her 
colleagues that if any of the prisoners who had been taunting her so relentlessly ever 
had to be subdued, that she wanted to be part of it. An opportunity came and what 
she did was to put her foot on one of the prisoners’ neck, knowing it was a deep 
insult. “It sounds terrible now, but I wanted him to have the humiliation of a girl 
doing that....I wanted to push his face in the sand. I kicked sand in his face, and it felt 
good.”286 On another occasion she played a dangerous trick on them. “They were 
always begging for our cigarettes, even though they had their own, so I took the 
chemicals out of the pouch we used to heat our MRE and sprinkled some in the 
cigarettes I gave them. I hoped something bad would happen to them. They insulted 
me; I wanted to get back at them. It sounds so childish now, but at the time nobody 
was thinking about consequences.”287 
One day, her acts of indignity became obvious to her. On the very day, she was 
listening to a Kuwaiti radio station up in her tower when a song called “Lady in Red” 
was being aired. She says she never turned the radio up loudly enough for prisoners 
to hear, because, as she opined “I figured you’re in prison, you make my life hell, so 
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I’m not doing anything nice to you.” But then a prisoner walks up to her tower and 
looked up at her. “Get the fuck away from me!” she yelled. “I just wanted to listen to 
‘Lady in Red,’” the prisoner replied in perfect English. “He spoke better English 
than I did! And that just scared the crap out of me. He could’ve been anybody from 
home! It got so easy to imagine them being animals...that guy, he could’ve been my 
next-door neighbor, he was so smart... this guy spoke five or six languages. A lot of 
them did, it scared me how smart they were.”288    
 Jen’s experience shows that the success of torture, apart from pure sadism, depends 
on the reduction in status, of the victim of such acts, in relation to its perpetrator.  In 
the end, torture and deterrent-non-preventative actions portray their perpetrators as 
anti-human and misfits of civilized societies. 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter makes distinctions between punishment, torture and detentions without 
trial that does not amount to punishment or torture. The aim of these distinctions 
being to argue against the defence of incarceration and torturing of suspected 
terrorists in the war on terror. The central focus of the arguments in the chapter is 
that if the war on terror is international in scope as acknowledged by President Bush, 
it has to abide by the international law on the treatment of prisoners of war which 
excludes torture. The chapter goes further to argue against the defendants of torture 
by pointing out the major philosophical problem with torture. The problem is not that 
torture is painful or aversive rather that it negates rationality or that it is intellectually 
absurd. The negation of rationality amounts to the negation of morality and the 
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negation of morality is nothing but a scorn or disdain on the dignity of the human 


























                                          GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 Most writers believe the saying “one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” 
relativizes the whole issue of terrorism, and by extension, the war on terror and thus 
should be dismissed outright. However, the outright dismissal of the saying or 
discourse emanating from it will render the imputation of guilt in acts of group-
violence a matter of historical recrimination.  Firstly, I assert that the saying “one 
man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” cannot be dismissed by a sleight of the 
hand, even going by historical facts. However, the freedom fighter’s discourse must 
be subjected to the demands of jus ad bellum principles to ascertain if the use of 
violence by a group seeking freedom can be justified in the terms of Just War 
Theory. 
A review of such principles of jus ad bellum shows that nothing in them disqualifies 
organized groups seeking freedom from an unjust government from making use of 
violence. However, there is always the tendency of opportunism masking under the 
principle of just cause and we must be aware of such opportunism. 
 
 Any definition of terrorism to be practically relevant must then bear in mind the 
specific claims of a group of people—freedom fighters; claims that may amount to 
equality in the distribution of burdens and benefits of citizenship. Different 
definitions of terrorism seem to circle around the issue of politics and non-combatant 
immunity to impute guilt on the so-called terrorists. The terrorists are seen as people 
who kill non-combatants for political aims, i.e., aims that tend to the common good 
of a people in a specific geography. However this conception is erroneous not 
withstanding that the so-called terrorists vehemently deny targeting non-combatants, 
but it renders problematic any attempt to identify a government or political 
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institution with terrorism. This is so given the fact that politics by its nature is 
inherently progressive while terrorism is generally conceived as destructive and 
retrogressive. 
 
Therefore, if the conception of terrorism solely as political acts is accepted as the 
norm, state and state-sponsored terrorism will logically disappear from the whole 
discourse of terrorism, and genuine freedom fighters, who seek avenues for self-
determination, will be dismissed as relativists.  We then run the risk of abandoning 
the moral demand of democracy and social equality, and of ossifying nation-states or 
turning them into a fetish that must be maintained at any cost. I argue then that the 
freedom fighter’s discourse is valid to the extent that it contains moral demands 
which, when taken into consideration, can unmask the issue of state and state-
sponsored terrorism.  
 
 It is also this practical issue of state and state-sponsored terrorism that turns the 
President Bush inaugurated war on terror a case study for moral and philosophical 
evaluation. This is to say that the violent acts that are part of the whole idea of the 
war on terror can be praised or condemned based on moral principles and rules that 
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